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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

VOX ET SILENTIUM DEI: A SOCIO-COGNITIVE LINGUISTIC THEORY OF
RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE

Contemporary research in the study of language and cognition frequently characterizes
religious metaphors as either monoliths of experience or stable synchronic structures, if not
both. In addition, by virtue of how the foundational theory of this paper, Conceptual
Metaphor Theory, has been situated in the literature, pre-modern theist writing on
figurative language has been largely ignored. This has resulted in a general application of
Conceptual Metaphor Theory to religious language which characterizes religious
experience as phenomenologically invalid with the contingent effect of contradicting the
basic experiential nature of metaphor. Here, I account for these principal theoretical
discrepancies through an exploration of the qualities and varieties of religious metaphor,
culminating in a proposed amendment to Conceptual Metaphor Theory. In the latter portion
of my thesis, I apply the amended theory to the journal of the American missionary John
Allen Chau to demonstrate its theoretical efficacy in relation to an analysis of sovereignty
metaphors within Chau’s evangelical ideology.
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Preface

Two well-assorted travellers use
The highway, Eros and the Muse.
From the twins is nothing hidden,
To the pair is naught forbidden;
Hand in hand the comrades go
Every nook of nature through;
Each for other they were born,
Each can other best adorn;
They know one only mortal grief
Past all balsam or relief,
When, by false companions crossed,
The pilgrims have each other lost.
– R. W. Emerson
“Love and Thought”

As one may have discerned from reading the present work in part and then returning here
for an explanation, this project may be classified, as such usually are, as interdisciplinary
or multidisciplinary. I resent this; and I feel the need to settle the issue here, at the forefront
of my unified linguistic theory of religious violence. As regards the current task with which
I – and perhaps we – are involved, I am conspicuously reminded of Tolstoy’s description
of his own work, War and Peace:
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What is War and Peace? It is not a novel, still less an epic poem,
still less a historical chronicle. War and Peace is what the author
wanted and was able to express, in the form in which it is
expressed.
I still hope to avoid producing a text on the model of which Henry James once asked, “What
do such large loose baggy monsters, with their queer elements of the accidental and the
arbitrary, artistically mean”. However, I will not compromise on what must be
accomplished: a holistic account of religious cognition, metaphor, experience, violence,
and faith in the midst of adversity. In this sense, I fully resent the terms interdisciplinary
and multidisciplinary. The present work is a work of linguistics – yes, first and foremost –
yet it is not moving across from linguistics to something other but rather expanding from
it to encompass the sum total of that which is required. It is holistic. All-encompassing:
though not to the point of excess. In that regard, this thesis is sufficient for accomplishing
what needs to be accomplished, for expressing “what the author wanted and was able to
express, in the form in which it is expressed.” I do not know whether to beg the reader’s
indulgence or forgiveness, then; yet, it is necessary, nevertheless (especially as it concerns
the many overlooked typos which I am sure exist throughout). Summarily, and somewhat
selfishly, this work is intended to be a safeguard against my own mortality, such as it is,
and therefore, the present work strives toward a unified (linguistic) theory of religious
metaphor and violence, fundamentally. I may be accused of grandiosity in such an
endeavor – which is good, because it is – but I nevertheless hope that this work may be of
some use – though, to whom it will be of use I am uncertain. Yet, persist I – we – must.
Thus, we have arrived back at our point of departure, the holistic enterprise: linguistic
viii

holisticism, if I may. As such, let us continue on in earnest. It is also in this nebulous
context of contradiction, namely the pursuit of largely unknowable truths at the expense of
self-reflection, that one can observe a microcosm of growing existential panic in the field.

I must admit, surely, that I do not feel fit to carry out such a Herculean task as I have set
forth for myself here. By this I do not mean the simple analysis of sermons, to be curated
in the academic halls of self-aggrandizing, intellectual exercises. I do not intend in this
paper to present the culmination of single-minded studies nor the self-appointed import of
the lone scholar, searching for truth only to imprison it in the written word. No; here, I
hope to capture the essence of a life lived in but the smallest portion of these ages’ long
iniquities. Though, I must further caution, the reader should not presume to read this text
as an autobiography, at least not prototypically. This work is what it needs to be: an
exploration, exaltation, and condemnation of humanity in toto; an autobiography of the
everlasting spirit of humanity as springs forth both from myself and others, both at once
virtuous and vengeful, and somehow neither as well. Perhaps that is what I have set out for
myself here: a catalog of human nature, bearing witness to humanity in all its terrifying
contradiction. Though, such a work could encompass all the sciences and humanities.

Regarding the task at hand, I remember some years ago now in the Fall of 2016 that, while
presenting at the Third Annual University of Georgia Linguistics Conference, I commented
on the breadth of my research in response to the polite inquiry of some professor or another:
“By understanding religious violence, I want to find a way to end religious violence.” This,
as might be expected, elicited a fair amount of incredulous laughter. After such, I have
ix

hence defined the goal of my work as mitigating religious violence, rather than outright
ending it, and I wonder if that is the right course of action. Surely, the mitigation of
religious violence, the goal by which my present work is motivated, is but a stepping-stone
on the path to ending religious violence, no matter how impossible such a dream might
appear to be. Yet, I wonder if such a compromise is possible. I fear what such a compromise
might portend for later years. In our day and age, is peace truly so unreachable, so
incommensurable with human nature that even the ideal of its pursuit must be tossed aside
in favor of some loathsome half-peace, some prolonged cruelty against the very spirit of
such ideals, a state in which one lives in incessant fearful vigilance against a presumed
inhumanity?

Yet, growing up as a queer kid in rural Tennessee, I am all too familiar with the
contradictory cruelty of an all-loving God – the Baptist’s God – my familial deity. I am all
too familiar with how the Father may reject the Son without altering his parentage, without
necessitating an abdication of filial piety. I must solemnly affirm that I am the queer child
of the Baptists’ God, the God of the cleansing, muddy waters which flow through the hills
of my home, that the perdition of knowledge unknown to Adam has marked me, that this
queer metaphysic has bound me to a pillaged inheritance. I have felt as if the gates of
heaven too early closed, and here I lie, bearing witness to a transient creation denied to me.
My cousin often claimed that blood is thicker than water, but I have become all too familiar
with the limitations of the Baptist family.

x

This is not to say, however, that this self-accounting of religious violence there and
queerness here is wholly without respite. Often hidden, we would pitch tents by the lake
and sing off-key, the stars in curiosity gazing upon our pagan threesome with the supple
earth, of fingers lingering and retreating, as if we were surely Tantalus-cursed and dazed
by the apple’s shameless approach. This is not to say that we did not escape damnation –
or were we exiled? – to the edge of that same creation, witnessing the Blue mosque set
against the sunrise, the spice markets lingering on our lips, hips covered by nothing but our
hands and the ancient songs of a foreign faith. I say again, we did not waste nights on
dreams of redemption as we proselytized to beauty, shedding tears in prayer to a softer
worship; receiving our own sacrament, offering up our souls as we thought each other gods.
Sleeping in open Spanish fields, we did not seek the indulgence of our long absent God,
the damning Father. Our road was carved long ago and will likely last at least a little more:
yet eternity, still, knows nothing of parting and love’s finality. I knew it then as I know it
now, how hands held must soon aside and hide the acolytes to love, that lonely god.

So, I affirm – I am a child of the Baptist’s God, in the full contradictory revelation of such
a heritage, the God of cold-love, that which bears no mercy for those hollowed by His
creation. Terrifying tumult that it is, I am mortalized, here, by the trials of life, forgotten
by all but the scars made in our haste to reconcile with love. Limited, or perhaps unlimited,
by language, the gnashing of teeth, I doubt that these tribulations and exhortations will
capture the true and utterly divine pain that binds us here. I doubt I could ever capture the
worshipped God’s proclivity for violence, called often mercy by the penitent. Yet, I
maintain a belief – a necessary belief in the midst of our story – that we may still find
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forgiveness, not of other’s, not of the Baptist’s God, and not of ourselves, but a forgiveness
which nevertheless precedes peace. We were spotless before the muddy water cleansed us
of our innocence, and guilty only thereafter.

So, here at the beginning – and the end for those who have now returned to my point of
departure from the present work – I ask, is striving for peace and the end of violence in the
name of love not a necessary prerequisite for the task set out here? The present project is
engaged specifically with the analysis of a singular moment in this much broader and
interminable narrative, the exploration of the cognitive and linguistic structures of faith,
but to what end? I fully maintain that no singular work or individual could ever achieve
peace on their own, that this human project must be a project of humanity, for humanity,
and by humanity. All for which I could ever hope is that this work be but a single stone in
the greater foundation of this not-yet-realized ideal, that it might contribute to a better
world and a better society, within which queer and trans children the world over may never
bear witness to pious cruelty. Rather than an exercise in futility, an exercise in valueless,
self-justifying intellectual inquiry, my greatest hope is that here I might even begin to grasp
what it might be like to have lived in such a world and to contribute to the realization of
that Eden, rediscovered.

Tyler Kibbey
Lexington., Kentucky

June 04, 2020
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And then, one Thursday, nearly two thousand years after one man
had been nailed to a tree for saying how great it would be to be nice
to people for a change, a girl sitting on her own in a small café in
Rickmansworth suddenly realized what it was that had been going
wrong all this time, and she finally knew how the world could be
made a good and happy place. This time it was right, it would work,
and no one would have to get nailed to anything.
Sadly, however, before she could get to a phone to tell anyone
about it, a terrible stupid catastrophe occurred, and the idea was lost
forever.
This is not her story.
– Douglas Adams
The Hitch-Hiker’s Guide to the Galaxy
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Introduction:
There is nothing quite so disconcerting as silence: it haunts the halls of eternity like
an unfathomable echo, reverberating. Silence is, of course, the absence of voice, and voice
in turn is the absence of silence. Yet, there remains something in the midst of the two, some
contradiction that as of yet cannot be disentangled from our own experience of the world:
the deafening silence or the word gone unheard. It is perhaps a tension in the air: a
dismemberment of the remembered self in the torment of our own realization. The stillness
which lingers over a shelled city, once full of voices and things attached to voices, now not
as yet a tomb but a quietened eulogy; the ruined structures humming in a tone
undiscernible, in a language as of yet unknown. And where is God in this? It really does
not matter which one – just any-god would do. Where is it that prayers go unanswered? A
blessing is but a curse in the silence; anathema when voiced as well: teardrops, regret, and
the cacophony of a world robbed of peace. In what world are the loving words of a cruel
God the substance of our society – in what world could there be more gods and deities than
miracles, than safe localities – in what world, this world, are we silenced by our own
words?
This is the apparent contradiction of language and religion: the ineffable – beyond
truth and falsehood – so malleable but only so because it is named as such. It conspires
against its creators. The Word of God, they say, forgetting that they themselves put the
commandments on the precipice of what – a tongue? Where is the voice of God in all this,
where is the silence of the soul that might free us from the eternal struggle of death defined
by our own weaponized words. Smiting all discourse of peace, all rhetoric of salvation still
as yet un-reclaimed. We yearn to silence it and to voice it simultaneously – fury, indignity,
1

absurdity, and all the others. We are playing a game of chess against ourselves; and this is
the issue at hand. How does one define language in abstentia, a language unheard and
unvoiced, until it is, both at once? How does one even begin to define such a language –
such a word – that is at the same time violence and tenderness, cruel in its kindness and
merciful in its grotesque proclivities? How does one go about explaining the excuses of the
one who bludgeons the other with a sunflower – that one who saw the sunset but never the
sunrise and thought ending divine?
The ineffable: a word that is not a word, the truth beyond the furthest edges of
language, the linguistic metaphysic of creation: something worth believing in, perhaps,
though it lingers in the mind, unnamed. One does not need to have a name to have a voice,
and one does not need a voice to be silent. The voice and silence of God, of gods, of divinity
– it is enough to crush the world under its weight, each vowel a grain of the universe, each
pause the very sinews of creation, aching. The Voice and Silence of God. Vox et Silentium
Dei. At once the most beautiful lament, a desperate plea to the self for peace and yet still
remaining unmoved – devoicing ourselves so that we may hear each other in the silence.
This is the language of religious violence.
*****
I remember when I was around the age of eleven, I first heard the phrase “Kill them
all; let God sort them out.” Caedite eos. Novit enim Dominus qui sunt eius. This terrified
me: faith above all else. Yet, what troubled me more were the words; I remember thinking
for a long time on the issue of voicing a word – yes or no – and deciding the fate of millions.
I wondered if that is what it would boil down to: a single individual at the end of the world
saying yes and blowing that very world away, destroying that which had necessitated yes
2

but also allowed for no. And who would hear it? Or perhaps the last of us, alone at the
brink of creation, managing to weakly utter an existential refusal to be absent: no. Would
it have mattered if they had said yes – would it have meant anything? I wondered: would
God hear it? And of God, the naming of that which it is, like changing clothes to match the
season: casting it off in the summer only to cling to it in the winter. I have heard it often
called the “religious turn” – the eventual homecoming of those who study the violence of
God through Their creation; a contradiction it must be: how can the reproach of violence,
violence done in the hope of redemption – how can it be that this is what inspires faith?
We try to speak over ourselves, and in so doing, silence each other.
Now, I am set about the work of understanding and linguistically describing
religious violence. I do not, however, have the leisure of shuffling my assorted specimens
into their respective phylum, and genus, and species. Like the lepidopterist, I swing with a
wide net to catch a butterfly that cannot be seen or heard, neither discerned nor detected,
but is nevertheless sensed, because one says it is sensed; it is unerringly false, terrible.
Borges describes it the best in “The Library of Babel,” his exploration of orthographical
symbolism and meaning:
In the vast Library there are no two identical books … in other
words, all that is given to express, in all languages. Everything: the
minutely detailed history of the future, the archangels’
autobiographies, the faithful catalogue of the Library, thousands and
thousands of false catalogues, the demonstration of the fallacy of the
true catalogue, the Gnostic gospel of Basilides, the commentary on
that gospel, the commentary on the commentary on that gospel, the
3

true story of your death, the translation of every book in all
languages, the interpolations of every book in all books.
This depiction of a world made of letters and, in their infinitude all, truth and falsehood
simultaneously – this depiction cuts close to the truth. However, Borges’ Library does not
have blank books. There is no silence in his exultation of linguistic infinity; the true
contradiction is left un-whole.
So, what is the point of studying something that cannot be understood in the hopes
of explaining that which goes against all reason? Well it is important, that is why. But why?
Take for example a room – not a room but a cube, hollowed, as it has no doors or exits and
cannot therefore be a room – take that room and put two men in it – and they are usually
men, are they not – and give them each a gun with a bullet. Things may take their natural
course: though, us not being there and all, and having not been made acquainted with these
men and discerned their temperaments, it would be difficult to predict what the natural
course would actually be. There is a balance. Now take another room, same as before, with
two men – which makes four more men than any one person needs – and give one man a
gun and a bullet, of the same type and fashion. Now one man has a gun, and the other does
not. Now give that second man – the gunless one – give that man a god. It is beautiful and
terrible: one at peace in all and the other at the mercy of mercy, cruel or kind on the whims
of a seemingly random order of events. In such a room with such a man, one soon discovers
that you cannot shoot a god.
But people are not in the usual habit of shooting gods, at least to my knowledge.
People are usually in the habit of shooting people: in fact, it increasingly seems less a bad
habit and increasingly more a hobby made of violent distractions: distracting us from what
4

– our other lesser violences. It is this that is our concern, the habit and the inhabited: space,
time, affect, history, a memory, all? The self-constitutive dichotomy of the Vox Dei and
the Silentium Dei, here briefly defined. One cannot approach any issue resulting from
religion, in any capacity, by denying religion a voice. Likewise, one cannot approach the
nature of religion, in any capacity, by silencing its expression. Either one alone fails to
address the most pressing issues of our historical moment, though a moment repeated ad
infinitum et aeternum throughout the chambers of our begrudgingly lived Library of Babel.
However, when paired together, the voice and silence of God converges, endlessly: like an
echo which has reverberated for so long in such a great expanse that we have forgotten
what was said or where it came from and can scarcely hear it without shouting. By Vox
Dei, I am referring to that which creates, understands, and destroys divinity – the silent
voice; by Silentium Dei, I mean the expression of the voice of God – the spoken silence:
acts of mercy and of violence; and therein by Vox Dei, I refer to that which creates,
understands, and destroys the Silentium Dei – the silent voice that speaks silence; and on
and on, until it is no longer known if one can have voice without silence or silence without
voice, only that silence voices silence and voice silences voice. This is simply the nature
of things.
*****
This thesis is an attempt at accounting for the Vox et Silentium Dei through a unified
linguistic theory of religious violence. As mentioned earlier, one cannot account for
religion, accurately, in any manner, without accounting for both the Vox Dei and the
Silentium Dei. Over the course of the last century, such accounts have been attempted in
various disciplines: William James’ Edinburgh Lectures, On the Varieties of Religious
5

Experience, at the turn of the twentieth century; René Girard’s formulation of Mimetic
Desire in Violence and the Sacred; and more recently with those enterprising individuals
seeking to develop a Cognitive Science of Religion, producing numerous, deep-searching
works. This is not withstanding the many writers – Augustine, Ibn Tufayl, PseudoDionysius, Kierkegaard, Keach – who have touched upon the Vox et Silentium Dei in the
pre-modern era of inquiry into religious violence and language. As so many of the subjects
studied in the later portions of this work make reference to it, let us first turn to the Bible
for a brief exploration of the Vox et Silentium Dei.
In the beginning of Genesis, in chapter one, God does about as much speaking as
he does creating: “God said, Let there be light: and there was light.” This God goes on to
name the Day, the Night, the Heaven, the Earth, and the Sea. This may not be a problem
for those of us who do not believe in – do not experience – the Bible, but for those of us
who do, this can be very troubling if thought about for too long. As such, one person who
was deeply confused by this passage is St. Augustine of Hippo, and of course, it was the
Vox et Silentium Dei which was at issue:
In all holy books, however, one ought to note what eternal realities
are there suggested, what deeds are recounted, what future events
foretold, what actions commanded or advised. So then, in accounts
of things done, what one asks is whether they are all to be taken as
only having a figurative meaning, or whether they are to be asserted
and defended as a faithful account of what actually happened. No
Christian, I mean, will have the nerve to say that they should not be
taken in a figurative sense.
6

These echoes of a long since uttered voice caused Augustine enough consternation that he
wrote quite extensively on the subject: one such work, of interest to us here, being his On
Genesis: A Refutation of the Manichees. He knew God to be eternal and unchanging, and
he knew the order of creation: heaven, earth, light, day, night, firmament, sun, moon, stars,
beasts, and finally man. He knew this as it had been stated clearly: “God said, Let there be
light: and there was light.” Yet, if God had not yet created anything, where did the voice
come from:
When scripture states, God said, Let it be made, we should
understand an incorporeal utterance of God in the substance of his
co-eternal Word, calling back to himself the imperfection of
creation, so that it should not be formless, but should be formed,
each element on the particular lines which follow in due order.
The incorporeal utterance calls back the imperfection of creation: the silent voice of God,
that which voices silence. This seemed a reasonable solution to Augustine, as he moved
forward in his writing to consider such things as the initial function of the sun and the
ordering of the evening and the morning in the first days of creation. God had gone on to
say lots of things, and Augustine was eager to listen through the written word. Yet, a second
voice appears here. In Genesis 2:19-20, that which was made in the image of God spoke:
19

And out of the ground Lord God formed every beast of the field,

and every fowl of the air; and brought them unto Adam to see what
he would call them; and whatsoever Adam called every living
creature, that was the name thereof. 20And Adam gave the names to

7

all cattle, and to the fowl of the air, and to every beast of the field;
but for Adam there was not found an help meet for him.
Two voices appear in two chapters: one being the voice of God, the Vox Dei, and the second
being the echo of the voice of God, that which can only be heard in silence, the Silentium
Dei, the voice of creation; and perhaps more terribly, God listened – for a single moment,
God was silent, and for a being such as God is, a moment can be eternity. However, this
voice of divinity does not itself come from divinity: it comes from silence. Likewise, the
silence of divinity does not itself, again, come from divinity: it comes from voice. Adam
could not have named if there were not already the absence of names. There could not have
been an absence of names if there were not already someone to name those very absences.
So here, we see a complete and total breakdown of Saussure’s signifier and signified: that
which is named is so named because it demands it and in demanding is silenced by being
named; but I will talk at greater length about this at the relevant time, in Book II.
Yet the Vox Dei is not a simple matter of exegesis: it is central to the entirety of
religion. For example, in 897 AD, Pope Stephen V (VI) ordered for the body of his
predecessor, Pope Formosus, to be exhumed, and thus began the Cadaver Synod (Moore
2012; 2016). There, the deceased pope was “dressed in papal regalia, and propped up on a
throne … [and] a deacon was appointed to answer on behalf of Formosus” (1). As the trial
concluded, Pope Formosus was convicted of various ecclesiastical crimes, was further
mutilated, and summarily tossed in the Tiber. Moore places this trail within a wider
collapse of power in the late ninth century, upon the slow dissolution of the Carolingian
dynasty, stating that “violence has the power to undermine the symbolic value of language
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and law, unless other forces come to the rescue” (6). He further quotes the Council of
Mainz in 888, which paints a grim view of that century:
Bishops and priests and other men of the ecclesiastical order are
maimed by the sword and handed over to death with various kinds
of pain. Every age and both sexes are consumed by various kinds of
death by sword and fire.1
A cacophony of Voces Dei vying for dominance over each other, with the resulting
Silentium Dei of ritual violence against the corpse of Pope Formosus: with the Voces Dei,
in their own turn, resulting from the Silentium Dei of the political landscape which was
devolving into prolonged crisis. As we can see, Pope Stephen V (VI) attempts to
reconstruct the Vox Dei amidst the turmoil of the Carolingian dynasty’s collapse, the
Silentium Dei. In so doing, the Vox Dei of the time before the Silentium Dei, spoken from
the silent mouth of a dead pope by assistance of a deacon, is deconstructed into that very
Silentium Dei resisted by Pope Stephen V (VI), who then attempts to reconstruct the Vox
Dei. This would prove for naught as he was soon imprisoned and strangled by a Roman
mob, “a cloud of de-sacralization [descending] on Rome and the papacy” (2016: 4). Thus,
this new Vox Dei was cut off mid-speech, and the Silentium Dei appeared once more.
Now consider, before Augustine and Pope Formosus, at the very dawn of
Christianity, Pliny the Younger bore witness to the eruption of Vesuvius, which hid the

1

Council of Mainz (888), in: Sacorum councilorum nova et amplissima collection, ed. J.D. Mansi,

(Paris, 1901-1927, repr. Graz, 1960-1961) Vol. 17a, pp.61-74, quoting p.62. Quoted in Moore
(2012).
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cities of Pompeii and Herculaneum from the world. Writing to his friend Tacitus, the
historian, he describes his experience of the eruption from his vantage point in the
neighboring city of Misenum, though some decades after the fact:
You could hear women moaning, children howling, and men
shouting; they were crying out, some seeking parents, others
children, and others wives, or recognizing them by the sound of their
voices. Some were lamenting. Some were lamenting their own
misfortune, others that of their families. A few in their fear of death
were praying for death. Many were raising their hands to implore
the gods, but more took the view that no gods now existed anywhere,
and that this was an eternal and final darkness hanging over the
world. (2009: 149)
So many voices and yet only one echoes through the ages: not moaning, howling, or
shouting, but instead prosaically propounding the Silentium Dei; the faithful raising their
voices to the god-filled sky and hearing only silence, that eternal and final darkness.
Stepping back for a moment, observing this moment as if it were suspended in epistolic
amber, let us determine where the Voice of God originates and when the Silence of God is
produced. At first, there is fear: lamenting and wailing, the Silence of God is conjured – it
is pseudo-linguistic in nature – it has a formless meaning; from this Silentium Dei, there
arises one voice, creating gods to implore, and another, creating gods to deny. Both are
nonetheless bound together in manner of the Vox Dei, produced from the Silentium Dei and
represented as divergent responses to it, many Voces Dei. Yet the world moves on, no one
can bear the silence, and so they name it silence; and they fear it because it is named: A few
10

in their fear of death were praying for death. Speaking upon themselves that same silence
from which they are trying to escape – not the silence of death: they feared that which they
had named as death, and in that moment, Pliny named it something else: eternal and final
darkness.
When reading Pliny’s description of Mt. Vesuvius’ eruption, I am further reminded
of another moment, preserved in another kind of amber, a Silentium Dei so loud it could
shatter glass as it breaks the heart. Elie Wiesel recalls another darkness which consumed
his first night at Auschwitz:
Never shall I forget that night, the first night in camp, that turned my
life into one long night seven times sealed. Never shall I forget that
smoke. Never shall I forget the small faces of the children whose
bodies I saw transformed into smoke under a silent sky. Never shall
I forget those flames that consumed my faith forever. Never shall I
forget the nocturnal silence that deprived me for all eternity of the
desire to live. Never shall I forget those moments that murdered my
God and my soul and turned dreams to ashes. Never shall I forget
those things, even were I condemned to live as long as God Himself.
Never. (Elie Wiesel Night: 3.68-75)
Even though I first read this passage years ago, it has haunted me. The pain, the silence, a
ringing in the ears. Where did this voice come from that commanded such a terrible silence:
one silent enough to kill God, one violent enough to create an eternity. Here, we see the
Vox Dei deconstructed once more into an absence, a singular experience, both individual
and shared: the Silentium Dei. In the midst of this silence, Elie Wiesel re-negotiates his
11

relationship with God, the Vox Dei. That is, violence kills God, destroys God, deconstructs
God, and from that dissolution of divinity, violence births, creates, and reconstructs God –
perhaps many from one or one from many, perhaps vengeful from kind or merciful from
wrathful, perhaps a nothingness of being, but God is recreated amidst the violence,
nevertheless.
*****
So again, after this series of vignettes, we arrive back at the question: what is the
Vox et Silentium Dei. Let us start again with the definitions: the Vox Dei is composed of
the language, thoughts, ideas, symbols, and meanings which arise from one’s experience
of the religious object – the ineffable – through an initial instance of violence, either an
action or event; the Silentium Dei is composed of the experience, faith, action, and
consequences which arise, again, from an initial instance of violence, either an action or
event. Here, instances of violence demonstrate an intermediary role in both reconstructing
and deconstructing the ineffable: reconstructing the individual and/or group experience of
violence into either one Vox Dei or many Voces Dei; or deconstructing the individual
and/or group experience into a single Silentium Dei. In Genesis, as in many religious
traditions, we may observe the origination of that Voice rising from a Silence, and
humanity, by responding, abdicated power to that Silence by having named it, by having
addressed it as such. At the Cadaver Synod, we observe the frantic struggle to find a Voice
amidst the Silence, various individuals trying to reclaim a lost Voice while others try to
assume their own. The Silence nevertheless prevails as the many Voices speak over each
other so that none may hear – the spoken silence. With Pliny the Younger at Misenum, the
Silence originates beyond the human, in nature, and in the chaotic aftermath of disaster, in
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that Silence, many Voices can be heard: the Voice of faith and the Voice of disbelief, gods
being created and killed simultaneously in the shared experience of violence. Some even
name the Silence – death – and in so doing give it Voice, and they pray for it. At Auschwitz,
Elie Wiesel captures the moment in which he and the other victims of genocide, that
horrifying violence, were enveloped by the Silence which killed God. Yet God re-emerges
nevertheless: Wiesel retains the name, but does the name still belong to the same God –
has God not changed in its most fundamental essence. This is the true contradiction that is
of principal concern to the present work.
In this work, I argue that religion is fundamentally social, cognitive, and linguistic
all at once, and that the various domains are all bound together by instances of violence.
Drawing from various disciplines – philosophy, theology, linguistics, phenomenology,
cognitive science, and many others – I advance a unified linguistic theory of religious
violence through the basic argument that religion is a socio-cognitive linguistic process by
which religious objects are continually deconstructed and reconstructed through instances
of violence. In that the religious objects are conceptualizations of an ineffable concept,
which itself possess unique and contradictory processes, I further argue that cognitive
linguistic processes allow for, structure, and enable this self-maintained system of religion
through the constant interpretation and re-interpretation of violence. As a part of this
argument, I attest that religion is both essentially a productive and producer of violence;
that it exists only in the violent world of violent humans who only wish to understand why
there is violence. This continual process of de-conceptualizing (or deconstructing) and reconceptualizing (or reconstructing) the ineffable is therefore a basic linguistic process
which occurs as a by-product of universal cognitive processes originating in the shared
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social context of violent institutions and a violent universe. This is why I am arguing, first
and foremost, for a unified linguistic theory of religious violence and not religion, as I
argue that violence is the basic constituting element of religion broadly.
Chapter 1: Conceptual Metaphor and Religion, There and Back Again
1.1: Conceptual Metaphor Theory: An Overview
Literature on the type of language and language usage that the word metaphor has
referred to over the years constitutes an expansive intellectual field, spanning from rhetoric
to cognitive science. The term metaphor here assumes its operational usage from a
comparatively new school of thought which asserts that metaphor is both ubiquitous in our
daily lives and a means of structuring complex thought in terms of more concrete concepts
rooted in our lived experiences. This usage, as well as Conceptual Metaphor Theory itself
, takes as its principal point of origin a 1979 paper by George Lakoff entitled “The
Contemporary Theory of Metaphor” which was published alongside numerous others in
the edited collection Metaphor and Thought, which had itself originated from a 1977
multidisciplinary conference on metaphor held at the University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign (1993). Such seemingly extraneous information is worth mentioning here as
this paper and its core theoretical claims quite quickly became a dominating – if the not the
dominant – theory in the field of metaphor studies2. This preceded a rapid multi-

2

Gibbs (2011) states rather summarily that “since 1980, there has been an avalanche of studies

from numerous academic disciplines that have been motivated by [Conceptual Metaphor Theory],
enough so that this perspective currently represents the dominant theoretical framework in the
academic study of metaphor” (p.530).
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disciplinary adoption of Conceptual Metaphor Theory, as it was successively known, as a
framework for analyzing the ways in which individuals understand, create, and interact
with abstract concepts (Gibbs 2019). However, Conceptual Metaphor Theory, fully if not
finally realized in Lakoff and Johnson’s 1980 work Metaphors We Live By, also
represented a dramatic, paradigmatic shift in the field. In Kuhn’s epistemological
exploration of scientific revolutions3, he describes newly emerged scientific traditions as
“not only incompatible but often actually incommensurable with that which has gone
before” (1970, p.103) which holds especially true for Conceptual Metaphor Theory and its
relationship to both modern and pre-modern writing on metaphor. Despite being both
widely lauded and criticized, the 1980 publication of Metaphors We Live By, as the
originating point of Conceptual Metaphor Theory in its current form, demarcated premodern traditions from “contemporary” ones and largely determined was included in the
new canon of metaphor studies. Thus, this review starts not in the distant past or with the
first historical treatise on metaphor but rather at the epicenter of the literature on the type
of language and language usage that the word metaphor now refers to.
Centrally, now, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) argued initially for a series of
hypotheses that could define conceptual metaphor. First and foremost, they argued that
metaphor is common to the expressions of everyday life and is not simply rhetorical
ornamentation. They further characterized metaphor as ‘systematic’ in that conceptual
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Gibbs (2019, p.67) claims that “[Conceptual Metaphor Theory] has been a leading force in what

some refer to as the ‘second revolution’ in cognitive science,” although he does little in the way of
informing the reader who some refers to.
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metaphors create relationships between concepts in a productive process by which gestalt
structures are formed; and to aid in the description of these conceptual systems, they
introduced the syllogistic framework

X IS Y

where a target domain (X) is understood, or

structured, in terms of a source domain (Y). Regarding additional subsidiary hypotheses,
conceptual metaphors are diachronic, as they exist and develop over time4; conceptual
mapping occurs unidirectionally from a concrete source domain to an abstract target
domain; and source domains may retain their basic ontological properties as imageschematic material (e.g. the person-like properties that are frequently mapped onto
inanimate objects in children’s movies). Finally, Lakoff and Johnson argued that metaphors
have a necessary explanatory function which grounds abstract concepts in an embodied
reality, that metaphorical expressions create metaphoric truths that are irreducible to literal
language without a loss in meaning, and that metaphor only partially describes the abstract
target domain by either foregrounding or backgrounding features of the source domain that

4

The terminology for how common a metaphor is, or whether its metaphorical content is

understood, includes conventional metaphors, which may occur subconsciously; novel metaphors,
which are intentional and generally original instances of figurative language, such as in poetry; and
dead metaphors, which are historical metaphors that have long since disappeared from our lived
conceptual systems – the example par excellence being the word pedigree which is derived from
the French phrase pied de grue meaning ‘foot of a crane,’ as a crane’s foot resembles the diverging
lines of pedigrees (Lakoff and Turner, 1989, p.129). These three categories, being derived from
some level of either conventionality or novelty, are highly contentious in the literature, and I discuss
them more thoroughly later in this sub-section when I overview Deliberate Metaphor Theory. For
now, I provide their definitions here for the sake of expediency.
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are relevant to the target domain. Taken together, these hypotheses are the central
arguments of Conceptual Metaphor Theory at the beginning of the 1980s and summarily
constitute a stark departure from comparison-based theories of metaphor, both
ontologically and epistemologically.
Early evidence in support of Conceptual Metaphor Theory largely came from the
analysis and description of conventional metaphors in many disparate languages (Feld,
1981; Gibbs, 2011, 2019; Goldwasser 2005; Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 1999). Recent studies
have also included analyses of metaphors in wine reviews (Creed, 2016), in post-9/11 news
articles (Snellen, 2006), in immigration discourse (Hart, 2010), and in Egyptian
hieroglyphic writing (Goldwasser, 2005) to name but a few areas of inquiry. However,
despite this ‘avalanche’ of research in a wide range of fields and subject areas, whether or
not these studies fully support all of Conceptual Metaphor Theory’s central arguments
remains tenuous (Gibbs 2011, 2019; Steen 2008; 2017). Conceptual Metaphor Theory has
also been criticized for mischaracterizing pre-modern thought on metaphor and figurative
language generally (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Soskice, 1985; Wood, 2015, 2017).
Regarding an even more fundamental point of contention, many scholars have criticized
Conceptual Metaphor Theory for lacking any operationalized criteria by which to identify
metaphor empirically and have developed a range of identification procedures based in
adjacent theoretical approaches (Burgers et al., 2016; Burgers, van Mulken & Schellens,
2011; Steen et al., 2010). Charteris-Black, among others, argued as well that Conceptual
Metaphor Theory is too reductive and ignores important contextual and ideological factors
(Charter-Black, 2004; Kövecses, 2009, 2015). Yet, these criticisms do not necessarily
detract from Conceptual Metaphor Theory’s utility in identifying and understanding
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diverse conceptual systems in the cultures of the world as they are expressed linguistically.
Of interest here, specifically, are three areas of criticism partially described above:
modelling metaphoric processes, determining conventionality, and identifying metaphors
(and instances of figurative language, generally) in language.
Regarding issues of modelling conceptual processes, the predominant pre-modern
method were similarity comparisons of the grammatical form “A is (like) B,” typified by
Black’s (1954; 1993) interactionist approach to figurative language5. This was primarily a
holdover from more rhetoric-based approaches, though Black took it a step further to
emphasize the role of grammatical form over conceptual systematicity6. For example:
1) A man is (like) a dog.

5

For a more thorough critique of Black’s interactionist account of metaphor, see Soskice (1985,

pp.38-51, pp.58-61).
6

Thus, metaphor was strongly delineated, or even quarantined, from the other tropes such as simile

and analogy. The idea behind this was that metaphor represents a special case of figurative language
because it is not explicitly expressed within the sentence through any identifiable grammatical
form. Hence, Black’s “interactionist” theory defines metaphoric processes as the logical
equivocation of overlapping systems. Though much closer to a cognition-focused account of
metaphor, his arguments retain a basis in “comparative” rhetorical theories, rooted, though
contentiously, in Aristotle’s definition of metaphor in Poetics (2005) and Rhetoric (2004). Sadly,
Black’s writings on metaphor have almost entirely been excluded from contemporary discussion
despite being an influential scholar during the period of Conceptual Metaphor Theory’s early
development. The reader will find this brief review of his work helpful, however, during the
discussion of pre-modern and classical rhetoric-based theories of metaphor.
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2) A home is (like) a safe harbor.
3) A plane is (like) a bird.
Thus, theories of metaphor based in comparison could explain what concepts were
“interacting” with each other but had difficulty explaining the emergence of composite
concepts or the conceptual foundations of more conventional and idiomatic expressions
(Gibbs 2019; Soskice 1985). In this regard, Conceptual Metaphor Theory was particularly
innovative with the syllogistic notational system

X IS Y

in that it largely ignored the

grammatical form in favor of higher-level abstract processes: Consider, for example,
instances of the conceptual metaphor A RELATIONSHIP IS A JOURNEY:
4) Our relationship has gone off the rails.
5) I think it’s time we went our separate ways.
6) Their marriage has weathered numerous storms over the years.
7) I can’t believe KurtxBlaine is canon! My favorite ship has set sail.
In an interactionist account, example (4) would be understood as an interaction between
‘relationships’ and ‘trains,’ (5) between ‘relationships’ and ‘journeys,’ and (6-7) between
‘relationships’ and ‘ships.’ In Conceptual Metaphor Theory, examples (4-7) are understood
as instances of a primary, conventionalized conceptual systems in which people’s
relationships are conceptualized in terms of physical journeys, often relying on an
experiential understanding of transportation and forward movement. Thus, Conceptual
Metaphor Theory demonstrates a more robust explanatory function, even across tropes:
8) Our relationship was like trying to drive blindfolded without a steering wheel.
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9) A good mechanic is constantly performing maintenance on their vehicle. In a
similar way, relationships also require constant maintenance.
As demonstrated in (8) and (9), the conceptual metaphor A RELATIONSHIP IS A JOURNEY is
able to account for the meaning expressed in similes and analogies respectively, which
would be difficult if not impossible from an interactionist perspective.
However, Conceptual Metaphor Theory struggles to model or explain the
emergence of complex, combinatory concepts and their frequently counter-intuitive
mappings, also known as conceptual blends (Fauconnier & Turner, 1998, 2003)7. In
Conceptual Blending Theory, a generic space serves as a template for two input spaces –
what would be referred to as a source and target domain in Conceptual Metaphor Theory.
These input spaces then serve as cognitive frames through which a blended situation space
is created: instead of a unidirectional mapping from a source domain to a target domain,
there is bi-directional mapping between the domains which use the generic space as a
model for selectively projecting image-schemata and ontological properties. Hart (2010,
pp.118-121) offers a particularly compelling example from Enoch Powell’s 1968 ‘Rivers
of Blood’ speech:
10) It is like watching a nation busily engaged in heaping up its own funeral pyre.
Hart’s appraisal of the described this argued, “the metaphor’s inference that the longer
present policy remains unchanged, the further the nation’s situation will deteriorate … the
equivalent of which would be that the higher the funeral pyre is heaped up, the more dead

7

For a more in-depth primer on Conceptual Blending Theory, see Hart (2010, pp. 115-124).
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the deceased” (pp.119-120). Other example might include instances where an individual is
both the agent and the object of some physical action – consider certain instances of TO BE
RESPONSIBLE FOR SOMEONE/SOMETHING IS TO CARRY SOMEONE/SOMETHING:

11) He carried himself across the finish line.
12) She picked herself up by her bootstraps.
In (11) and (12), there is a clear contradiction where the agent is also the person being
carried even though this is contrary to the way in which we experience both carrying things
(i.e. lifting something off the ground) and being carried (i.e. being lifted off the ground).
In Conceptual Blending Theory, this could easily be explained through a cross-domain
mapping between one input space, in which it is possible to be responsible for oneself, and
a second input space, where it is impossible to carry oneself. Here, the conceptual frame,
or logical structure, of the first input space and the image-schematic properties of the
second input space are preserved in a blended situational space. While Conceptual
Metaphor Theory could generally account for the conceptual reasoning which underlies the
metaphor

TO

BE

SOMEONE/SOMETHING,

RESPONSIBLE

FOR

SOMEONE/SOMETHING

IS

TO

CARRY

it would struggle to identify the process through which selective

aspects of each domain are preserved in the linguistic expression itself.8
This theoretical discrepancy is fundamentally derived from the persistent inability
of metaphor scholars to arrive at a consensus on what it means for a metaphor to be

8

Some scholars, though, have argued that Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Conceptual Blending

Theory are compatible if not complementary (Hart, 2010). This is explored more carefully – and
more practically – in Chapter 3.
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conventional, novel, or dead. Starting with the simplest, dead metaphors are generally
agreed to be expressions that are longer identifiable as figurative expressions: such as
pedigree which is derived from the French pied de grue or “crane’s foot.” The terminology
of ‘dead metaphor,’ however, is generally avoided as a rule, as it carries rhetorical
connotations that any metaphorical expression that is not novel (i.e. conventional) is a dead
metaphor (Lakoff, 1987). Therefore, it remains generally absent from modern discourse on
metaphor, and I introduce it here only for the sake of comprehensiveness. Likewise,
novelty enjoys a fair amount of consensus in its definition (Lakoff & Turner, 1989): the
term ‘novel metaphor’ can be differentiated to apply to novel conceptual metaphors at the
abstract level of thought (e.g.

WAR IS A BATTERY);

novel extensions of conventional

metaphors (e.g. In the battle for his heart, I was forced to enter peace negotiations – wherein
the conventional metaphor
domain

WAR

LOVE IS WAR

is extended to include an aspect of the source

that is not commonly realized conceptually or linguistically); and novel

elaborations through specificity or detailed description (e.g. for LOVE IS WAR, one could say
we battled over their affection which is conventional, or one could say we engaged in
trench warfare for the sake of their affection – the latter being more evocative,
communicating a much more nuanced conceptualization). Yet, the criteria for identifying
metaphors as novel – in conception, extension, or elaboration – varies by approach: the
intuitionist approach established by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) relies on the researcher’s
judgement alone9; a constructionist approach would largely rely on a quantitative measure

9

Lakoff (1990) and Lakoff and Johnson (1999) tried to rein in the haphazard intuitionist approach

through any appeal to prototypicality and embodied realism, respectively. As discussed later, these
attempts to formalize metaphor identification did little in the way of improving the empiricality of
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of frequency within a corpus (Goldberg, 2019); and the metaphor identification procedures,
MIP (Pragglejazz, 2007) and MIPVU (Steen et al., 2010), would determine novelty based
on its presence (conventional) or absence (novel) from a reference dictionary or similar
work – to name but a few perspectives. Finally, scholars have engaged in rigorous debate
over the nature of ‘conventionality’ in metaphor studies, especially in the context of
Conceptual Metaphor Theory. Similar to novelty, conventionality is often determined
through appeals to intuition, frequency, presence in a dictionary reference, or documented
diachronicity: however, conventional metaphors enjoy far less security in their definition,
little consensus exists on the exact boundary between novelty and conventionality – or even
what it means for a metaphor to be conventional. For instance, Deliberate Metaphor Theory
(Steen 2008, 2017; Steen et al., 2010) – briefly overviewed in the immediately following
paragraph – would consider conventional ‘metaphors’ as non-metaphorical because they
are subconscious expressions of abstract reasoning (i.e. non-deliberate), whereas
Conceptual Metaphor Theory would consider conventional metaphors to be the bulk of
metaphoric expression (i.e. ubiquitous) in daily usage (Gibbs, 2011, 2019; Kövecses, 2003,
2015; Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff & Turner, 1989; and many others). Given
such feeble operationalization of metaphoricity, the problem of identifying metaphors has
as of yet no satisfactory solution and remains a central point of contention in what Gibbs
(2019) expressively refers to as the ‘Metaphor Wars.’

conceptual metaphor analysis. Gibbs (2011, 2019), approaching Conceptual Metaphor Theory from
a psycholinguistic perspective, has long criticized the theory’s tacit approval of intuitionist analysis
for its “lack of methodological rigor” (2019, p.15).

23

These ‘wars’ – though here we need only focus on one – hinge on the definition of
“conventionality” in relation to metaphor identification as a means of making the field
more empirical. To exemplify the conundrum, using the frequency approach to determining
conventionality, one is able to some degree to distinguish between pervasive and
anomalous usage, but this procedure still cannot, by itself, distinguish the literal from the
metaphorical. One group of scholars took advantage of frequency metrics and corpus
analytic methodologies to determine conventionality while simultaneously outsourcing the
identification of metaphoricity (i.e. whether a word is literal or figurative) to dictionary
references (Pragglejazz, 2007). Deliberate Metaphor Theory took this a step further,
arguing that deliberate usage meant to change the addressee’s perspective was the
determiner of metaphoricity and, in so doing, minimizing the role of the novel versus
conventional dichotomy (Steen, 2008, 2017)10. This line of reasoning can be observed in
the guidelines for the Metaphor Identification Procedure Vrije Universiteit (MIPVU)
(Steen et al., 2011), an offshoot of the earlier Metaphor Identification Procedure (MIP)
(Pragglejazz, 2007), and MIPVU’s numerous bastardizations such as the Verbal Irony
Procedure (VIP) (Burgers, van Mulken & Schellens, 2011), the Hyperbole Identification
Procedure (HIP) (Burgers et al., 2016), and eventually the Deliberate Metaphor
Identification Procedure (DMIP) (Reijnierse, Burgers, Krennmayr, & Steen, 2018).
Despite amassing a modicum of popularity, their theoretical basis is dubious at best.

10

See Gibbs (2019, pp.83-90) for a more scathing critique of Deliberate Metaphor Theory in which

he reduces the theory to a “simplistic, faulty view of the psychology of human language
production” (p.90).
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Overall, despite its shortcomings, Conceptual Metaphor Theory provided a
productive and efficacious foundation for the analysis of figurative language and the
underlying cognitive structures present in abstract thought. It was revolutionary in its
argument that metaphor was a conceptual process that allowed for reasoning through
embodied experiences, focusing on the explanatory value that metaphors have regarding
abstract conceptual domains. Furthermore, its emphasis on the irreducibility of metaphoric
expressions to literal language without a loss of meaning and its observation of conceptual
metaphors’ ubiquity in everyday life represented a turning point in metaphor studies.
However, the ensuing bottleneck in the literature and the (mis)characterization of premodern metaphor traditions resulted, in many ways, in the oversimplification of metaphor
as a category, wherein all conceptual metaphors were understood to behave in a uniform
and predictable manner and in accordance with a well-defined set of rules. The lack of
engagement with these pre-modern traditions, the reasons for their exclusion, and the way
in which they were (mis)characterized constitutes a major epistemological oversight in the
contemporary – and even early – literature on Conceptual Metaphor Theory and
unintentionally proliferates an incredibly bleak view of metaphors found beyond the
confines of “daily life.”
1.2: Metaphor in Classical Philosophy: The Traditional-Contemporary Dichotomy
As already detailed above, the 1980 publication of Lakoff and Johnson’s Metaphors
We Live By was a watershed moment in metaphor studies, and as such, it drew a line
between the new order and the old, the contemporary from the traditional. Early proponents
of the Conceptual Metaphor Theory established their cognitivist account of metaphor as a
response and in opposition to what they referred to as the Traditional View, the creation of
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which they attributed to Aristotle (Kövecses, 2002; Lakoff, 1993; Lakoff & Johnson,
1980). Lakoff and Johnson (1980) summarized it as an intellectual process where:
Within a week we discovered that certain assumptions of contemporary philosophy
and linguistics that have been taken for granted since the Greeks precluded us from
even raising the kind of issues we wanted to address. The problem was not one of
extending or patching up some existing theory of meaning but of revisiting central
assumptions in the Western philosophical tradition. (pp. ix-x)
This also serves to make metaphor the natural occupation of western philosophers,
neglecting other early traditions as described later. At the beginning of the 21st century,
Kövecses (2002) summarizes ‘this traditional concept’ into five characteristics:
First, metaphor is a property of words; it is a linguistic phenomenon … Second,
metaphor is used for some artistic and rhetorical purpose … Third, metaphor is
based on a resemblance between the two entities that are compared and identified
… Fourth, metaphor is a conscious and deliberate use of words … Fifth, it is also
commonly held that metaphor is a figure of speech that we can do without. (pp. viiviii)
These five central characteristics of the Traditional View, as described by Kövecses,
conveniently align with the ‘contemporary’ theory, by this time known by its current
name11. This is representative of the trend in metaphor studies after 1980 to set up Aristotle

11

Wood (2017) does not say so in as many words but insinuates that the Traditional View’s

arguments outlined by Kövecses are presented as such as a matter of argumentative convenience,
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– and sometimes Plato – as a figurehead for the entirety of pre-modern thought on
metaphor, spanning from the 4th century BC to at least the mid-20th century12.
1.2.1: The Greek Philosophers
In the writing of a more diligent metaphor scholar who engaged with both classical
and contemporary scholarship on the topic, Soskice (1985) takes the ‘Classical Accounts

especially in that he “very neatly opposes each of the five features he attributes to the Traditional
View to a corresponding feature that characterizes the Cognitive View” (Wood, 2017, p. 65).
12

Max Black’s (1954) paper likely represents one of the initial shifts in metaphor studies leading

up to the development of Conceptual Metaphor Theory and other more cognitivist approaches. Yet,
he does so – curiously – through an appeal to ‘literary critics’ in the paper’s prescript, quoted here
in its entirety as an example of how metaphor was commonly perceived during the mid-20th
century:
To draw attention to a philosopher's metaphors is to belittle him-like praising a logician for
his beautiful handwriting. Addiction to metaphor is held to be illicit, on the principle that
whereof one can speak only metaphorically, thereof one ought not to speak at all. Yet the
nature of the offence is unclear. I should like to do something to dispel the mystery that
invests the topic; but since philosophers (for all their notorious interest in language) have
so neglected the subject, I must get what help I can from the literary critics. They, at least,
do not accept the commandment, "Thou shalt not commit metaphor", or assume that
metaphor is incompatible with serious thought. (p.2)
It is interesting to note Black also cites only Aristotle in introducing the origin of western thought
on metaphor, to the neglect of Aristotle’s successors or as he later refers to them, “those
innumerable followers … who have supposed metaphors to be replaceable by literal translations”
(1993, p.22).
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of Metaphor’ to include Plato’s dialogue Cratylus, Aristotle’s Poetics and Rhetoric,
Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria, and other tangential works addressing rhetoric generally,
such as Cicero’s De Oratore and Plato’s Phaedrus: all taken together, these works span
roughly 600 years of philosophical thought on metaphor, from Plato in the 5th century BC
to Quintilian in the 1st century AD. Starting with the works of Plato in the 5thc century BC,
the dialogues Phaedrus and Cratylus may be seen as the foundational texts of the tradition
that eventually evolved into Conceptual Metaphor Theory13 and also serve as foundational
texts within the discipline of linguistics as a whole14. The Phaedrus, much more similar to
the kind of early theory of metaphor contentiously detailed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980),
treats metaphor as a linguistic utility in a longer discussion of love, rhetoric, and politics:
And thus, dear Eros, I have made and paid my recantation, as well as I could and
as fairly as I could; the poetical figures I was compelled to use, because Phaedrus
would have them … and if Phaedrus or I myself said anything objectionable in our

13

The Phaedrus and Cratylus would be considered the predecessor to the later Greek tradition of

rhetoric an, in the words of Lakoff and Johnson, “certain assumptions of contemporary philosophy
and linguistics that have been taken for granted since the Greeks” (1980, p. ix).
14

I largely base this assertion on my own pedagogical foundations: specifically, a class on

Diachronic and Synchronic linguistics taught by Dr. Jeff Mellor and Dr. Bethany Dumas during
the Spring semester of 2017. Soskice defends her inclusion of these works, specifically in the debate
on metaphor, through an appeal to a more foundational question related to the philosophy of
language: “one of the earliest-known controversies concerning the nature of language: whether
language is grounded in nature or convention” (1985, p.2).
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first speeches, blame Lysias, who is the father of the brat, and let us have no more
of his progeny. (Plato, trans. 2007, p.118).
The Cratylus, however, is more concerned with etymology and the relationship between
words and the world, often appealing to sound symbolism or unlikely resemblances
between groups of words and concepts. In many cases, words are given etymologies that
are in essence dead, or nearly dead, metaphors – such as in Socrates’ offered etymology
for ‘Zeus’:
[Zeus] has also an excellent meaning, although hard to be understood, because
really like a sentence, which is divided into two parts, for some call him Zena, and
use the one half, and others who use the other half call him Dia … which are one
name, although divided, meaning the God through whom all creatures always have
life.15 (trans. 1937, p.186, emphasis added)

15

In his commentary on Cratylus, Sedley (2003, p. 90-92) elucidates the reasoning behind this

etymology as derivative of the Greek words zēn (‘life’) and dia (‘because of’), thus ‘the God
through whom all creatures always have life.’ Laughably, this proposed etymology touches close
to one offered by Jackson (2017). He argued that Zeus was derive from the Indo-European *di̯ éu̯ (the assumed ‘god of the diurnal sky’) and frequently occurring in the Indo-European theonym
*di̯ ḗu̯ s ph2tḗr, later realized as the Greek vocative Zeû páter. This form had assumed a combined
theonymic form in the Latin Iuppiter, the Roman equivalent of the Greek Zeus. Though there is a
marked difference between ‘sky-father’ and ‘the God through whom all creatures always have life,’
there remains an uncanny parallel. This process of theonymicizing metaphor-based epithets for
deities is discussed more extensively in Chapter 3.
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Both the Phaedrus and Cratylus are primarily concerned with the distinction between the
nature (nomos) and convention (phýsis) of language. They are nevertheless the foundation
of Classical discussions of metaphor. In Aristotle’s Poetics and Rhetoric, a clearer sense
of the function of metaphor and its usage begins to take shape. In Chapter 21 of the Poetics,
Aristotle defines metaphor as “the application of an alien name by transference either from
genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or by analogy, that
is proportion”16 (trans. 2005, p. 61). Wood (2017) argues that, by specifying these genusspecies relationships, Aristotle is principally operating within a vertical theory of metaphor
– focusing on how words related to their real-world referents – rather than a horizontal
theory – which focuses on differentiating senses of a word. Furthermore, in the Rhetoric,
Aristotle echoes Plato in arguing that “metaphor also preeminently involves clarity,
pleasantness, and unfamiliarity …[and] one must also make one’s metaphors appropriate”
(trans. 2004, p.219), focusing on metaphor’s communicative and rhetorical functions rather
than its form. Aristotle reframes the discussion here as a distinguishing poetry and prose,
the latter of which he argues to “have fewer supports than poetry” and states, regarding the
place of metaphor in prose, that “we should take more trouble over them” (p. 219). Soskice
(1985), however, does not understand Aristotle’s definition of metaphor in the Poetics to
constitute an early predecessor of the substitution or resemblance views of metaphor17.

16

The idea of transference is inherent to the basic meaning of the Greek metaphora (‘metaphor’):

from meta (‘trans’) and pherein (‘to carry’). Note, genus means an expression that is general, and
species means an expression that is specific.
17

Soskice (1985) does allude to the frequently quoted lines from the Poetics: “But the greatest thing

by far is to have a command of metaphor. This alone cannot be imparted by another; it is a mark of
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Despite the diligence presented here, this aligns with a more detailed account of the
Traditional View offered by Lakoff and Johnson (1999, pp.122-127) in their re-visitation
of Classical Greek writing on metaphor, though they once again include only “Aristotle,
the father of the traditional theory” in their discussion18.

genius, for to make good metaphors implies an eye for resemblances” (Aristotle, trans. 2005, pp.
69-71, emphasis added). Though Soskice generally provides a more careful appraisal of Aristotle’s
writings in comparison to other modern metaphor scholars, she begins her inquiry with the question
of whether or not “what Aristotle is describing is what the modern analyst would count as metaphor
at all” (p.5). By this line of reasoning and much unlike Wood (2015, 2017), she sequesters Aristotle
with the other classical philosophers, rhetoricians, and grammarians but avoids burdening them
with “questions that were never theirs to ask” (1985, p.7).
18

Lakoff and Johnson (1999, pp. 373-374) also refer briefly to Plato’s philosophical thought but

only as a contrast to Aristotle’s philosophy of metaphysics (pp.373-390). Soskice (1985, p. 9)
reasons that it may not be fair to judge Aristotle’s theory as comparable to work in modern
linguistics because his definition was a practical one designed for an audience of poets and was not
so much concerned with the mechanisms and processes of metaphor in thought or daily life. Wood
(2017) reaches a stronger conclusion, which is worth quoting in full here by virtue of its biting
remarks: “To the extent that Aristotle does not consider thought to have anything to do with the
brain – for him the centre of perceptive and intellectual activity is the heart, the brain being just a
kind of cooling system – we are clearly dealing with two different worldviews altogether, and not
just two theories of metaphor that could be compared as if in a vacuum” (p.87). Lakoff and Johnson
(1999, pp.383-384) do note that the idea of a metaphorical concept would have been completely
unintelligible to Aristotle given a difference in classical and modern philosophy of language; yet,
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1.2.2: The Latin Orators and Grammarians
Soskice (1985) also counts the De Oratore and Institutio Oratoria, works of the
Roman orator Cicero and the grammarian Quintilian respectively, in her appraisal of
classical accounts of metaphor. Cicero’s De Oratore is included largely for his criticism
that ‘wise speaking’ and ‘elegant speaking’ are inherently at odds19, a criticism that enjoyed
widespread popularity among philosophers well into the 20th century. In comparison,
Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria provides a more practical – and favorable – definition of
metaphor as well as other tropes, forging a stable link between Classical Greek thought and
philosophy of rhetoric present in the early Roman Empire. Though much more simplified
than Aristotle’s definition, Quintilian nevertheless provides a robust tropological account
in Chapter 6 of Book 8 (trans. 1978, pp. 103-125) – though mostly expounding Aristotle’s
work for his contemporaries. Similar to Aristotle in the Rhetoric and Cicero in De Oratore,
Institutio Oratoria was primarily aimed and instructing oratory skills; this is most obvious
in his introduction to Chapter 6, which defines tropes in terms of quality: “A trope is a
change that improves upon proper meaning of word or phrases”20 (p. 105)*. Furthermore,

they are not as strongly committed to idea that this disqualifies comparison, going so far as to
expand on the five simplified tenets of the Traditional view offered by Kövecses (2002).
19

In an ironically elegant manner of speech, Cicero fumes rhetorically: “For what so effectually

proclaims the madman as the hollow thundering of words – be they never so choice and resplendent
– which have no thought or knowledge behind them” (trans. 1959, p. 39).
20

My translation from the Latin Tropos est uerbi uel sermonis a propria significatione in aliam

cum uirtute mutatio with reference to Cousin’s 1978 French translation Le trope est un changement
qui améliore la signification propre d’un mot ou d’une locution.
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by introducing the chapter as one on ‘tropes’, Quintilian clarifies implicitly that he is not
offering a theory of figurative language but rather a catalogue of figurative devices to the
exclusion of any discussion on their underlying mechanisms. A similar approach to the
topic can be found in the Rhetorica ad Herennium (trans. 1989, pp.150-174), a work of
unknown authorship contemporary with Quintilian in the 1st century AD. When taken
together, both the Institutio Oratoria and the Rhetorica ad Herennium are responsible for
the continuation of Classical Greek thought through the Roman Empire and into the
European Middle Ages, each retained in the ensuing tradition of rhetoric if not enjoying a
widespread popularity.
All considered, the ‘Traditional View’ of metaphor – being otherwise a collection
of Classical scholarship in rhetoric and the philosophy of language – can admittedly be
called the foundation of Western thought on metaphor. However, contemporary metaphor
studies has failed to adequately account for their contributions in any meaningful, nuanced
fashion, with few exceptions (Soskice, 1985; Wood, 2015, 2017). In delineating the
boundaries of Conceptual Metaphor Theory and by the way in which such was
accomplished, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) reduced the nearly 700 years of scholarship to
the singular figurehead of Aristotle and did so with little regard for even fair review of
Aristotle’s work. Critics of this move notwithstanding, the following uptake of this
reductive Traditional-Contemporary dichotomy was to the detriment of the field by reason
of excluding numerous, divergent scholarly traditions save Aristotle. This willful omission
of pre-modern thought on metaphor is even more drastic in regard to writing on religious
metaphor and with much more immediate, fundamental problems arising from such
omission. These generally theological works – on which I take up a discussion below –
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receive far less than the meager defense with which the Classical authors have been forced
cope. Yet even theological writing on metaphor and figurative language, especially those
of the European Middle Ages, contend with the Classical texts detailed above, which serve
as a foundation for more than just a single ‘contemporary’ theory.
1.3: Pre-Modern Theological Thought on Religious Metaphor and the Ineffable
Shortly before the introduction of Conceptual Metaphor Theory, Shibles (1971), in
his comprehensive reference book and commentary on metaphor, listed the works of four
pre-modern theologians: Augustine of Hippo, the Venerable Bede, Thomas Aquinas, and
Benjamin Keach. Of these four, only Aquinas has been included – though sparingly – in
the literature on Conceptual Metaphor Theory and in that of modern metaphor studies
generally (Soskice, 1985, pp. 64-66). Yet, these pre-modern theologians do not even come
close to being representative of pre-modern metaphor traditions in theology. Early Jewish
discussion of metaphorical language and the language of divinity spans over a millennium
from Philo of Alexandria in the late 1st century BC to Moses Maimonides in 12th century.
Early Christian writing on the subject included, to name but a few, Augustine of Hippo in
the late 4th and early 5th centuries, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite in the early 6th century,
Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century, and Benjamin Keach in the 17th century. Similar
questions regarding the language divine reference were being asked by Muslim
philosophers during the Islamic Golden Age, such as Ibn Tufayl in 12th century Andalusia.
In India, Yogācāra Buddhists had developed an entirely unique tradition of metaphor
studies rooted in Buddhist teachings as early as the 1st century AD. In the words of Gibbs,
pre-modern theological writing on metaphor, though narrowly focused on religious
metaphor, is an avalanche of scholarly thought; yet, it has all but entirely been neglected.
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Keach’s Tropologia, for instance, is entirely absent from the literature after 1980 despite
being the most comprehensive study of metaphor up until the 20th century. The reasoning
behind this exclusion – or worse, scholarly neglect – is complex, likely ranging from simple
oversight to the well-established tendency of the sciences to shy away from anything even
remotely tied to theology. Yet, it is easier to understand why something was excluded by
means of understanding what was excluded, an explanation of latter I undertake in the
remainder of the sub-section.
1.3.1: Philo of Alexandria, Hellenic Judaism
Beginning in the late 1st century BC and into 1st century AD, I include Philo of
Alexandria, also known as Philo Judeas, not because he discusses metaphor explicitly at
any length – or at all – but because of his prodigious use of allegorical interpretation and
his philosophical foundations in late Hellenistic Judaism. Moreover, it is clear that Philo is
no stranger to grappling with the description of divinity and creation, as in this short excerpt
from On the Unchangeableness of God:
[The] principal assertion in the sacred oracles is especially well adapted, that “God
is not as man.” But neither is he as heaven, nor as the world; for these species are
endued with distinctive qualities, and they come under the perception of the
outward senses. But he is not even comprehensible by the intellect, except merely
as to his essence; for his existence, indeed, is a fact which we do comprehend
concerning him, but beyond the fact of his existence, we can understand nothing.
(trans. 2016, p.163)
Even though Philo is not discussing figurative language explicitly, it is implicit to his
discussion of divine reference – that is to say his attempt to explain what can be understood
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about the ineffable. Yet, an assertion of ineffability is equivalent to an assertion of nonliteralness. Philo argues that only the existence of God can be understood and nothing else,
which is to say that God is the abstract concept par excellence. It follows that if one speaks
of the ineffable and one also holds its ineffability to be true, then anything that is spoken
of such must be figurative only21. Much like Conceptual Metaphor theorists, this entails
that language used to refer to – conceptualize – God, as Philo names the ineffable, is
irreducible to literal language ipso facto its preclusion from being literal. This belief in the
ineffability of God, as well as its linguistic entailments, can be further observed in Philo’s
extensive interpretation of individual verses in Allegorical Interpretations I-III; however,
they need not be dwelt on here. It is sufficient to note that Philo of Alexandria remains an
early example of this type of theological engagement with figurative language22.
1.3.2: St. Augustine of Hippo, Early Christianity
Now, continuing forward to the late 4th and early 5th centuries AD, Augustine of
Hippo was one of the first early Christian writers to explicitly contend with religious
language in relation to divinity, though his engagement with ineffability – in like manner
to Philo – was no less pervasive, and furthermore, he possesses one of the most extensive

21

I will expound upon the theoretical merit of this claim in the following chapter, but for now, I

will proceed under the assumption of this linguistic definition of ineffability, as this concept is the
central means by which theologians engage with discussion on metaphor in the context of divine
reference.
22

I will return to a discussion of Philo and religious metaphor in Chapter 3, specifically regarding

his unique application of Pythagorean cosmography to the books of Moses, prototypically
represented in On the Creation (trans. 2016; Voss, 1995).
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body of work within which any pre-modern theologian, with the possible exception of the
17th century writings of Benjamin Keach, explores and applies a (pseudo)theory of
figurative language – whereas, for example, Philo only does so implicitly. Here, I focus on
three of Augustine’s writings, on Genesis in particular, as being representative of his
greater body of work: Book I of On Genesis: A Refutation of the Manichees, which focuses
on the Act of creation and that which preceded it in Genesis Chapter 1:1-5; Book XIII of
Confessions, which focuses on the Creation in Genesis Chapter 1:1-31; and Chapter 27,
Book XV of The City of God, which focuses on the Flood in Genesis 6-9. This close
analysis of Augustine’s engagement with the topic of figurative language in his exegetical
writings on Genesis allows for a nuanced view of an emergent theological tradition on
metaphor largely independent of Aristotle and Quintilian’s accounts.
The narrowest in subject matter of these three works, mentioned briefly in the
preceding chapter, Augustine’s On Genesis: A Refutation of the Manichees is concerned
with the metaphysics of time and the nature of creation by God in Genesis 1:1-523. For
example, Augustine struggles to explain, or even come to terms with, how God could say
anything in Genesis 1:3 when time would not be created until two verses later: “now if time
was already there before light was made, in what time would the voice have been made

23

I provide Genesis 1:1-5 KJV here for convenience: 1In the beginning God created the heaven and

the earth. 2And the earth was without form, and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep.
And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters. 3And God said, Let there be light: and
there was light. 4And God saw the light, that it was good: and God divided the light from the
darkness. 5And God called the light Day, and the darkness he called Night. And the evening and
the morning were the first day.
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with which to utter Let light be made” (trans. 1990, p.174). Additional issues discussed by
Augustine included the nature of the light that existed before the first day – whether it was
spiritual or corporeal – and the time in which the forms of the as of yet formless matter
were created. He also had to solve the problem of Christ’s absence from these first lines of
the Bible at risk of undermining the Trinity, eventually settling on an interpretation of the
“beginning” in the first verse as referring to “the creation created at the start through [God],
and chiefly for the spiritual, and consequently for the totality of creation” (p. 173) or in
other words, the co-eternal Son of God. The metaphysics of the first day aside, Augustine
is unique here as he explicitly states the manner in which he conducts his exegesis:
So then, in accounts of things done [in all the holy books], what one asks is whether
they are all to be taken as only having a figurative meaning, or whether they are
also to be asserted and defended as a faithful account of what actually happened.
No Christian, I mean, will have the nerve to say that they should not be taken in a
figurative sense, if he pays attention to what the apostle says: All these things,
however, happened among them in figure (1 Cor 10:11). (p. 168)
Although this is a strategic move against the Manicheans who frequently assumed a literal
interpretation of scripture in order to more easily argue against Catholic faith, this approach
to figurative language is entirely unlike the Classical philosophers in that Augustine
maintains the truth of the expressions despite their non-literalness. Note, much of modern
metaphor scholarship would say that the Traditional View of metaphor (i.e. everything
before the mid-20th century) was purely substitution-based with a commitment to the
interchangeability of literal and metaphorical expression without a loss in meaning, that
the only truth in a metaphor was in the similarities it shared with its literal counterpart. Yet,
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in this 5th century response to the Manicheans, one may observe the exact opposite: an
argument that maintains the value of figurative truths, which is in line with Conceptual
Metaphor Theory. Although, this commitment to truth is based in circular reasoning from
an assumed immutability of scriptural truth: the truth of figurative language allows for faith
in the face of ineffability so that if a scripture-based belief is proven to be unequivocally
false, “then this is not what divine scripture contained, but what human ignorance had
opined” (Augustine, trans. 1990, p.186). More conservative logics aside, Augustine finds
this argument sufficient for his own theological and exegetical thought.
The role of Augustine’s coming to terms with the idea of figurative truths is readily
apparent in Book XIII of his Confessions and theologically consistent with his conversion
to Christianity following some engagement with Manicheism in his early life. The content
of this book, while ostensibly an exegesis of Genesis Chapter 1:1-31, is presented in a form
more similar to a conversation with God: as in On Genesis: A Refutation of the Manichees,
Augustine discusses the spiritual and corporeal forms of light leading up to and on the first
day of creation as well as more expansive topics such as what is signified by the order in
which living things were created. Yet, even in this greater exegetical work, Augustine
maintains a commitment to the figurative language of the Bible as that which is true in
meaning though inadequate, not necessarily false, in form:
Who can understand the omnipotent Trinity? And who does not speak of the
Trinity, if indeed it truly is the Trinity that he speaks of? Rare is the soul, whatever
it says of the Trinity, that knows what it is saying. Men quarrel, and men fight, but
without peace no one sees the vision … both [the Trinity as one and multiple are]
true and in some marvelous manner, at once simple and multiple, the Infinite is
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Itself Its own object so that by Itself It is and knows Itself and suffices to Itself
immutably the Selfsame in the super-abundant magnitude of Its unity – who can
easily conceive? Who can attain to express it? Who would have the rashness to
claim the manner of it? (trans. 2006, pp.295-296)
In the above passage, Augustine makes two fundamental arguments: man is insufficient in
their ability to understand the ineffable and true statements can be made about the ineffable
as they are known to the ineffable and therefore exist as true statements. One may also
observe a tactic – which I will return to in the following chapter – wherein Augustine
appeals to true contradiction as a means of both supporting Trinitarian theology and
expressing the futility of comprehending the ineffable. It is in the impossibility of the true
contradiction that Augustine finds the greatest support of the divine’s incomprehensibility.
Augustine also argues that the inclusion of anything is scripture, in the manner in which it
is expressed, demands an attempt to understand even if such is impossible or can only be
accomplished through figurative interpretation:
If we consider the natures of things not allegorically but properly, the phrases
increase and multiply24 is proper to all creatures born of seed. But suppose we
regard it as used figuratively, as I think that scripture meant us to regard it, since it
cannot be for nothing that it attributes this blessing only to the offspring of creatures
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Genesis 1:28 KJV: 28And God blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply,

and replenish the earth, and subdue it: and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl
of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth.
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of the sea and men: if we do so, we find multitudinousness both among spiritual
and corporeal creatures. (trans. 1990, p. 312)
Again, in the above passage, Augustine explicitly states that a figurative interpretation is
required of exegesis but also qualifies this by arguing that such is necessary because
scripture demands to be understood: if it a verse were not meant to be understood and were
not intended as divine truth, the reasoning goes, then they would not have been included.
Thus, in the face of blatant contradictions between real world experiences and literal
interpretations of scripture, Augustine moves to a figurative reading of the text, which is
another common conceptual move which will be discussed at length in the following
chapter. Here, Augustine’s Confessions is not only an important piece of the pre-modern
theological tradition on metaphor in Christianity but also a detailed guide to the life
experiences and theological processes which eventually lead to Augustine’s argument for
the figurative interpretation of scripture.
Finally, in a much shorter area of text from Chapter 27, Book XV of The City of
God, one can observe an example of Augustine’s figurative approach to scripture beyond
the creation story of Genesis 1:1-31 – although still remaining in Genesis, focusing on the
Flood narrative in Genesis 6:1-9:29. Unlike in the previous two works, however, Augustine
cannot find recourse in the obscure, esoteric metaphysics of creation and instead finds
himself defending the position that the events of the Flood narrative – the Flood itself, the
number of animals, the size of the ark, and other conundrums of technicality – were literal,
as described in scripture as a historical event. However, not relinquishing his argument for
the figurative content of Genesis and scripture generally, he asserts both historical and
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figurative interpretations of Genesis as equally valid but also equally necessary to
understand, or attempt to understand, the divine truth conferred by such:
No one ought to imagine, however, that this account was written for no purpose, or
that we are to look here solely for a reliable historical record without any allegorical
meaning, or, conversely, that those events are entirely unhistorical, and the
language purely symbolical, or that, whatever may be the nature of the story it has
no connection with prophecy about the Church. Surely it is only a twisted mind that
would maintain that books which have been so scrupulously preserved for
thousands of years, which have been safeguarded by such a concern for so wellordered a transmission, that such books were written without serious purposed, or
that we should consult them simply for historical facts. (trans. 2003, p.645)
He later comments that, beyond the historical truth of the Flood narrative, the verses “had
a wise purpose” (p.648). Taken together, one may observe a curious departure from an
understanding of figurative truths consistent with Conceptual Metaphor Theory that have
been seen in Augustine’s works thus far. In this case, as somewhat of a contradiction, he
argues that scripture can be true in two ways – in the figurative and the historical senses –
on the grounds that the assumed importance of any passage’s inclusion in scripture
warrants a spiritual interpretation, which aligns frequently with his conception of figurative
truths in his other writings. This serves both an immediate utility in argument, allowing for
both a refutation of Manichean criticisms and the maintenance of spiritual experience as a
transcendent phenomenon. Yet, in comparison, this overlap in figurative and literal
meanings is not entirely inconsistent with Conceptual Metaphor Theory: consider a setting
where a man falls in love with a woman at first sight; the woman, having none of it, punches
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the man in the face and sends him flying several feet back; if the man then remarks,
assuming he his conscious, that she knocked me off my feet, then one may also observe an
overlap in figurative and literal truth, though in a secular context. However, it would be
inaccurate to truly equate Augustine’s conception of figurative truths in a spiritual context
and figurative truths in a secular context, wherein there is no explicit engagement with the
latter in Augustine’s writings. In fact, from his reasoning presented in the previous three
considered texts, Augustine’s “theory” of metaphor and figurative language generally
would be along the lines of any language used in a religious context – possibly narrowed
to only that which is found in scripture – in reference to an ineffable event or the divine, in
that it is true by virtue of being present regardless of whether that truth is or can be
ascertained by the corporeal25, which is then forced to suffice with the figurative meaning
alone or in conjunction with historical facts. While a much narrower allowance of
figurative truth is made, here, it is no less notable that such a strikingly modern formulation
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Although it is beyond the scope of this restricted appraisal of Augustine’s work, he struggles to

accommodate both divine Truth and what he refers to ‘sense knowledge’ or ‘what the soul knows
and experiences through the body’. The issue here being that divine truth is, according to
Augustine, immutable in that it is of God and that by humans coming into possession of divine
Truth it becomes changeable, as an entity in time, and therefore deprived of its divine nature. As I
provide only a cursory overview of select writings in pre-modern theological in this section, my
engagement with the complexities of each writer’s theology is also cursory by necessity. The
interested reader may find a more extensive yet not exhaustive discussion of Augustine’s approach
to epistemology in Gilson (1961), Part One.
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of figurative language – in any context, secular or religious I can be found in pre-modern
theology.
1.3.3: Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, Early Christian Mysticism
At around the same time, during the late 5th and early 6th centuries AD, PseudoDionysius the Areopagite presented another approach in The Mystical Theology, which
was elaborated upon further in The Divine Names. In brief, Pseudo-Dionysius belonged to
Apophatic tradition on Western theology: also knows as the via negative, this tradition
asserted that one could only speak of the ineffable through negative statements or through
an assertion of its fundamental incomprehensibility (Fayaerts & Boeve, 2018). He writes
of this esotericism as that which:
Plunges the true initiate unto the Darkness of Unknowing wherein he renounces all
the apprehension of his understanding and is enwrapped in that which is wholly
intangible and invisible, belonging wholly to Him that is beyond all things and to
none else (whether himself or another), and being through the passive stillness of
all his reasoning powers united by his highest faculty to Him that is wholly
Unknowable, of whom thus by rejection of all knowledge he possesses a knowledge
that exceeds his understanding. (trans. 1990, p. 2)
This extreme esotericism focusing on the unknowableness of the divine is a common theme
throughout the writings of many of the writers presented in this section. However, unlike
Augustine’s assertion that religious truths may be understood through figurative language,
Pseudo-Dionysius goes further, arguing that the limits of human understanding preclude
an ability to say anything about the divine, figurative or otherwise. This ‘Darkness of
Unknowing’ represents a non-epistemology, an esoteric claim to knowledge through a
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rejection of one’s ability to know that knowledge, leading to “a knowledge that exceeds his
understanding.” Yet, simultaneously, Pseudo-Dionysius’ apophaticism necessitates that
the ineffable may only be referred to with figurative language even though he does not
commit himself to metaphoric truth. This also represents a refutation of a key element in
Kövecses’ (2002) and Lakoff and Johnson’s (1999) characterization of the ‘Traditional
View’ – this element being the ability to reduce figurative language to literal language
without a loss in meaning. Pseudo-Dionysius’ belief that nothing true can be said about the
ineffable necessitates both a commitment to the (false or inadequate) figurativeness of such
as well as a commitment to the irreducibility of such to literal language. This highly esoteric
form of apophaticism is common to many pre-modern theologians26 though not necessarily
as extreme: nevertheless, Pseudo-Dionysius exemplifies this branch of theology which is
of the utmost importance for understanding figurative religious language in the pre-modern
world.
1.3.4: Ibn Tufayl, Islamic Golden Age Avicennism
During the Islamic Golden Age, the 12th century theologian and philosopher Ibn
Tufayl presented an argument for an understanding of God similar to Pseudo-Dionysius’
extreme apophaticsm but more firmly grounded in a commitment to the virtues of rational
thought. He pursues this argument through use of a philosophical novel about a man named
Hayy ibn Yaqzān. In this story, Ibn Tufayl focuses on the innate human ability for rational
thought as he details Hayy’s life beginning with his initial abandonment as a newborn.

26

There were of course opponents to apophatic theology, namely cataphatic theology or the via

positive, which asserted that one could make true (i.e. literal) statements about God or the ineffable.
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Hayy was then ‘adopted’ by a doe and raised in isolation from human society. Possessing
the ability for rational thought ab initio, the man moves along from philosophical thought
on the self, the soul, the finite, and the non-finite to eventually arrive at pure understanding
of God. Consider the following excerpt, especially in the context of Philo’s On the
Unchangeableness of God and Pseudo-Dionysius’ The Mystical Theology:
Hayy made a concerted effort to purge his awareness-of-the-Truth, die to himself.
At last it came … Everything melted away, dissolved, “scattered into fine dust.”
All that remained was the One, the True Being, Whose existence is eternal, Who
uttered words identical with himself: “Whose is the Kingdom on this day? God’s
alone, One and Triumphant.” (trans. 2003, pp. 148-149)
Here, Hayy’s “effort to purge his awareness-of-the-Truth” bears a striking resemblance to
Pseudo-Dionysius’ effort to “[plunge] the true initiate unto the Darkness of Unknowing.”
In addition, Hayy’s focus on the pre-eminence of the essence of God in (un)knowing him
mirrors Philo’s portrayal – “beyond the fact of his existence, we can understand nothing”
– but diverges on the point of whether this (un)knowledge may be achieved through
rational inquiry. Ibn Tufayl, through the eyes of Hayy ibn Yaqzān, does not possess the
same level of admiration that Augustine has for figurative language. In the latter portion of
the story, Hayy finally meets other people, specifically people of the Islamic faith, and as
he learns more about the religious rituals and customs associated with the true religion, he
asks:
Why did this prophet rely for the most part on symbols to portray the divine world,
allowing mankind to fall into the grave error of conceiving the Truth corporeally
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and ascribing to Him things which He transcends and is totally free of … instead
of simply revealing the truth? (p.161)
This later, in fact, poses a problem as Hayy begins to proselytize to the masses. He
understands people to have developed a corporeally corrupted form of faith despite having
more ready access to the Truth, wherein Hayy did not have access to the Quran but still
arrived at an understanding of God through rational thought alone:
Hayy now understands the human condition. He saw that most men are no better
than unreasoning animals, and realized that all wisdom and guidance, all that could
possibly help them was contained already in the words of the prophets and the
religious traditions. None of this could be different. There was nothing to be added.
(p.164)
Sometimes in concert with the theologians previously discusses and sometimes at odds
with them, Ibn Tufayl showcases a philosophical middle ground between the extreme
inaccessibility of God found in Pseudo-Dionysius and the commitment to figurative truth
found in Augustine. That is to say he mirrors Pseudo-Dionysius regarding the true
ineffability of God and the preeminence of spiritual experience in (un)knowing him but he
professes an epistemology more akin to Augustine, where the corporeal world can serve as
a guide to the ineffable despite its inadequacy in (literally) representing ineffable truth.
1.3.5: St. Thomas Aquinas, Late Medieval Catholicism
Considering now a more conciliatory view, the Medieval Christian Philosopher
Thomas Aquinas describes an analogical approach to meaning in scripture, largely parallel
to the argument advanced by Augustine in On Genesis: A Refutation of the Manichees,
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specifically, as well as his various other works. Aquinas even goes so far as to reference
Augustine’ writing on the matter, though not from one of the texts I have outlined above;
he agrees with Augustine in terms of the figurative form and meaning of scripture but does
not commit himself to a multiplicity of meanings (e.g. historical, figurative, ineffable, etc.)
overlapping in the same word or phrase. For instance, in his Summa Theologiæ, he writes:
The literal sense is not the figure of speech itself, but the object it figures. When
scripture speaks of the arm of God, the literal sense is not that he has a physical
limb, but that he has what it signifies, namely the power of doing and unmaking.
(trans. 1964, p. 41)
This may seem a bit strange considering that he is discussing the role of figurative language
in scripture, but he also outlines a broader definition of literality earlier:
That first meaning whereby the words signify things belongs to the sense first
mentioned, namely the historical or literal. That meaning, however, whereby the
things signified by the words in their turn also signify other things is called the
spiritual sense; it is based on and presupposes the literal sense. (p.37-39)
Thus, even though the effect of his argument is measurably the same as Augustine’s, he
arrives at exactly the opposite conclusion: Augustine states that no Christian would have
“the nerve to say that [scripture] should not be taken in a figurative sense,” and Aquinas
responds that “nothing false can underlie the literal sense of Scripture” (p.41). Essentially,
his reasoning follows that a metaphor’s metaphorical sense is its intended meaning as a
metaphor and therefore literal, as the metaphorical meaning of the metaphor makes it true
(i.e. literal) as a metaphor. More so than earlier authors, the theory that Aquinas attempts
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to put forward is primarily concerned with how one is able to refer to or speak of God –
what Soskice (1985) terms the ‘logico-linguistic’ intent of his argument – and less
concerned with the relationship between the corporeal and spiritual, which Philo and Ibn
Tufayl for example tend to emphasize. While all of the theologians discussed in this section
are important considerations for the study of religious metaphor, it is this logico-linguistic
sensibility that sets Aquinas apart as one of the foundational Western theologians in regard
to a theory of metaphor.
1.3.6: Benjamin Keach, Particular Baptist Theology
Finally, in the 17th century, the Particular Baptist minister Benjamin Keach wrote a
guide to the language of sermons for prospective preachers – the Tropologia – which is
undoubtably the most exhaustive English account of metaphor before the 20th century. In
this work, Keach divides the tropes that he had identified in scripture into three broad
categories: anthropopathy27, prosopopoeia, and other (Holmes, 2009). Anthropopathy
includes attributions of human characteristic to God – such as form, emotions, agency, and
adjuncts – and attributions of non-human creatures to God. Prosopopoeia28 refers to

27

The use of anthropopathy, or the attribution of human emotions, is the general term used in the

Tropologia for the attribution of any human characteristic, including the more familiar tropes
anthropomorphism and personification. Where appropriate reference to the text is required, I use
Keach’s, and where his tropology is otherwise discussed, I distinguish between the three.
28

My use of prosopopoeia differs from Keach in that I use the term to refer to the attribution of

human speech or the ability to speak to non-human objects. As Keach uses anthropopathy in a
much broader sense which encompasses personification and anthropomorphism, this idiosyncratic
delineation is to be expected.
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“things that are proposed as persons [but] are not persons at all” (p.100). Finally, there are
the subclassification of the ‘other’ metaphors: metaphors taken from spiritual entities and
the elements, metaphors taken from minerals and living things (e.g. plants, animals, and
other miscellaneous creatures), metaphors taken from the human body and human
experience, and metaphors taken from the sacred (e.g. worship, sacred or pious people,
sacred rites, etc.). While this categorization is not always clear, especially in the case of
metaphors related in any way to humans, it allows Keach to exhaustively annotate every
instance of figurative language that was identifiable to him in scripture. In addition to
providing a more-or-less working typology, Keach also discusses the function and purpose
of figurative language, especially in a pastoral context:
Similitudes or Metaphors are borrowed from visible Things, to display and
illustrate the excellent Nature of invisible Things. Yea, heavenly Things are often
called by the very Names, that material or earthly Things are; which is not to
obscure, or hide the meaning of them from us, but to accommodate them to our
understanding. God by a gracious [condescension] conveys the Knowledge of
himself, and spiritual Things, by preaching them by their respective earthly, or
terrestrial Similitudes. (pp. ii-iii)
While Keach’s account is still clearly based on comparison or ‘similitude,’ it is not
equitable with the substitution view that modern scholars have assumed to be
representative of the pre-modern traditions (Kövecses, 2002; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999).
Furthermore, he advances the argument that metaphor serves as an important
communicative purpose and that it is not simply for poetic ornamentation (Vaughn, 1989),
an argument which is consistent with Conceptual Metaphor Theory and contemporary
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research. If one also takes into account his inclusion in Shibles’ (1971) reference, Keach’s
exclusion, either willfully or through ignorance, from modern metaphor studies literature
indefensible. Even though the Tropologia is restricted to religious metaphor, the full import
of Keach’s contributions have been neglected under the umbrella of the ‘Traditional View’.
1.3.7: Untenable Exclusion
The work of the theologians outlined in the previous sections represents only a
small portion of the totality of pre-modern theological thought on religious metaphor. This
larger body of work has unfortunately been excluded from the literature principally on
account of the field in which it was written and secondarily on account of the historical
bias of Early Modern metaphor studies to focus on poetic language. Since Soskice (1985),
there have been few if any attempts within the field to even marginally seek to include
theological thought in metaphor research, and when research has been conducted on
metaphor in religious discourse, it has been conducted in an ad hoc or a-priori-judgementriddled fashion. The original formulation of a Traditional-Modern dichotomy by Lakoff
and Johnson (1980; 1999) played a large role in excluding such a body of literature from
the field’s canon. However, to continue to do so is no longer a tenable position with respect
to research on religious metaphor. The 2010’s have seen a gradual increase in the number
of publications, theses, and dissertations on the topic of either metaphors in religious
discourse or religious metaphors specifically. However, by accepting the notion that
Conceptual Metaphor Theory is as easily applied to religious discourse as it is newspaper
articles or that the conceptual domain of GOD is no more complex than that of TIME, these
recent studies commit themselves to an inaccurate and unjustified mode of analysis,
drawing into question many of their conclusions. In the remainder of the chapter, I present
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a review and critique of these modern studies of religious metaphor in linguistics and
related fields as well as a brief examination of the application of Conceptual Metaphor
Theory, ironically, within modern theology.
1.4: Modern Applications of CMT to the Study of Religious Metaphor
Research on religious metaphor within the Conceptual Metaphor Theory literature
generally falls into two categories: studies that build from positive a priori assumptions and
those that build from negative assumptions about the existence of the religious object
relevant to the discourse being studied. A number of recent studies also focus on general
metaphor usage in religious discourse, so they do not necessarily fall into either category,
but their theoretical positioning in relation to the religious subject often tends toward one
or the other. Conceptual Metaphor Theory has also, ironically, found a place within some
works of theology; however, its impact has remained quite limited.
There is hardly a better example of the methodological contrast in a priori
assumptions than in Sweetser’s (1995) discussion of Greek mythology and DesCamp and
Sweetser’s (2005) appraisal of the role of patriarchal frameworks within Christianity.
Sweetser (1995), for example, argues that the metaphorically familial relationships
between humans and the Greek deities as well as between the Greek deities interpersonally,
as presented in Hesiod’s Theogony, are predicated on the metaphor CAUSATION IS
PROGENATION in conjunction with image-schematic mappings from the natural world.
This metaphor, first explored in Turner (1987), asserts that the relationships between
causation and causal products are conceptually understood in terms of procreation and birth
and is seen not only in everyday language (e.g. “Necessity is the mother of invention.”) but
also in the Greek mythos, as evidenced in the relationship between the Mother Earth
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Goddess Demeter and Persephone, goddess of Spring and Summer (Sweetser 1995).
However, Sweetser structures her analysis around the mapping of natural image-schemas
onto a priori personified forms, thus treating Greek mythology as a diachronically neutral
expression of metaphoric thought rather than as a synchronically active expression of
religious experience. Contrastively, DesCamp and Sweetser (2005) allow for the validity
of Christian religious experience, stating that “there is a vast indeterminacy in our
understanding of God. From the point of view of cognitive linguistics and cognitive
science, the concept of God exhibits an impoverished non-metaphorical reality” (215).
Furthermore, their analysis of the patriarchal GOD IS FATHER metaphor includes
ultimaticity as a key property: “God is a male progenitor who is more powerful than and
nurtures human beings” (221). This ultimaticity, unfortunately, is never adequately
explained, and the domain of GOD is treated as possessing a positive a priori ontology
within the broader system of Christian metaphor.
The issue of a priori assumptions gone unaddressed is further compounded by the
text under analysis, especially in consideration of holy texts. Jäkel (2002) exemplifies this
issue in his analysis of

JOURNEY

metaphors in the Holy Bible wherein metaphors for the

“names of God” are almost entirely set aside as “less interesting in respect of theoretical
considerations” (p 24). The author reasons that because the

JOURNEY

metaphors utilize

source domains with more clearly delineated image-schemata then the analysis of such
would provide clearer insights into the role of metaphor in religious discourse. While these
metaphors demonstrate interesting moral disambiguation (e.g. THE WICKED ARE IGNORANT
OF GOD’S WAY and GOD TEACHES THE RIGHTEOUS HIS WAY, according to Jäkel’s notations),

the motivation for that disambiguation in the underlying conceptualization of the religious
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object, God, is never clarified. Furthermore, holy texts and religious discourse more
broadly are conflated within the study, with the text of the Holy Bible’s English translation
being taken as a convenient data set for Christian discourse in its entirety. While this
generalization is fundamentally suspect, it also fails to account for issues arising from
historical distance, translation, and editing of the text through the intervening centuries.
These methodological and theoretical assumptions collide in the study’s conclusion when,
after examining instances of religious metaphors that figure God as both a path and a guide,
Jäkel demurs: “it may be that the conceptual dissonance is an intended one, the violation
of ordinary metaphorical coherence hinting at the metaphysical, and indeed supernatural
character of the whole enterprise of the religious life. This is a question that metaphor
analysis will have to leave for theologians to tackle” (p 34). In brief, the analysis cannot
justify or account for the metaphors it purports to analyze in such cases, perhaps the
majority of cases, where the metaphor relates to a religious object or a true contradiction.
This study was replicated by Shokr (2006) which undertook a parallel analysis of JOURNEY
metaphors in the Qur’an – a study which in turn replicated all of the earlier study’s
theoretical and methodological problems. Furthermore, Jäkel (2002) and Shokr (2006)
create similar problems in their framework as a result of isolating the text of the Bible and
the Qur’an from their historical and contemporary religious contexts. Shokr does however
make note of some irregular properties possessed by the Qur’anic LIFE IS JOURNEY
metaphor, stating that “Human life is viewed in the Qur’an as a journey in which the
departure is birth and the destination is an unknown place that is never reached i.e. the
afterlife. Thus, life in the Qur’an is an endless journey in which death is only one of the
stages of the trip as we have seen” (129). In the phrase endless journey used to characterize
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spiritual life (as opposed to biological life), this intuitive analysis of the Qur’an’s religious
JOURNEY metaphors makes implicit claims to a highly-abstract or ineffable domain but
once again fails to offer an adequate explanation for the presence of ultimaticity in the
ontological properties of the metaphor’s mappings.
Richardson (2012; 2013) comes close to considering the effects of religious experience on
metaphor when considering the “ultimate goal” of religion in his analysis of movement and
proximity metaphors in conservative Christian and Muslim speech. The study specifically
engages with the genre of religious testimonials and demonstrates a relationship between
certainty in belief and the conceptual proximity of the believer to an entity. While also
engaging with literature in the cognitive science and anthropology of religion, the study
similarly fails to account for any conceptual structuring of the religious object or develop
any methodology for the description of such. Okpeh (2017) likewise approaches this issue
in his analysis of Nigerian Pentecostal Christian discourse and attempts to reconcile the
hierarchical relationship between God, the pastor, and the congregation through an appeal
to socio-cultural context. Yet, again, though this research is revealing in terms of the social
institutions which promote certain forms of metaphor29, the author avoids the issue of how
these metaphors are generated in relation to the religious object of experience or how such
considerations would affect the theoretical framework of analysis.
Research on religious metaphor has, however, notably expanded into religions
beyond Christianity, Judaism, and Islam in the recent decades and has also extended its

29

This approach is remarkably similar to Kövecses’ (2015) work in delineating levels of linguistic

and cultural contextualization.

55

theoretical considerations beyond the initial cognitive framework of early Conceptual
Metaphor Theory. For instance, Tzohar (2011; 2018) develops a linguistic tradition of
metaphor in Yogācāra Buddhist thought which is set as distinct from the decidedly
Western-based Conceptual Metaphor Theory. Two edited collections, Pathak (2013) and
Chilton and Kopytowska (2018), also present a diverse range of research crossing
disciplinary boundaries, religious traditions, and theoretical frameworks while maintaining
a focus on symbolic religious thought as expressed through language. This diversity in
research both in terms of disciplinary grounding and theoretical framing however betrays
the underdevelopment and nebulous nature of the given subject area, an area at the
intersection of religion, language, and cognition. Goldwasser (2005) provides a prominent
example of this underdevelopment in her application of Conceptual Metaphor Theory to
conceptual categories in Egyptian hieroglyphic texts where writing about the divine
coincides with the symbolism of the divine, a characteristic that is regarded more as a
curious addendum rather than a serious theoretical issue. This is a pervasive issue
throughout the literature, where Conceptual Metaphor Theory is assumed as a sufficient
tool for analysis rather than a theory with its own implications for religious metaphor as a
topic of research.
Finally, this assumption of Conceptual Metaphor Theory as a tool in religious
metaphor research rather than a theoretical interface with which religious metaphor might
engage topically is no better demonstrated than in contemporary theological work with the
theory. Some such as Masson (2014) see it as a means of legitimizing theology whereas
others such as Gomola (2015) see it as potentially undermining church dogma. At times,
work on one subject in cognitive science with the application of Conceptual Metaphor
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Theory, such as prayer in Downes (2018), builds from previous theological applications
without proper consideration of the works origin, with prayer in Brümmer (2008). Some
such as Szatjer (2008) and Egge (2013) have even elucidated the foundational aspect of
metaphor to religious discourse, but the field of research on religious metaphor as a proper
subject of research is at best disorganized and at worst a smattering of ad hoc theoretical
guess work. Crystal (2018) identifies the underlying disciplinary issue as a failure of
Theolinguistics, an emerging subdiscipline in the 1960s and 70s, to develop into a fully
functioning subdiscipline of linguistics. The development of such is well beyond the
abilities of this thesis and the questions addressed here. Nevertheless, the future
development of a successor to Theolinguistics is essential to the program that is outlined
here and necessary for sorting the mound of research being piled together messily on the
subject of religion and language broadly, with religious metaphor being a substantial
subcomponent of such.

1.5: Concluding Thoughts
There is no doubt that Conceptual Metaphor Theory is efficacious, at least to some
notable degree, in the study of religious language and thought as demonstrated by the
numerous studies and applications of the theory within numerous disciplines and
theological traditions. It is also clearly evident that the compelling linguistic questions
found within theology, both in their historical and modern forms, have been ignored by
contemporary metaphor research much to its own detriment. In the application of
Conceptual Metaphor Theory to religious discourse specifically, this theoretical recusal
overlooks an ever-growing gap between the theoretical framework of analysis and the
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situated reality of that which is being analyzed, both in terms of its relation to the individual
and the individual’s faith. As it is, Conceptual Metaphor Theory remains inadequate for
the analysis let alone the identification and definition of religious metaphor, an inadequacy
that is shared by many linguistic studies of religious discourse. In its foundational literature
as well as its analytic groundwork, Conceptual Metaphor Theory necessarily requires an
amendment in regard to the domain of religion which avoids an artificial separation of the
research subject from the context in which it occurs. Such an amendment is developed in
the following chapter.
Chapter 2: A Socio-Cognitive Linguistic Theory of Religious Violence
2.1: Towards a Theory of Religious Metaphor
In this chapter, I provide the initial, foundational outline of a theory of religious
metaphor, based not in the mishandled, overtly negative approach representative of work
on the subject up until this point, but rather based in a framework of careful consideration.
As quoted earlier, and I believe it bears repeating, Girard writes that “by denying religion
any basis in reality, by viewing it as a sort of bedtime story for children, we collaborate
with violence in its game of deception” (1972: 28). I feel this should be kept in mind on
two points: as we continue on this analysis of religious metaphor, it is necessary to define
an approach which (1) unwaveringly maintains the validity of religious experience; but (2)
we must not become so caught up in affirming theology’s virtues that we lose sight of
religion’s proclivity for, even dependence on, violence. In this dichotomous point of view,
religious metaphor is not a neutral expression of embodied conceptualization: it is a volatile
admixture of faith, ideology, and experience, any one of which just might prove to be the
catalyst for a terrifying chain reaction. Much in the same way one may investigate an
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arsonist’s pyrotechnic passion, we must investigate the genealogy of violence that
progresses from a state of neutrality, or even liberality, unto the most heinous acts of
religious aggression. Only then will we be able to understand the means by which theology
may be utilized for resisting such acts.
In this regard, linguistics is a necessary cornerstone of religious metaphor analysis.
As I argued in the previous section, if religion is fundamentally cognitive and cognition is
facilitated in part by the supporting structure of language, then religion must be
fundamentally linguistic (Sørensen 2005). As Conceptual Metaphor Theory has been
demonstrated to be inadequate for analyzing religious metaphor as it is, we must set upon
the task of making critical amendments, a task which I undertake, to my mind successfully,
in the following chapter. As such, I briefly enumerate here the subcomponents of my theory
of religious metaphor, subsidiary to Conceptual Metaphor Theory but nonetheless set apart
from it. First, I clarify and delineate that which is generally referred to as ‘religious
metaphor’ in three parts: (1) metaphors which take a religious source domain, (2) secular
metaphors augmented within the context of religious rhetoric, and (3) metaphors used to
conceptualize the object of religious experience. I then devise a modelling system, which
I term Multi-Modal Phenomenological Modeling, as a means of accomplishing an
empirical account of religious experience which is practical for the issue of religious
language, and therein the discipline of linguistics. Within this modelling system, I argue
that it is possible to ground religious experience in our embodied reality without sacrificing
a commitment to the validity of that experience: rather than assuming an a priori position
on the existence of a religious object, either negative or positive, this framework allows for
disembodied experience as a self-constitutive conceptual process.
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In regard to that last point, the disembodiment of embodied cognition, I engage
extensively in defining that which is understood by religious metaphor, the religious object:
otherwise known as the ineffable, the ultimate concern, God, and various other names
(Priest 2002; 2015; Neville 1982; 2013). In this, I stipulate a conceptual domain of unique
and contradictory ontology which I refer to as an end-point concept: in a sense, briefly,
end-point concepts are the ineffable, such as it is, expressed within the notational system
of Conceptual Metaphor Theory, albeit in a modified form. I then present a convergence
of these arguments under the name Ilithyic metaphor, the metaphor that creates the divine.
Finally, I present a summary of my arguments and the central tenets of a theory of religious
metaphor.
2.2: Religious Metaphor Differentiated
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Conceptual Metaphor Theory must be
amended to account for religious metaphor and its complexities. This is not to say that nonreligious metaphors are simple, far from it: they are the prototypical instance of metaphor
and its underlying cognitive processes. Nevertheless, the fact remains that religious
metaphor, when accounted for accurately, is of a different caliber altogether. Having
demonstrated the necessity for amending Conceptual Metaphor Theory, in this chapter, I
set about to formulate such an amendment to the extent that religious cognition and
metaphor may be incorporated within an empirical framework: the first step of which is to
clarify the nomenclature of religious metaphors. I therefore propose the following threepart classification: (1) conceptual metaphors which take a culturally defined religious
domain as either their source or target, (2) conceptual metaphors in the context of religious
rhetoric, and (3) metaphors used to conceptualize the object of religious experience.
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Regarding the former two, I discuss them here in detail, but I have elected to postpone
discussion of the final category until the end of this chapter, following the necessary
theoretical scaffolding required by such a nebulous and heretofore ill-defined category.
2.2.1: Metaphors with a Religious Domain, Culturally Defined
In the course of Conceptual Metaphor Theory’s development, various scholars have
on occasion conflated metaphors which utilize a culturally defined religious domain with
those which conceptualize religious objects. Of those that assume a culturally defined
religious domain, consider the following examples:
(1) She looks like a goddess.
(2) This beautiful library is a heaven on Earth.
(3) That little devil tore up my garden yesterday.
(4) Go to hell!
(5) This cheesecake is absolutely divine.
These exemplify a number of religious metaphors that use religious domains – and are
perhaps informed by religious experience – but are not concerned with the experience of a
religious object. These various metaphors include (1) BEAUTY IS DIVINITY, (2) A PLEASANT
PLACE IS HEAVEN, (3) A BAD PERSON IS A DEVIL, (4) AN UNPLEASANT PLACE IS HELL, and (5)
GOODNESS IS DIVINITY,

which is a more basic formulation of that observed in (1). Each of

these makes use of a religious domain –

DIVINITY, HEAVEN, DEVIL,

and

HELL

– but is

nevertheless rooted in their cultural definitions, not those informed by immediate or
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transposed religious experience.30 Another example from Romeo and Juliet, the favorite
and oft quoted poetic example of Conceptual Metaphor Theory, reads:

30

However, the pseudo-hyperbolic aspect of such expressions hints at the extremity of these

domains, as will be explored later. It is interesting to note that Robin Lakoff (2004) also singles out
divine as an expression of femininity in women’s language, belonging to “a group of adjectives
which have, besides their specific and literal meanings, another use … but [it] seems , in its
figurative use, to be largely confined to women’s language” (45). She further argues that, in such
overt extremity, expressions which use divine are a way for women to express that something is
“essentially frivolous, trivial, or unimportant to the world at large” (46). Working from a basic
definition of hyperbole as scalar, referential, and possessing a contrast between the propositional
and intended meaning, DIVINITY as a target domain is then hyperbole par excellence (Burgers,
Brugman, de Lavalette, & Steen 2016): representing a terminal scalar value, a uniquely singular
reference, and contrast in meaning by definition. In comparison, the expression that was the best
concert in the history of the known universe also denotes a high degree of hyperbolic extremity but
seems to be a lesser evaluation when compared to that concert was divine, at least at face value. In
this, I cannot help but be reminded of a specific example of transgressive hyperbole in one letter of
Heloise (a nun) to her ill-fated lover Abelard (a monk), in the twelfth century: “You alone can grant
me the grace of consolation … God is my witness that if Augustus, Emperor of the whole world,
thought fit to honour me with marriage and conferred all the earth on me to possess forever, it
would be dearer to and more honourable to me to be called not his Empress but your whore” (Radice
2003: 51). Though a more extended hyperbole, through analogy, than Lakoff’s examples (e.g.
adorable, lovely, divine, etc.), Heloise’s nevertheless extremity in hyperbole, augmented by both
the language of religion and the physical context of a convent – a literal instantiation of the
institutions which separate women from the world – showcases perhaps a more general
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Romeo: If I profane with my unworthiest hand
This holy shrine, the gentle fine is this:
My lips, two blushing pilgrims, ready stand
To smooth that rough touch with tender kiss.
Juliet: Good pilgrim, you do wrong your hand too much,
Which mannerly devotion shows in this;
For saints have hands that pilgrims’ hands do touch,
And palm to palm is holy palmers’ kiss.
Romeo: Have not saints lips, and holy palmers too?
Juliet: Ay, pilgrim, lips they must use in prayer.
Romeo: O, then, dear saint, let lips do what hands do;
They pray, grant thou, lest faith turn to despair.
Juliet: Saints do not move, though grant for prayer’s sake.
Romeo: Then move not, while my prayer’s effect I take.
Thus from my lips, by yours, my sin is purged.
Juliet:

Then have my lips the sin that they have took.

Romeo: Sin from thy lips? O trespass sweetly urged!
Give me my sin again.

characteristic of the language of marginalized communities as a whole: that expressivity, even
transgressive expressivity, might be a means of disarming, or flagrantly engaging, the very
institutions which oppress them and which repress their narrative locality. Admittedly, this does
not seem to be a religious analogy per se, rather an analogy occurring within religious rhetoric:
nonetheless, its religious cotext conveys the same hyperbolic qualities discussed above.
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Juliet:

You kiss by the book.

As can be observed, there are two overlapping systems: one composed of fairly isolated
conceptual metaphors occurring within a prolonged analogy and then the analogy itself.
A BEAUTIFUL BODY IS A PLACE OF WORSHIP

This holy shrine, the gentle fine is this

LIPS ARE PILGRIMS

My lips, two blushing pilgrims, ready stand

LIPS ARE HANDS

with A KISS IS A PRAYER

let lips do what hands do; / They pray
Then move not, while my prayer’s effect I take.

LOVE IS FAITH

lest faith turn to despair
Each of these may be categorized in relation to the primary metaphor

LOVE IS RELIGION

which Shakespeare uses in this scene to evoke the intensity of love at first sight. Consider
another, more contemporary example, from Fall Out Boy’s 2018 song Church:
If you were church, I’d get on my knees
Confess my love, I’d know where to be
My sanctuary, you’re holy to me
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If you were church, I’d get on my knees31

As can be seen here, the metaphor LOVE IS RELIGION is a highly productive, diachronically
active conventional metaphor, with the conceptual mappings remaining remarkable similar
across the centuries. In the excerpt from Romeo and Juliet, the ritual actions, location, and
motivations of prayer are mapped onto the domain LOVE in such a way that kissing lips are
conceptualized as praying hands, the body becomes a place of worship, and the act of
kissing is rendered as an act of absolution. In Fall Out Boy’s Church, we may observe
some overlap – for instance, the body being understood as a place of worship – as well as
some novel expressions: a confession of love being conceptualized as prayer or a
confession of sin, symbolically represented in the image-schematic mapping of ritual
practice, kneeling, onto the a secular instance of the domain CONFESSION; and the phrase
My sanctuary, you’re holy to me, denoting the metaphors A BEAUTIFUL BODY IS A PLACE OF
WORSHIP

(i.e. my sanctuary) and AN OBJECT OF LOVE IS AN OBJECT OF WORSHIP (i.e. you’re

holy to me).
Another example of metaphors with a religious source domain, drawn from the
language of the world as it exists, the metaphor

A PASSIONATE STRUGGLE IS A CRUSADE

demonstrates both the volatility and ambiguous metaphoricity possessed by this type of
expression. Take for example, Bush’s use of this metaphor in his post-9/11 address to the
American people:

31

The reader must forgive me for not italicizing the metaphorical expressions, here, as the quatrain

in its totality would need to be italicized.

65

This is a new kind of – a new kind of evil. And we understand. And
the American people are beginning to understand. This crusade,
this war on terrorism is going to take a while. And the American
people must be patient. I'm going to be patient. (George W. Bush;
September 16, 2001)
In this example, the metaphor crusade is not being used in its literal, religious context –
although an argument can be made that it was primed by Bush’s religious ideology. Yet, it
is distinctly separated from the framework of religion within the context of its usage in the
speech. Thus, these metaphors which make use of religious source domains are not
themselves indicative of the underlying conceptual, and therein cognitive, systems of
religion. As alluded to beforehand, religious metaphors – those which take an object of
religious experience as their target domain – possess certain properties reminiscent of
incomprehensible ultimaticity, eternity, infinity, and other such expressions. In a phrase,
religious metaphors in their prototypical form should mirror the expressiveness of the
mystic, not star-crossed lovers. Thus, while this subset of metaphor is interesting in its own
right, as it sheds light on the place of religion in society and non-religious human relations,
it is nevertheless only tangential to the type of metaphor which this thesis takes as its
principal concern.
2.2.2: Conceptual Metaphors in the Context of Religious Rhetoric
The second type of religious metaphors detailed in this section are those that occur
within the context of religious discourse but do not take religious conceptual domains as
either their source or target domains. Unlike the previous sub-category of religious
metaphors, these are well-documented outside of religious rhetoric and form the foundation
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of literature in support of Conceptual Metaphor Theory. In fact, the majority of research
on religious metaphor has focused on this category of usage. As such, having already
thoroughly covered such research in section 1.4, I will proceed into my discussion of the
third category, ineffable metaphors.
2.3: On the Theoretical Description of Ineffable Metaphors
In contrast to the two categories detailed above, metaphors with religious source
domains and metaphors occurring within religious discourse respectively, the third
category is much more expansive and varied. At the beginning of this section, I defined
this third category as metaphors used to conceptualize the object of religious experience,
but this is perhaps an oversimplification of the matter. This category of metaphors instead
might more accurately be described as metaphors which construe the ineffable. I will return
to a discussion of the exact meaning of construe later in the chapter, but for now, it is
necessary for the sake of typology to consider what it might mean for a metaphor to be that
which construes the ineffable, henceforth simply ineffable metaphors. This of course
includes metaphors which take an object of religious experience as their target domain such
as in monotheism or polytheism, but also includes metaphors for the absence of any
religious object such as in atheism. This domain must also include metaphors for what
happens to the individual after death and before birth, metaphors for the unquantifiable
such as infinity and eternity, and the metaphors of fiction such as Borges’ infinite library.
This category of metaphor, in a sense, must include all of the ways in which language
allows us to know the unknowable, an epistemological impossibility by definition.
Moreover, as a category, these distinct sub-types of ineffable metaphor must all be derived
from a single formula in that they are all concerned with the same ineffable thing. So, while
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I am here primarily concerned with religious metaphor – that sub-type of ineffable
metaphors which take an object of religious experience as their target domain – all of these
sub-types must be considered in due course. As these sub-types, generally, tend towards
likely co-occurrence, I will begin with the central theoretical question of religious metaphor
and discuss the other sub-types as they become apparent in that more focused discussion.
2.3.1: The Leap of Faith, Complex Integrity, and Vox et Silentium Dei
This project has been largely in response to the problem of religious validity:
namely, how can Conceptual Metaphor Theory account for religious metaphors if in doing
so it must invalidate the individual’s religious experience, instead opting to the use of a
priori definitions of religious concepts. This is the central problem that must be solved as
a necessary step in the scientific study of religious language. This pervasive problem within
a scientific study of religious language, or religion of any kind, derives from the nature of
the religious object. It is, by its very nature, something that is non-deducible. In
metaphysics, one of its name is the first cause, that which has caused everything else to be
caused. Of course, this begs the question: what caused the first cause? The uncaused cause
then becomes a contradictory position, and humans being as they are, developed an entire
discipline of inquiry towards the reconciliation of that contradiction. It is the same in
religion. However, the fundamental contradiction cannot be reconciled: if another cause
caused the first cause, then what caused that other more-first first cause. The contradiction,
in this sense, is self-sustaining despite its unstable valency – its ineffability. Therefore,
before we can begin to consider what derives from this contradiction, we must assert that
it is a true contradiction. That is, appropriately here, we must take a leap of faith. However,
as with all such positions, a leap of faith necessitates an equally radical motivation, that
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motivation being for this project the development of a holistic method of identifying,
describing, and analyzing religious metaphors specifically and ineffable metaphors
generally. It is therefore necessary to make this philosophical move, an affirmation of the
true contradiction, at the initial loss of the principle of non-contradiction and the principle
of the excluded middle. However, having made this initial leap of faith, the true
contradiction can be isolated in a conceptual singularity, the ineffable, with all other
arguments proceeding from it as normal.
So, let us here at the outset as a leap of faith assume that there exists such an
ineffable conceptual domain, Ω, that is a true contradiction symbolically representing the
ineffable. It is by its nature a non-existent existence, a singular plurality, a known
unknowableness, and all other such esoteric renditions. The language used to refer to the
true contradiction – the problem of reference being another issue considered below – is
also necessarily esoteric in the initial formulation of its theory, and as will come as no
surprise, I argue that metaphor is the only possible linguistic form in which the ineffable
can be referenced. In the preface to his exploration of this ‘originary reality,’ from which
my thesis takes substantial inspiration, Grassi states that “metaphor, as the language of that
which is originary, remains, despite our uninterrupted quest, a word which is unspoken and
therefore unheard, but is also, for this very reason, irrepressibly marvelous and disturbing”
(1994: ix-x). Thus, moving forward from this ‘marvelous and disturbing’ leap of faith, I
argue that this kind of metaphor, that which takes Ω as their target domain, possesses the
following properties and necessitates the ensuing presumptions: (1) The ineffable concept
Ω exists as a disembodied concept, (2) source domains cannot ‘map’ onto the target domain
because Ω, as the primary domain, possesses no coherent, stable ontology in and of itself;
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(3) as such, the source domain of the primary metaphor Ω

IS Y

takes the form of an

ontological shift, wherein the entirety of the source domain is moved into Ω, notated by
the form [Ω](γ); and (4) a core collection of primary metaphors used to conceptualize Ω,
notated as [Ω](Yn ˄ Yn+1), constitute a conceptual realization of Ω, notated as [Ω](δ). We may
call this argument the Leap of Faith Argument. I further argue that these metaphors
constitute concepts of two classes: (1) Ilithyic Concepts, being [Ω](Yn ˄ YN+1) and [Ω](δ),
which necessitate internal conceptual structures; and (2) End-Point Concepts, being[Ω](γ),
which do not necessitate internal conceptual structures. We may call this categorical
bisection the Complex Integrity Hypothesis.
In order to maintain both the Leap of Faith Argument and the Complex Integrity
Hypothesis, I argue for what I call the Vox et Silentium Dei and what Grassi, quoted above,
would call the ‘word which is unspoken and therefore unheard.’ The Vox et Silentium Dei
is of two parts: (1) the Vox (Voces) Dei, being [Ω](Yn ˄ YN+1) and [Ω](δ), as the linguistic
representation of that which cannot be named; and (2) the Silentium Dei, being Ω, or the
recognition that that which is named (i.e. linguistically represented) cannot be named. I
argue that this conceptual instability between the Vox Dei and the Silentium Dei is
constituted by an interminable process of conceptual deconstruction from the Vox Dei to
the Silentium Dei (i.e. [Ω](δ) → [Ω](Yn ˄ YN+1) → Ω) and conceptual reconstruction from the
Silentium Dei to the Vox Dei (i.e. Ω → [Ω](Yn ˄ YN+1) → [Ω](δ)). This continual process,
again, is non-terminating, preserves the experiential grounding of Ω regardless of changes
in conceptual structure, and is motivated by an innate necessity to reconcile an
unreconcilable contradiction. For example, briefly, an individual in a Christian tradition,
who experiences Ω as [Ω](GOD) and who then moves into an atheistic tradition, now
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experiencing [Ω](NOTHING), never stops experiencing Ω; they have only deconstructed
[Ω](GOD) into Ω and then reconstructed Ω into [Ω](NOTHING) in an attempt to reconcile their
experience of Ω with the experiences of their embodied reality. In this sense, there is
perpetual tension between the embodied and disembodied. This latter argument for a Vox
et Silentium Dei is contingent upon the prior two hypotheses, and thus, I will defer further
exploration of this fundamentally socio-cognitive linguistic process until the end of the
chapter.
Taken together, these three core arguments provide a theoretical explanation for
how religious metaphors are conceptualized, identified, and realized in complex social
contexts through underlying socio-cognitive linguistic processes. In the following section,
I proceed in order of their presentation from the Leap of Faith Hypothesis to the Complex
Structural Integrity Hypothesis, culminating in a discussion of the Vox et Silentium Dei.
Throughout this line of argumentation, I will seek to accommodate these hypotheses within
the tradition of Conceptual Metaphor Theory, generally, and will dictate appropriately how
the notational systems for this type of metaphor are to be integrated into that theory’s
present syllogistic system. Where appropriate, I will comment on the implications of this
theory for current theories in the cognitive science of religion and the study of religious
violence, as they are central to the present project if not always necessary for the present
theory. However, I first start with a problematization of the category of ‘religion’ in order
to allow for a more accurate identification of ‘religious metaphors’ and develop a more
accurate nomenclature for such, beyond the tripartite delineation mad here. I then proceed
into a detailed discussion of the Leap of Faith Argument, beginning with the experiential
grounding problem and ending with a formalized definition of metaphors which take Ω as
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their target domain. I then continue into a discussion of the Complex Structural Integrity
Hypothesis and how Ilithyic as well as End-Point Concepts function in both larger
conceptual metaphor systems and in general discourse. From here, I undertake a detailed
exploration of Vox et Silentium Dei, its deconstructive and reconstructive processes, and
its motivating factors – social, cognitive, and linguistic. At the culmination of this chapter,
I unify these three lines of argument into a robust and fully realized socio-cognitive
linguistic theory of religion which may be widely applied and easily operationalized, as
will be demonstrated in the following chapters.
2.3.2: The Leap of Faith Argument
First, it is necessary to more clearly define the subsidiary arguments that together make up
the Leap of Faith Argument. For reference, these arguments may be summarized as such:
The Leap of Faith Argument
(1) The ineffable concept Ω exists as a disembodied concept
(2) Source domains cannot ‘map’ onto this concept because Ω, as the primary
domain, possesses no coherent, stable ontology in and of itself
(3) As such, the source domain of the primary metaphor Ω IS Y takes the form of
an ontological shift, wherein the entirety of the source domain is moved into Ω,
notated by the form [Ω](γ)
(4) a core collection of primary metaphors used to conceptualize Ω, notated as
[Ω](Yn ˄ Yn+1), constitute a conceptual realization of Ω, notated as [Ω](δ)
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This argument is by nature additive and ordered so that the exclusion of a preceding subargument would necessitate the revision of all following sub-arguments. Thus, it is in this
order that these will be discussed.
(1) The ineffable concept Ω exists as a disembodied concept
Perhaps of all the constituent parts of the Leap of Faith Argument, this first
argument could be described as the actual leap itself. Looking towards religion for an
example, one can observe the common debate between atheists and theists: ‘you cannot
prove God exists’ followed by ‘you cannot prove that God does not exist’ and so on and
so forth. Yet, in the actual study of religion, the researcher must always come to the
question of how to treat the religious object, a deity for example: the researcher could
simply say that the deity exists only in the minds of the community and does not truly exist
as a matter of ontology; they could assume that the community’s experience of the deity is
valid regardless of its existence; or they can assume that the deity does in fact exist in which
case they commit themselves to the ability of making true and false claims about that deity
with those claims being dictated by either formal or informal theologies. These approaches
might be described simply as atheistic, apatheistic, and theistic accounts, respectively. For
this paper’s leap of faith, it is necessary to avoid the first one altogether and to develop a
coalescence of the latter two accounts. Namely, a theory of religious metaphor must be
able to commit itself to the validity of religious experience irrespective of the actual
existence of that which is purportedly being experienced, as in the apatheistic account, but
it must also be able to treat the object purportedly being experienced as a real object which
can possess a seemingly endless propensity for engendering different religious experiences
in different religious communities. In addition, while committing to the existence of
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phenomenological truths, the theory must also commit itself to ontological truths. To state
it briefly, the first leap of faith here assumes a concept that is ineffable: a concept that is
all at once true and not false, false and not true, neither true nor false, and both true and
false. Yet, this ineffable concept must possess some condition of truth otherwise one would
not be able to claim that any predication of the religious object is or is not literal. Priest
(2015) describes this state of ineffability as the following, using e to notate a fifth value
equivalent to a state of ineffability:

“If A is effable, so is ¬A; if A and B are effable, so are A ˅ B and A ˄ B. But
conversely, if A is ineffable so, presumably, is any more complex thing in which
one might incorporate it. Hence, something takes the vale e iff some component
does. The addition of e does nothing to change our designated values (e is not, in
itself, a species of truth). So our definition of validity is as before.”

While I do not principally base my own theoretical work – as describe herein – on formal
logic, Priest and myself seem more or less in agreement on the nature of ineffability. I have
simply moved here to posit an ineffable, that is an ineffable thing from which the quality
of ineffability is derived.
Therefore, I claim for the sake of moving forward that this ineffable thing exists
and can be notated as Ω, with the following arguments (2)-(4) delineating its specific
qualities as regards its function within an amended Conceptual Metaphor Theory. Yet, the
astute reader may have noticed a contradiction of terms to which this theoretical
formulation leads. If in positing a notation for the ineffable (i.e. Ω) and if that which is
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notated by Ω is truly ineffable, then, following from Priest’s definition of ineffability and
in my own formulation in kind, all of our metaphorical formulations must in turn be
ineffable. So, the question is how this account can claim to make judgments on the
literalness or metaphoricity of a predication of the ineffable if that predication also becomes
ineffable. Perhaps here Aquinas’s thought on the literalness of divine predication may
prove insightful even if I do not commit myself, as I do not, to his account: “whereby the
things signified by the words in their turn also signify other things is called the spiritual
sense; it is based on and presupposes the literal sense” (trans. 1964). As such, one might
say that a predication of the ineffable that in turn becomes ineffable itself is in fact
inherently non-literal or, more accurately, metaphorical, but assuming that the predication
in question is effable in isolation, then it would populate the ineffable concept with
ontological properties with which one could form contradictions. In the absence of these
properties, the ineffable would simply be ineffable in its truest sense – that it would not
even be able to be condensed into something as pedestrian as the word ineffable. Therefore,
following from this line of thought, let us say that the population of the ineffable concept
with some effable ontological properties, though in turn becoming themselves ineffable,
allows for some instantiation of truth conditions so that any conceptualization of the
ineffable may be patently literal as a matter of usage but is always blatantly metaphorical
as a matter of experience and its internal conceptual structure32. This quality of ineffable
metaphors will henceforth be referred to as disembodiment, wherein the ineffable is a fully
non-embodied concept.

32

To offer what I think is an appropriate analogy, it is akin to answering the question of whether

Schrodinger’s cat is dead or alive with “It’s a zombie”.
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I am by no means the first person to consider the ineffable or discuss it as such, that
which can only be talked about in contradiction and ultimate epistemological abdication.
As touched on in the review of theological accounts of religious metaphor in the previous
chapter, it has been called many things: Pseudo-Dionysius’ darkness of unknowing,
Grassi’s word which is unspoken, Tillich’s ultimate concern, Neville’s being-itself,
Aristotle’s unmoved mover, Wittgenstein’s proclamation whereof one cannot speak,
thereof one must be silent, Heidegger’s ‘is’ itself – being – [which] ‘is’ not, and on and on.
There are so many names for that which cannot be named that even that begins to be a
contradiction: the overly effable ineffable. So, again as I have ruminated upon in these few
present paragraphs, how can we proceed from this? To quote Wittgenstein, again, one must
“so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it” – in this case, the ladder
being the initial assumption of Ω. Thus, the Leap of Faith Argument is a necessity of any
linguistic theory of the ineffable. This ineffable, Ω, can then in sum be said to possess the
following properties: Ω has no ontology, has no discernible numerosity, has no equal in
abstraction, and may not be surpassed in abstraction. It represents a metaphoric truth but
has no truth beyond metaphor. It is the metaphor, Grassi’s primordial metaphor. This is
the first step toward the leap of faith that we must necessarily take in order to proceed with
the present project.
(2) source domains cannot ‘map’ onto the target domain because Ω, as the primary
domain, possesses no coherent, stable ontology in and of itself
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Let us first begin again with a brief consideration of the ineffable, Ω. By definition,
as well as how I have operationalized it above, Ω cannot be referred to literally, as it
exceeds the limits of human cognition, and can only be referred to metaphorically, though
it may be possess a patent literal usage (i.e. it is disembodied). So, I have a few examples
of the direction in which we might orient ourselves when trying to find that which cannot
be found. One obvious example is death. It is a fundamental truth of our biological
existence that we cannot know what it is like to never again be ourselves alive, requiem
aeternam. The entirety of our existence is predicated, redundantly, on the fact that we exist.
To exist in a non-existent state, as some might believe, represents a contradiction in terms.
A being that exists cannot know what it is like to not-exist. This seems like a fairly common
example of the ineffable, and we can observe the conceptualization of this DEATH in various
religions around the world:

HEAVEN, VALHALLA, NOTHINGNESS, PARADISE, HELL,

and so

on. A more novel example than the after-life, however, is the before-life. Try to think back
as far as you remember, to your first memory. Then try to remember before that: you simply
cannot remember something that was never ‘membered’ in the first place. Go look for a
picture of you when you were a newborn, maybe even find your first ultrasound picture.
Yet, where were you before you were born? We spend quite a long time thinking about
where we are going because it is of immediate concern to us, but we do not often think
about the opposite. Furthermore, unlike with mummies, fossils, and cryogenically
preserved bodies, which we can point to and say that is what’s left of poor Jim, there’s
nothing we can point to five years before our birth and say that is what will one day be
what is left of poor Jim. So, try to remember what it was like to exist before you existed:
what it was like to be before you were. That thing, that state-of-(non)being¸ that
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unknowable before and that unknowable after is the ineffable Ω, a singular non-beingthing. You cannot, by definition, experience it as it is but you can experience its absence.
You know it is there, you experience its thereness, but you cannot experience what it is
like to be there. In trying to understand it, you create that which is understood to be it: the
ineffable metaphor. Less prosaically, you can only experience silence by naming it and in
so doing by un-naming it. That is the ineffable, as such, possesses no coherent, stable
ontology in and of itself. This is why the ineffable as a singularity may be understood as
propagating a plurality of ineffable metaphors (e.g. for death,
NOTHINGNESS,

HEAVEN, VALHALLA,

etc.) as they arise sporadically in different times, places, and cultures. Yet,

at the same time, it is the fact that it can give rise to such diverse derivations and that such
behave in similar ways would seem to indicate a lack of both ontological stability and
coherence. That is to say simply that Ω is not an empty set, that sub-argument (1) commits
itself to the existence of Ω, and that sub-argument (2) commits itself to the notion that
neither true nor false statements can be said about Ω (i.e. it possesses no point with which
truth or falsehood could gain leverage).
Within Conceptual Metaphor Theory, this means that Ω possesses neither imageschemata nor qualities or properties that could be transferred from itself to another domain;
and therefore, precluding it from acting as a source domain. Likewise, Ω possesses neither
image-schemata nor qualities or properties that could be mapped onto it from another
domain; and therefore, precluding it from acting as a target domain in the original sense of
Lakoff and Johnson (1980). However, it does make sense to consider it the target domain,
in as much as it is the domain that is being understood by means of a more concrete domain,
which in this case is all other domains that are not Ω. This issue can be remedied by simply
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re-orienting our perception of the “mapping” process for Ω so that instead of a source
domain mapping onto Ω, the source domain shifts into Ω, as a process of ontological
shifting, discussed in (3) below.
(3) as such, the source domain of the primary metaphor Ω IS Y takes the form of an
ontological shift, wherein the entirety of the source domain is moved into Ω, notated by
the form [Ω](γ)
Now, continuing in our leap of faith, let us assume that Ω is a viable, though
irreconcilably unique, target domain. We must now consider how this domain might
behave within a conceptual system, beginning with the most basic system: Ω IS Y. Before
we can move onto more complex structures and systems, let us consider a common endpoint concept33, infinity:
Ω IS SPACE → [Ω](SPACE) ≈ INFINITY
In this metaphor, the source domain SPACE appears to be ‘mapped onto’ Ω, but this begs
the question, again, of what it is being ‘mapped onto.’ There is clearly a process in which
the source domain

SPACE

does something with or to Ω. Since, Ω has no properties or

schemata onto which those of the domain

SPACE

can be mapped, the entirety of the

conceptual domain SPACE, with all of its attending properties, schemata, and entailments,

33

A more thorough exploration of what end-point concepts are and how they behave linguistically

will be presented in the following section. For now, I will work from the simplified definition of
an end-point concept as that which necessitates no further conceptual elaboration to be realized as
a concept (in comparison to an Ilithyic concept, which necessitates further elaboration of Ω before
being realized as a concept).
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is shifted into Ω to form an End-Point Concept [Ω](SPACE). This End-Point Concept seems
to have all the same properties but of a different degree. It is not quite hyperbole because
it is not really an exaggeration: it is almost like an exaggeration that is so exaggerated it
takes on a life of its own and just is. For instance, let us specify the space as a garden:
Ω IS A GARDEN → [Ω](GARDEN)
Now this [Ω](GARDEN), which we may realize linguistically as the infinite garden, is just like
any other garden in that it has flowers, mazes, statuary, exotic birds, and well-dressed men
walking around and talking just out of earshot – let us just assume for the sake of argument
that we are both thinking of a very fancy Victorian garden in which we are having a really
fun time. However, unlike any garden that could ever possibly exist, it has every flower,
and every flower is your favorite flower. All the mazes go on forever and whenever you
think about it too much you come out right where you thought you would which is
anywhere and everywhere. All the birds sing your favorite songs, and all the well-dressed
young men look like an infinite number of subtle variations on a theme, and that theme is
every young man you have ever had a crush on. You think it could not be a more lovely
garden and in so doing it is a more lovely garden. You want a puppy; you get the perfect
number of puppies. I think you also get the point. This infinite garden is infinitely gardenlike in all the ways you think a garden should be.
Now, let us also consider as an example the metaphor and ensuing end-point
concept Ω IS A LIBRARY → [Ω](LIBRARY) from Jorge Louis Borges’ short story ‘The Library
of Babel’, the excerpted passage first presented in the Introduction being once again
presented for convenience:
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In the vast Library there are no two identical books … in other
words, all that is given to express, in all languages. Everything: the
minutely detailed history of the future, the archangels’
autobiographies, the faithful catalogue of the Library, thousands and
thousands of false catalogues, the demonstration of the fallacy of the
true catalogue, the Gnostic gospel of Basilides, the commentary on
that gospel, the commentary on the commentary on that gospel, the
true story of your death, the translation of every book in all
languages, the interpolations of every book in all books.

The metaphoric reasoning underlying this passage can then be described as such:
Ω IS A LIBRARY → [Ω](LIBRARY) ≈ THE LIBRARY
A library contains books
THE LIBRARY contains infinite books
However, note that infinite books is not equivalent to [Ω](BOOK) – (although by its nature,
[Ω](LIBRARY) would also contain [Ω](BOOK)). From this same formula, one may also identify
other entailments of the end-point concept [Ω](LIBRARY).
I cannot combine some characters – dhcmrlchtdj – which the divine
Library has not foreseen and which in one of its secret tongues do
not contain a terrible meaning. No one can articulate a syllable
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which is not filled with tenderness and fear, which is not, in one of
these languages, the powerful name of a god.
In this case, one may observe a similar derivation:
Ω IS A LIBRARY → [Ω](LIBRARY) ≈ THE LIBRARY
A library contains books
THE LIBRARY contains infinite books
(and)
A book is written in a language
The infinite books are written in infinite languages
As a linguist, I cannot help but be appealed to by this metaphor: envisioning infinite
grammars of languages which may or may not one day come into existence seems at least
like a delightful way to spend an evening. As with the infinite garden being infinitely
garden-like in all the ways you think a garden should be, so too are the infinite library, the
infinite books, and the infinite languages infinitely library-like, book-like, and languagelike in all the ways they should be respectively.
If the reader will indulge me, one further example may add to this demonstration of the
ontological shift’s efficacy in describing the augmentation of the source domain in endpoint concepts. This time, from Neil Gaiman and Terry Pratchett’s Good Omens:
God does not play dice with the universe; He plays an ineffable
game of His own devising, which might be compared, from the
perspective of any of the other players (i.e., everybody), to being
82

involved in an obscure and complex version of poker in a pitch-dark
room, with blank cards, for infinite stakes, with a Dealer who won’t
tell you the rules, and who smiles all the time.
Excepting the Ilithyic concepts (i.e. God, He, His, and Dealer), which will be discussed
shortly, this excerpt may be described as the following:
Ω IS A POKER GAME → [Ω](POKER GAME) ≈ THE INEFFABLE POKER GAME
A poker game is difficult to learn
THE INEFFABLE POKER GAME is

infinitely difficult to learn

(and)
A poker game is difficult to play
THE INEFFABLE POKER GAME is

infinitely difficult to play

(and)
A poker game is difficult to win
THE INEFFABLE POKER GAME is

infinitely difficult to win

In the excerpt, poker is assumed to be difficult to learn, play, and win. This in turn means
that the INEFFABLE POKER GAME is infinitely difficult and bordering on impossible to either
learn, play, or win – let alone accomplishing all three. Thus, this passage can be reduced
to essentially – to translate the above notation into plain English – the ineffable poker game
that is infinitely poker-game-like in exactly all the ways you think a poker game should be.
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It is this augmentation of the source domain – making it ineffable, infinite, eternal,
or any combination thereof – that is notated with the ontological shift of Y into Ω yielding
[Ω](Y), and this process shows that Ω possesses some quality that in English seems most
easily expressed as infinity. As you may recall, far greater scholars than I have come up
against the wall of the ineffable and have fallen prey to the same issue of naming its itness: here, Neville’s being-itself and Heidegger’s ‘is’ itself – being – [which] ‘is’ not seem
to be approximately the augmentation of the source domain and its entailments which may
be observed in the examples of above. Still, infinite and perhaps also in conjunction with
its temporal parallel eternal (Ω

IS TIME

→ [Ω](TIME) ≈

ETERNITY)

are by far the most

convenient markers of end-point concepts in plain English and will be used where
appropriate to indicate such, being that Heidegger’s ‘is’ itself – being – [which] ‘is’ can
really only do so much descriptively. I will also take the liberty of, like Gaiman and
Pratchett, shamelessly using the cop-out term ineffable where it seems pertinent to do so.
Now, having extensively demonstrated the functions and products of ontological shifts,
sub-argument (4) may apply them to the analysis of more complex ineffable
conceptualizations, namely Ilithyic metaphors.
(4) a core collection of primary metaphors used to conceptualize Ω, notated as [Ω](Yn ˄
Yn+1),

constitute a conceptual realization of Ω, notated as [Ω](δ)

In the case of the first ontological shift into Ω being at the same time the final shift for that
conceptualization, requiring no further elaboration, this leap of faith need not proceed
beyond sub-argument (3). These end-point concepts need only be expressed as Ω IS Y 
[Ω](γ) ≈ INEFFABLE γ. However, in and of itself, end-point concepts are relatively simple in
comparison to Ilithyic concepts, which I will for the time being define as that which
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requires n+1 elaborations in order to be realized as a concept. Specifically, end-point
concepts are fundamentally of the form [Ω](γ) whereas Ilithyic concepts are necessarily of
the form [Ω](Yn ˄ Yn+1) which we can equate to a form notated as [Ω](δ). For the sake of
simplifying our clarifying this notation system let us also assume that the following rules:
Ω may not be a conceptual source domain; [Ω](Yn ˄ YN+1), [Ω](γ), and [Ω](δ) may not be
conceptual source domains for target domains that are not Ω, [Ω](Yn ˄ YN+1), [Ω](γ), [Ω](δ);and
Ω, [Ω](Yn ˄ YN+1), [Ω](γ), and [Ω](δ) may take any effable source domain; and [Ω](δ) may take
a source domain without that source domain necessarily becoming a substructure of its
equivalent [Ω](Yn ˄ YN+1). Having now clarified a few rules, this is the point at which we
first encounter the conceptual instantiation of a religious object, which is, for the sake of
exemplifying the point in the following example, a deity. Let us assume we are about the
business of creating a god – and let us defer the phenomenological basis of the act of
instantiation of the religious object for the time being. So, for this ‘god’, let us go against
the grain and say that it possesses the following properties in the following order: it is a
causality, it is an agency, it is a morality, and it takes the form and disposition of a
chameleon – that is to say we are going about the business of creating a chameleon god
who we will theonymize for convenience as Cam-Deus. Now, let us also assume for the
sake of argument that Cam-Deus is a wrathful deity that is not afraid to smite chameleons
who do not adhere to Cam-Deism or its strictly defined tenets. The religious object CamDeus may then be described as such:
Ω IS A CAUSE  [Ω](CAUSE)
[Ω](CAUSE) IS AN AGENCY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY) IS A MORALITY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ MORALITY)
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[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ MORALITY) IS A CHAMELEON  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ MORALITY ˄ CHAMELEON)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ MORALITY ˄ CHAMELEON) ≈ [Ω](CAM-DEUS) ≈ CAM-DEUS
If we might reasonably assume for the time being that most of the Chameleon religions in
this hypothetical world conceptualize their deities or religious objects as fundamentally
moral causal-agents, then we can reduce the notation to:
Ω IS A MORAL-CAUSAL-AGENT  [Ω](MORAL-CAUSAL-AGENT)
[Ω](MORAL-CAUSAL-AGENT) IS CHAMELEON  [Ω](MORAL-CAUSAL-AGENT ˄ CHAMELEON)
[Ω](MORAL-CAUSAL-AGENT ˄ CHAMELEON) ≈ [Ω](CAM-DEUS) ≈ CAM-DEUS
This is not to say that we should assume this collection of conceptual metaphors (i.e. CAUSE
˄ AGENCY ˄ MORALITY) is necessary, fundamental, or essential to religion generally; rather,
for the time being, it is an intuitively pervasive category that we may reduce easily by
definition. Anyway, the underlying conceptual structure for the Ilithyic concept CAM-DEUS
has been specified. Note, if this notation were to cease at Ω IS CAUSE  [Ω](CAUSE), there
would only be an end-point concept – the uncaused cause. In astrophysics, it may be
reasonable to claim that [Ω](CAUSE) is equivalent to the big bang, that is to say an ineffable
cause that is ineffably cause-like in all the ways an astrophysicist might expect a cause to
be. However, it is the secondary elaboration that initially constitutes a distinct Ilithyic
concept:
Ω IS CAUSE  [Ω](CAUSE)
[Ω](CAUSE) IS AGENCY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY) ≈ [Ω](ENTITY) ≈ THE INEFFABLE ENTITY
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This is essentially the same Ilithyic structure underlying Aristotle’s the unmoved mover
mentioned in passing in the preceding chapter. Following this, the tertiary elaboration
further develops the Ilithyic concept through the addition of moral conceptual properties
from the domain MORALITY.
Ω IS CAUSE  [Ω](CAUSE)
[Ω](CAUSE) IS AGENCY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY) IS MORALITY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ MORALITY)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ MORALITY) ≈ [Ω](MORAL-ENTITY) ≈ THE INEFFABLE MORAL-ENTITY
Now the addition of the domain MORALITY poses several questions about the moral nature
of this INEFFABLE ENTITY. In the formulation above, the INEFFABLE ENTITY can be said to
be a manifest incarnation of morality-itself, that it is morality-itself. Meaning, this
unknowable causal-agent constitutes and determines morality in accordance with its own
actions. If one understands the formulation of morality as good versus the absence of good,
then it stands to reason that an INEFFABLE MORAL-ENTITY can only do and be good and that
what constitutes what is good is that which THE INEFFABLE MORAL-ENTITY does and is. Given
the ineffability of the Ilithyic concept’s internal structure, this circular reasoning stands as
a valid understanding of what it means for an INEFFABLE ENTITY to be MORALITY. This also
precludes, in some sense, the existence of evil which gives rise to the necessity of
theodicies in various theological traditions – a fact which will be discussed as length in
Chapter 4. This structure is consistent with the wrathful deity CAM-DEUS, but let us
consider what it might mean to set the INEFFABLE ENTITY’s moral compass as either VIRTUE
or EVIL.
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THE ETERNAL RIGHTEOUS ENTITY

Ω IS CAUSE  [Ω](CAUSE)
[Ω](CAUSE) IS AGENCY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY) IS VIRTUE  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ VIRTUE)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ VIRTUE) ≈ [Ω](VIRTUE-ENTITY) ≈ THE ETERNAL RIGHTEOUS ENTITY

THE ETERNAL WICKED ENTITY

Ω IS CAUSE  [Ω](CAUSE)
[Ω](CAUSE) IS AGENCY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY)
[[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY) IS EVIL  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ EVIL)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ EVIL) ≈ [Ω](EVIL-ENTITY) ≈ THE ETERNAL WICKED ENTITY

In contrast to THE INEFFABLE MORAL-ENTITY, the moral natures of THE ETERNAL RIGHTEOUS
ENTITY

and

THE ETERNAL WICKED ENTITY

ontological properties into [Ω](CAUSE
respectively, such that

are pre-determined by the ontological shift of

˄ AGENCY)

from the domains

THE ETERNAL RIGHTEOUS ENTITY

VIRTUE

can do no evil and

and

EVIL

THE ETERNAL

WICKED ENTITY can do no good. Now, the absence of any moral domain in the sub-structure

of the Ilithyic concept would indicate that THE INEFFABLE ENTITY is neither inherently good
nor evil and that its actions and being do not inherently constitute the foundations of
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morality. For

CAM-DEUS,

let us assume that the Ilithyic substructures mirror that of

THE

INEFFABLE MORAL-ENTITY. Thus, the final domain CHAMELEON can be shifted into [Ω](CAUSE
˄ AGENCY ˄ MORALITY) as

in the following notation, again reduced for brevity:

Ω IS A MORAL-CAUSAL-AGENT  [Ω](MORAL-CAUSAL-AGENT)
[Ω](MORAL-CAUSAL-AGENT) IS CHAMELEON  [Ω](MORAL-CAUSAL-AGENT ˄ CHAMELEON)
[Ω](MORAL-CAUSAL-AGENT ˄ CHAMELEON) ≈ [Ω](CAM-DEUS) ≈ CAM-DEUS
The result is the full instantiation of the Ilithyic concept CAM-DEUS which we have
determined from the onset of this discussion to be the religious object of the chameleons.
We need only take one prototypical property of chameleons, their ability to selfcamouflage through changing the color of their skin, to demonstrate one of the Ilithyic
concept’s possible ineffable entailments.
[Ω](MORAL-CAUSAL-AGENT ˄ CHAMELEON) ≈ [Ω](CAM-DEUS) ≈ CAM-DEUS
A chameleon can change the color of its skin
CAM-DEUS can change its very form and mode of existence
Perhaps in one sect of this chameleon religion, the adherents have given CAM-DEUS the
epitaph the Great Concealment or, as stated earlier that this religious object is wrathful, the
composite epitaph the All-Wrathful Concealer. One might imagine any innumerable
variants in how this Ilithyic concept might be realized linguistically. However, it is
important to note that these linguistic realizations of the Ilithyic sub-structures of CAMDEUS, when terminated at different lines as described above –
ENTITY, MORAL-ENTITY, and CAM-DEUS

THE INEFFABLE CAUSE,

– are each a specific and distinct [Ω](δ). However,
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they are also additive in the sense that CAM-DEUS presumes THE INEFFABLE MORAL-ENTITY,
which presumes THE INEFFABLE ENTITY, which presumes THE INEFFABLE CAUSE, and which
in turn presumes Ω – such that CAM-DEUS is necessarily at the same time THE INEFFABLE
CAUSE but that THE INEFFABLE CAUSE is not necessarily CAM-DEUS. Thus, a core collection

of primary metaphors used to conceptualize Ω, notated as [Ω](Yn ˄ Yn+1), constitute a specific
conceptual realization of Ω, notated as [Ω](δ). However, one final problem in this subargument ensues from using this notational framework to denote a specific [Ω](δ) as
opposed to a unique [Ω](δ).

The specificity versus uniqueness of [Ω](δ) perhaps poses an issue that deserves further
consideration: so again if one presumes as following from the preceding sub-arguments
that Ω is by definition non-numerable – or in other words a singular numberlessness – how
is it that equally valid experiential conceptualizations of Ω which occur in different
cultures, especially those conceptualizations which possess parallel qualities, can be
theoretically accounted for as a clearly delineated plurality despite being exactly the same
notationally? I believe that this point deserves greater clarification before proceeding and
that it speaks to the technical aspects of how sub-argument’s (2) and (3) can inform the
more complex [Ω](δ) structure in sub-argument (4). So, I offer one final thought experiment.
Let us assume that there are two islands in complete isolation on which there are two
peoples who exist in likewise isolation. These two peoples are neither connected
genealogically, genetically, culturally, or linguistically and are not in communication with
any other peoples. Now, among each group at roughly the same time, a new religion is
born which worships the ocean, and their informal theology is exactly the same in their
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understanding and experience of each deity, which we might distinguish as Ocean-Godα
and Ocean-Godβ. By some coincidence, both groups also use the same name in their
distinct languages for this deity, which we will say as you might expect is simply OceanGod and is of the following structure:
Ω IS A MORAL-CAUSAL-AGENT  [Ω](MORAL-CAUSAL-AGENT)
[Ω](MORAL-CAUSAL-AGENT) IS AN OCEAN [Ω](MORAL-CAUSAL-AGENT ˄ OCEAN)
[Ω](MORAL-CAUSAL-AGENT

˄ OCEAN) IS AN ANTHROPOMORPH

[Ω](MORAL-CAUSAL-AGENT

˄ OCEAN ˄

ANTHROPOMORPH)

[Ω](MORAL-CAUSAL-AGENT ˄ OCEAN ˄ ANTHROPOMORPH) ≈ [Ω](OCEAN-GODα) ≈ OCEAN-GOD

(and)

Ω IS A MORAL-CAUSAL-AGENT  [Ω](MORAL-CAUSAL-AGENT)
[Ω](MORAL-CAUSAL-AGENT) IS AN OCEAN [Ω](MORAL-CAUSAL-AGENT ˄ OCEAN)
[Ω](MORAL-CAUSAL-AGENT

˄ OCEAN) IS AN ANTHROPOMORPH

[Ω](MORAL-CAUSAL-AGENT

˄ OCEAN ˄

ANTHROPOMORPH)

[Ω](MORAL-CAUSAL-AGENT ˄ OCEAN ˄ ANTHROPOMORPH) ≈ [Ω](OCEAN-GODβ) ≈ OCEAN-GOD

At first glance, there appears to be no meaningful distinguishing characteristic that might
distinguish Ocean-Godα from Ocean-Godβ, and for all intents and purposes, the two appear
to be the same deity. Now let us say that a horrible disaster befalls the island of OceanGodα, and all evidence of the people, their culture, and the god they worship is irrevocably
destroyed beyond all hope of recovery. For all intents and purposes, this people never
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existed at all. The question then is whether or not Ocean-Godα has ceased to exist and
whether or not it has continued to exist as Ocean-Godβ, both being the same with the
exception of their origin. It is clear that Ω would continue to exist as a necessary condition
of an embodied reality, but the ineffable metaphors derived for it do not seem to be as longlasting. Going back to the previous discussion on the validity of religious experience in
sub-argument (1) that must be committed to in order to preserve Ω theoretically, it is
reasonable to suggest that ineffable metaphors are a spatio-temporal artifact of an
individual or group that is constituted by the experience of Ω in a specific spatio-temporal
context. So, it is possible to resolve this issue by claiming that Ocean-Godα exists within
its time, place, and people but does not persist, while Ocean-Godβ continues to persist as a
realization of Ω until such a time as Ω is no longer experienced as Ocean-Godβ. This is
similar if not equal to theories of religion which claim its rituals, expressions, and
institutions are primarily derivative of culture (Everett 2008; Girard 1977; Sørensen 2005),
an argument which will receive critical consideration in section 2.3.2.1. Regardless of
whether or not religion is derivative of culture, this idea that identical Ilithyic conceptual
structure can exist each as a distinct [Ω](δ) but persist and be realized as different religious
objects creates a problem where, in basing their persistence on the experience of the group
or individual, it is indeterminable whether the individual in isolation or the group
collectively structure, understand, and experience the purportedly identical [Ω](δ) in the
same way; and if they do not, whether this entails a number of [Ω](δ) which is at least equal
to the sum total of all individuals who have ever existed. This question, which can also
apply to the experience of any object, physical or abstract, is pervasive in phenomenology
and the study of religious experience (Williamson & Pollio 1999; Williamson, Pollio, &
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Hood 2000). However, this too must need be deferred to the following sub-section, and for
now, it will be assumed that the experience of a religious experience can be generalized
within a group to at least a somewhat accurate degree and that identical Ilithyic structure
for [Ω](δ) may be distinguished by the way in which they are linguistically manifested, even
if they were to share the identical theonyms.
2.3.3: Complex Integrity Hypothesis
Now, having described the properties and behaviors of Ω both in isolation and in
relation to various source domains and sub-structures, it is necessary to better define and
delineate the two classes of concepts which were first introduced in the course of
expounding the Leap of Faith Argument: End-Point Concepts and Ilithyic Concepts. As a
reminder, these concepts have so far been defined as that which necessitates no further
conceptual elaboration to be realized as a concept, of the form [Ω](γ), and that which
requires n+1 elaborations in order to be realized as a concept, of the form [Ω](Y ˄ YN+1) and
its equivalent [Ω](δ), respectively. However, before launching into a detailed exploration of
these two concept classes, it is first necessary to return briefly to a property of the ineffable
mentioned briefly but not elaborately in sub-argument (1) of the Leap of Faith Argument:
disembodiment. The very idea of disembodiment, at least by my own understanding, is
nearly as esoteric as the ineffable itself and may as well be the ineffable itself, seeing as
disembodiment may be its most fundamental quality. Yet, to understand what is
disembodied, it is necessary to begin with an understanding of what is embodied. The sense
in which I am using the word embodied here is much in line with the extents and limits of
our bodily engagement with the plane of existence within which we find ourselves,
physically and cognitively. In this plane, there exists an embodied world – one that is
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realistic only in a human sense, to borrow from Lakoff and Johnson’s (1999) conception
of embodied realism – within which living organisms, atoms, elements, space-time,
mathematics, emotions, and so many other things, including especially ourselves, exist. In
the following illustrative diagram, it is illuminating to at first imagine this embodied realm
as a rather small box.

Figure 1. On Disembodiment or The Ineffably (or Infinitely) Recursive Ineffable
Thingish-Non-Thing
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From our perspective, this is just the box within which all of this mundanity resides. Also
residing, partially, in this box is the ineffable, Ω. I say only partially because for our
purposes here the ineffable in this box-based analogy is akin to the outline of the box in
which we find ourselves. Just as if we were in a fully-enclosed room without any entrances
or exits, we can only perceive what is in the room with us, what constitutes the room, and
what we understand to be the floor, ceiling, and walls of the room (i.e. the boundary). The
perception of a cognitive or existential boundary is only half of what the ineffable emerges
from, the other half being the idea that there might be something beyond the wall that we
have no hope of reaching – that is to say, the idea that there is an outer side of the wall that
exists parallel to the inner side of the wall. Taken together, this stands for the ineffable
which is a necessary part of our embodied reality – that is to say the dichotomous
counterpart to our embodiment. Yet, Ω is essentially only a recognition that there is
something unknowable and incomprehensible. It is the rejection of its incomprehensibility
that in turn constitutes an end-point concept, [Ω](γ). Following our walled-in box analogy,
this would be akin to drilling a hole into the wall and, being unable to reach the other side
– if there is another side – understanding the other side of the wall to be at the very least
somewhat further along than the depth of the hole that has already been drilled. Now, once
the end-point has been assumed – the idea that there is an outer wall – this then allows for
the idea that there is something at or beyond the end-point – that beyond the wall is another
space and perhaps another wall with another space behind it. This recursive ineffability –
the idea that there is always something more abstract than the most abstract thing you can
imagine or that, in describing the ineffable, the ineffable simply moves further along – is
what constitutes [Ω](δ), which is analogically the walls beyond the wall. This ineffably (or
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infinitely) recursive ineffable thingish-thing extends into what can be considered
something similar to the end of an unending road – the unbounded Ω, or Ω‽. There is really
not much point in trying to talk about Ω‽ so I will not do so. As such, in the sense of the
analogy presented above, disembodiment is to the ineffable what embodiment is to the
effable, the entailments of which are as yet somewhat beyond formulation for the time
being.
Now, following this brief review of disembodiment and returning to an outline of
the hypothesis at hand, the Complex Integrity Hypothesis holds that ineffable concepts are
of two types: End-Point Concepts (i.e. [Ω](γ)) and Ilithyic Concepts (i.e. [Ω](Y ˄ YN+1) and its
equivalent [Ω](δ)). While these classes presume certain properties of Ω, this hypothesis is
not directly involved with justifying Ω in the same way as the Leap of Faith Argument.
This hypothesis is concerned with the behavior of each class of ineffable concepts
especially in relation to their linguistic realizations and their relationship to experience,
individual or otherwise. As a secondary concern, it also contends with how the occurrence
of these concepts and their linguistic realizations can be successfully modeled relative to
their spatio-temporal and social contexts, a concern which is addressed through a MultiModal Phenomenological Modeling System described later in this subsection – the reader
need not concern themselves with it at this point. Primarily, the Complex Integrity
Hypothesis argues that each class of ineffable concepts behaves in specific definable ways
(e.g. Ilithyic concepts presume spatio-temporal End-Point Concepts) and that while some
operations have predictable limitations (e.g. [Ω](TIME) IS TIME  [Ω](TIME ˄ TIME) ≈ ???) others
may behave in unpredictable or recursively redundant ways (e.g. [Ω](MORAL-CAUSAL-AGENT) IS Ω
 [Ω](

MORAL-CAUSAL-AGENT

˄ Ω)

≈

THE INEFFABLY INEFFABLE MORAL ENTITY).
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When the

disembodied is attempted to be reconciled with the embodied, problems begin to occur, as
one might expect, and what elaborations may be made become much more restricted as the
number of elaborations increase. These increased number of elaborations also result in an
increased ability to promote embodied effects while simultaneously creating an increased
risk of irreconcilable contradiction. Like a lucid dream the purely disembodied end-point
concept may go in whatever direction the dreamer wishes and may take on any number of
variable states and forms, however, when the dreamer awakes and thinks that the dream is
connected to reality, an Ilithyic concept then there is a problem. The infinite garden is
infinitely lovely, but people might get very upset, or at the very least agitated, if you tell
them it actually exists and, when they start asking for directions, you find yourself at a loss
for words. An exploration of these behaviors can be found in the following sub-sections.

2.3.3.1: End-Point Concepts
End-Point Concepts are of a single type: Ω IS Y  [Ω](Y) ≈ [Ω](γ). However, it is possible
to sub-divide this category into four kinds of End-Point Concept: (1) Spatial End-Points,
(2) Temporal End-Points, (3) Property End-Points, and (4) Object End-Points. The first
two sub-categories – Spatial and Temporal End-Points – appear to operate as the
disembodied equivalents of our embodied reality in three dimensions of space and one
dimension of time. As such, they are implicit in all other End-Point and Ilithyic Concepts,
though they themselves may exist as individual End-Point Concepts. The third subcategory, Property End-Points, constitute the bulk of elaborative sub-structures in Ilithyic
Concepts and are recognizable by their realization in English through the interchangeable
Omni- and All- suffixes: for example, Ω

IS POWER
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 [Ω](POWER) ≈ ALL-POWERFULNESS or

OMNIPOTENCE.

The fourth sub-category, Object End-Points, is related to the ineffable

realization of the innumerable domains which take real-world ‘objects’ as their referents.
This includes, as the reader may recall, [Ω](GARDEN), [Ω](LIBRARY), and [Ω](POKER GAME) which
were discussed briefly in the previous section. In Ilithyic Concepts, this sub-category of
End-Point Concept frequently appears as the terminal elaboration in the Ilithyic substructure, more often than not giving the Ilithyic concept its form or mode of paralleled
embodiment, as in the CAM-DEUS example where the final elaboration might be
represented in isolation as the End-Point Concept [Ω](CHAMELEON). Taken together, these EndPoint Concept sub-categories may be realized linguistically in infinitely varied ways as
derived from generalized or localized entailments and, when systematically combined
within an Ilithyic Concept sub-structure, can be infinitely elaborative in respect to more
complex ineffable concepts. The following subsections contend with these End-Point
Concept subcategories and their respective properties.
2.3.3.2: Spatial End-Points: Infinity
The prototypical Spatial End-Point Concept, infinity, has already been discussed briefly in
the previous section, but I once again present the notation for it here for the reader’s
convenience.
Ω IS SPACE → [Ω](SPACE) ≈ INFINITY
In the above notation, it can be observed, unsurprisingly, that the domain SPACE shifts into
Ω yielding an End-Point Concept [Ω](SPACE) which means something along the lines of more
than all of space. However, the sense of the domain SPACE used here can be more carefully
described as our understanding of the three dimensions of space which make up our
embodied reality: the spatial dimensions of width, height, and breadth. Note also, the use
98

of the word dimension here does not include mathematical dimensions and their
applications. In light of this clarification, the formulation for infinity meaning more than
all of space (i.e. what is contained within the three-dimensional universe) is of the
following form:
Ω IS THREE-DIMENSIONALITY → [Ω](THREE-DIMENSIONALITY) ≈ INFINITY (THE INFINITE UNIVERSE)
This is the form of infinity used when talking specifically about spatial aspects of a concept
as opposed to infinite quantities and infinite qualities. Yet, if we define the spatial EndPoint Concept

THE INFINITE UNIVERSE

DIMENSIONALITY,

as deriving from the source domain

THREE-

then we should be able to conceptualize Ω spatially in terms of both

lower and higher spatial dimensionalities.
Beginning with lower dimensions – namely two- and one-dimensionality, it is reasonable
to assume that these subordinate spatial forms may be understood and described in literal
terms seeing as they are sub-components of the three-dimensionality in which we reside.
Describing a one- or two- dimensional universe though, as parallel or equivalent to our
own in terms of what a universe ought to be, is somewhat more abstract but need not be
any less literal. An example of this possible literality in lower dimensions may be observed
in Edwin Abbott’s (1884) Flatland: A Romance of Many Dimensions. Although principally
a critique of social class in Victorian England, Abbott’s Flatland as described through the
eyes – although sight is by definition of a non-visual kind in Flatland – of the text’s
protagonist A. Square as he journeys to and explores both lower and higher dimensions
relative to his two-dimensional reality. This text’s initial demonstration of how one might
talk about a two-dimensional world and its inhabitants literally (e.g. Flatlanders cannot
have a digestive system as it would bisect them) is closely followed by a description of a
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one-dimensional world, Lineland, and a brief description of a zero-dimensional world,
Pointland. The protagonist endeavors to explain his two-dimensional world to the
inhabitants of these lower dimensional realities to no avail before he is in turn visited upon
by an entity from a three-dimensional reality, Spaceland, who likewise suffers in vain to
explain to A. Square what a third dimension would be like. Abbott’s Flatland is an
interesting example of mathematical fiction, but the intricacies of his universe need not be
of such close concern here. Rather, what is important is that the inhabitant of Flatland can
easily comprehend and describe the mechanics of Lineland and Pointland, as these are subcomponents of his own reality, but cannot begin to comprehend the higher dimensions of
Spaceland, or indeed any dimensionality beyond it. Thus, lower dimensionality appears
allowably literal while higher dimensionality appears fundamentally unknowable in literal
terms.
This is not to say that Ω cannot be construed as an End-Point in terms of these lowerdimensions. For example, the ineffable two-, one-, and zero-dimensionalities below:
Ω IS TWO-DIMENSIONALITY → [Ω](TWO-DIMENSIONALITY) ≈ THE INFINITE PLANE
Ω IS ONE-DIMENSIONALITY → [Ω](ONE-DIMENSIONALITY) ≈ THE INFINITE LINE
Ω IS ZERO-DIMENSIONALITY → [Ω](ZERO-DIMENSIONALITY) ≈ THE INFINITE ABYSS
Ineffable concepts always seem to resist a true comprehension, but in the case of these
three, it is THE INFINITE ABYSS which begins to hint at some initial issues with and limitations
of End-Point dimensionality. Consider this excerpt from Flatland in which A. Square and
his three-dimensional visitor venture to Pointland, or the Abyss of No Dimensions, and
observe its sole inhabitant:
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Behold yon miserable creature. That Point is a being like ourselves,
but confined to the non-dimensional Gulf. He is himself his own
World, his own Universe … he has no cognizance even of the
number Two; nor has he a thought of Plurality; for he is himself his
One and All, being really Nothing.
This is to say that zero-dimensionality is so untethered from our own experience of existing
within dimensions that its mere conceptualization, not even as an End-Point, stretches the
limits of what may be referred to literally, even within this fictional world or perhaps
because of it, such that Zero-Dimensionality intuitively approaches an equivalency with
[Ω](ZERO-DIMENSIONALITY). This characteristic seems shared by the higher dimension End-Point
Concepts for any 3 + n dimensionality, which already seems fundamentally unknowable –
though apparently not undefine-able, so at preclude the possibility of being Ω. As an
example, the End-Points for four- and seven- dimensions:
Ω IS FOUR-DIMENSIONALITY → [Ω](FOUR-DIMENSIONALITY) ≈ THE INFINITE FOURTH DIMENSION
Ω IS SEVEN-DIMENSIONALITY → [Ω](SEVEN-DIMENSIONALITY) ≈ THE INFINITE SEVENTH DIMENSION
The peculiarities of these mathematically definable concepts that are at once seemingly unconceptualizable as literal entities, though not necessarily existent entities, is only
worsened by some of the more mind-bending spatial dimensionalities.
Ω IS (0 – n)-DIMENSIONALITY → [Ω]((0 – n)-DIMENSIONALITY) ≈ Ω‽((0 – n)-DIMENSIONALITY)
Ω IS ∞-DIMENSIONALITY → [Ω](∞-DIMENSIONALITY) ≈ Ω‽(∞-DIMENSIONALITY)
Ω IS (∞ - 1) -DIMENSIONALITY → [Ω]((∞ - 1) -DIMENSIONALITY) ≈ Ω‽((∞-1)-DIMENSIONALITY)
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This is the first time we have encountered ineffable concepts of this type, a type that is
nameable and definable but so fundamentally unknowable that there is no sense in trying
to discuss it. In fact, I think it prudent that we should not discuss it, and so for these
concepts, I appeal to Ω‽ on the grounds that any discussion of even one of these End-Point
Concepts could very constitute several theses and a moderately sized dissertation. Seeing
as our discussion of ineffable dimensionality here has reached even this end, let us move
on to Temporal End-Points.
2.3.3.3: Temporal End-Points: Eternity and Nevernity
By my own evaluation, Temporal End-Point Concepts are far easier to account for than
Spatial End-Point Concepts, being as our universe only possesses a single temporal
dimension. Thus, there Temporal End-Point Concepts are of two types: eternity and
nevernity, of the following forms:
Ω IS TIME → [Ω](TIME) ≈ ETERNITY
Ω IS ANTI-TIME → Ω‽(ANTI-TIME) ≈ NEVERNITY
The End-Point

ETERNITY

has already been outlined briefly in the previous section, but a

brief review of its nature is appropriate in this context.

ETERNITY

is simply the totality of

time and that which exceeds the totality of time: in one sense, the before, during, and after
times of our universe, and in another dichotomous sense, the before and after of our lives.
Like Spatial End-Point Concepts,

ETERNITY

appears implicit in Object End-Points unless

formulated otherwise – with, for example, the infinite garden going on forever in all
directions and all times (e.g. infinite and eternal). On the hand, NEVERNITY – if the reader
will forgive my neologism – seems contrary to all reason but also necessary as the
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antithetical counterpart of ETERNITY – as parallel with the relationship between INFINITY (THE
INFINITE UNIVERSE) and THE INFINITE ABYSS. Unlike ETERNITY, however, NEVERNITY cannot be

said of anything as when something is stated to be nevernal then it is at once conjured it an
existence, or at the very least an absistence, and is therefore no longer nevernal. Essentially,
it is the sum total and that which exceeds the absence of time. As such, we may set
NEVERNITY

aside for our purposes here as nothing more than a curiosity in disembodied

temporality. Going forward, ETERNITY will be the only Temporal End-Point Concept of any
concern for the present study.
2.3.3.4: Property End-Points: Omnipotence, Omniscience, Unendingness, Etc.
Much like Spatial and Temporal End-Point Concepts, Property End-Point Concepts are
frequently implicit in Object End-Point Concepts, but for the time being, it will be useful
and illuminating to describe these End-Point Concepts in their restricted and isolated forms.
This will also prove efficient for the sake of exploring Ilithyic Concepts in the following
sub-section. Here, we will principally examine five Property End-Points: Omnipotence,
Omniscience, Omnipresence, Omnibenevolence, and Unendingness, which are of the
following forms.
Beginning with the first, OMNIPOTENCE seems a natural derivation of another Property EndPoint Concept, [Ω](AGENCY). In isolation, however, OMNIPOTENCE is not tied to the notion of
doing but more so to the ability to do – the resting state of the sum total and that which
exceeds the ability to do. It takes the following form:
Ω IS POWER → [Ω](POWER) ≈ OMNIPOTENCE
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The concept OMNISCIENCE parallels the nature of OMNIPOTENCE in that it is not the action of
knowing but the ability to know that is shifted into Ω. In this case, OMNISCIENCE is the sum
total and that which exceeds the ability to know and takes the following form:
Ω IS KNOWLEDGE → [Ω](KNOWLEDGE) ≈ OMNISCIENCE
What is interesting about this End-Point Concept,

OMNISCIENCE,

is that is need not

necessarily be connected to sentience or agency. For example, Borges’ THE LIBRARY could
be said to be omniscient in the sense that it would have contained all that there could have
possibly been to know. Now, OMNIPRESENCE is of the following form:
Ω IS PRESENCE → [Ω](PRESENCE) ≈ OMNIPRESENCE
Likewise, OMNIBENEVOLENCE and UNENDINGNESS may be expressed in parallel:
Ω IS VIRTUE → [Ω](VIRTUE) ≈ OMNIBENEVOLENCE
Ω IS QUANTITY → [Ω](QUANTITY) ≈ UNENDINGNESS
Regarding the first,

OMNIPRESENCE

appears frequently in Ilithyic structures that are

centered around the proximity of the religious object to the believer, such that a deity is not
just with you but is always with you. In the same way – and as discussed in a preceding
section – the End-Point concept OMNIBENEVOLENCE often occurs in Ilithyic structures that
are centered around or include a religious object’s specified moral nature. The last one,
UNENDINGNESS,

is slightly more productive as an entailment of certain Object End-Points,

discussed below. It has a similar meaning to INFINITY in the sense that it exceeds a defined
limit but is at the same time a singularly defined limit. For instance, if one were to imagine
– for some reason – an ineffable bag of jelly beans of the form Ω IS A BAG OF JELLY BEANS
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→ [Ω](BAG OF JELLY BEANS) ≈ THE INEFFABLE

BAG OF JELLY BEANS,

then it stands to reason that

one entailment would be similar to UNENDINGNESS perhaps in conjunction with an infinitude
of that which exceeds all possible flavors. But I digress, Property End-Points are fairly
straightforward in the sense that they are principally individual sub-structures in larger,
more complex Ilithyic concepts or may be similar in meaning to the entailments of Object
End-Point Concepts, though they are not the equivalent of the parallel Property End-Point
Concept itself. They are principally a restricted sub-group despite being limitless in their
linguistic realizations.
2.3.3.5: Object End-Point Concepts
Now, for the sub-group identified as Object End-Point Concepts, the reader may
well remember a previous example of THE INFINITE GARDEN, where the ice in your iced tea
never melts and the sun is never in your eyes. Object End-Pont Concepts are by far the
most varied of the End-Point Concepts in regard to their linguistic realizations in as much
as the source domain constituting the ontological shift in the metaphor carries with it a
more numerous and diverse group of ontological properties and image-schematic material;
but while they may be elaborated upon and be manipulated relative to their innumerable
possible entailments, the Object End-Point Concepts themselves do not represent any more
complex conceptual structure. Having mostly at this point considered pleasant Object EndPoints like libraries and gardens, let us consider the following example to work from in
this section:
Ω IS A SPAM EMAIL → [Ω](SPAM EMAIL) ≈ THE ETERNAL SPAM EMAIL
I believe this will be the most illuminating example to work from given the somewhat
innocuous and unassuming nature of spam emails in addition to their affectual
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ambivalence, which is to say that while they are mildly irritating, they are not so bad as to
evoke unbridled rage in the recipient.
As to

THE ETERNAL SPAM EMAIL ITSELF,

properties present in the source domain

certain entailments follow from the

SPAM EMAIL.

For the time being, let us assume

three: (1) spam emails are sent through the internet, (2) spam emails often involve potential
scams, and (3) spam emails are sent repeatedly with no conceivable way of stopping them.
Now, if the reader will indulge me, let us examine one possible linguistic realization of this
specific Object End-Point Concept in respect to these three properties.
One day, much like any other day, you open your email inbox to
find that you have received a spam email. However, this spam email
cannot be deleted: in fact, by trying to delete the spam email, it
begins to duplicate exponentially to the point of filling your inbox
to capacity. Your inbox is now, ostensibly, your spam folder, and
your spam folder is now, ostensibly, the sum total of your ability to
communicate through email, which is nil. Finally, you decide to
open one of the now numerous duplicates. It’s from your grandson,
which is strange given that you’re only twenty-three, and he’s
asking for a large sum of money to be wired to his bank account. In
return, he says he will give you half of the profits from some poorly
described financial scheme. He is also, inexplicably, a Nigerian
prince. You ignore the email and decide to turn in for the night. In
your dreams, the dreamscape is filled with an ever expanding,
infinite spam email that has been forwarded to your dream by your
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inbox. It asks for your first-born in return for half of the profits in
some ill-conceived scheme. It is all-consuming. You wake up to find
that you are a Nigerian prince with a large sum of gold that cannot
be moved from your country. You attempt to enlist the help of an
overseas stranger in exchange for half the profits.
Here, we first and foremost have the benefit of having pre-defined the nature and possible
linguistic realizations of the Object End-Point THE ETERNAL SPAM EMAIL, in advance. While
this is all good in well for the purposes of exploring the properties of Object End-Points, it
also conceals the actual mode with which these End-Points are analyzed: through linguistic
realizations of the concept. The astute reader may have already noticed this problem. For
now, we will leave this issue for the later sub-section of Vox et Silentium Dei, which is
more strongly associated with the application of this framework. For our purposes here, we
will assume the following derivations:
Ω IS A SPAM EMAIL → [Ω](SPAM EMAIL) ≈ THE ETERNAL SPAM EMAIL
Spam emails are sent through the internet
(1) THE ETERNAL SPAM EMAIL is sent through all conveyances
Spam emails often involve potential scams
(2) THE ETERNAL SPAM EMAIL creates all scams
Spam emails are sent repeatedly with no conceivable way of stopping them
(3) THE ETERNAL SPAM EMAIL is omnipresent

107

Having only picked out three possible ontological properties from the source
domain SPAM EMAIL, this represents only a minimal glimpse into the End-Point
Concepts realizations. In the crafted narrative above, however, once can observe
realizations of (1) in the expression “the dreamscape is filled with an ever
expanding, infinite spam email that has been forwarded to your dream by your
inbox” in which THE ETERNAL SPAM EMAIL is somehow delivered psychically; of
(2) in the expressions “it’s from your grandson, which is strange given that
you’re only twenty-three, and he’s asking for a large sum of money to be wired
to his bank account” and “you wake up to find that you are a Nigerian prince
with a large sum of gold that cannot be moved from your country” in which THE
ETERNAL SPAM EMAIL

self-constitutes all possible schemes across all possible

times and all possible worlds – it is self-creating; and of (3) in the expression
“this spam email cannot be deleted: in fact, by trying to delete the spam email,
it begins to duplicate exponentially to the point of filling your inbox to capacity”
in which THE ETERNAL SPAM EMAIL is non-removable because it is the absence of
removableness itself. Admittedly, the passage looks more akin to something one
would read in a horror fiction novel than in any real instance of language usage.
Yet, that it may exist and be understood indicates to some degree the efficacy of
this framework for Object End-Points.
This is not to say that Object End-Points are without limit: though they
are limitless in their variation, they are also ultimately dependent on the degree
to which their source domain is already populated with ontological properties
and image-schemas. Take for instance:
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Ω IS BANDERSNATCH → Ω‽(BANDERSNATCH) ≈ THE INEFFABLE BANDERSNATCH
This is of course the same Bandersnatch that appears in Lewis Carroll’s poem
Jabberwocky, within which this fictional creature’s existence solely occupies half a
quatrain: “Beware the Jubjub bird, and shun/ The frumious Bandersnatch!” Other than that
the Bandersnatch is a beast to be shunned – well presumably a beast – and that it is
frumious, which is an equally nonce word. With such sparsely populated source domain to
begin with, it becomes nearly inconceivable as to what

THE INEFFABLE BANDERSNATCH

actually is: it can be named and can be understood to have ineffable properties pertaining
specifically to what we can know about through Carroll’s description, but it is not as
productive when it comes to realizing THE INEFFABLE BANDERSNATCH linguistically.
Now, unlike Spatial, Temporal, and Property End-Points, Object End-Points are
much more likely to bring with them image-schematic information from their source
domains. The avid reader of history may recall the religious conflicts between iconoclasts
and iconophiles in the eighth and ninth century Byzantine Empire: setting aside for the
time the various political motives involved in these conflicts, the tension derives from the
representation of the divine and whether such representations are actually representative
or can stand as an instantiation of the divine. Essentially, assuming momentarily the
mantle of a ninth century Byzantine Christian, everyone knows that God is a man, everyone
understands the image-schema associated with MAN, and everyone understands intuitively
how that image-schema interacts with the properties of the ineffable; yet, the question is
how could any physical reproduction of that ineffable image-schema do the divine justice,
and if not, are all images of divinity inherent idolatry. This unimaginable but not
inconceivable image reminds me most closely of Pseudo-Dionysius’ Darkness of
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Unknowing in that despite having attributed a form to the ineffable, it still appears formless
to some degree. On the opposite end from formlessness, there is the problem that attributing
any image-schema to the ineffable opens the door for all image-schemas to be applicable,
omnimorphicity. Perhaps it would be safe to say, or at least easier to say, that attribution
of image-schematic material to the ineffable, especially in Object End-Points, invites a
tendency towards a more literal representation of the image-schema. Looking back to THE
ETERNAL SPAM EMAIL,

it is reasonable to assume that when discussing this End-Point one

conceived of a literal email just perhaps of altered proportions: yet it would have been quite
odd if THE ETERNAL SPAM EMAIL initially spawned the image of an elephant. It is reasonable
to assume, in this case, that Object End-Point Concepts will always tend towards a
preservation of core image-schematic content.
2.3.3.6: The Spatio-Temporal End-Point Implicature
As a brief aside, Property End-Points, Object End-Points, and more complex
Ilithyic Concepts, discussed below, tend to have properties similar to spatial and temporal
End-Point Concepts. This may result from the fact that all source domains are inherently
rooted in an embodied world – even fictional ones, in the case of the Bandersnatch. That
is to say, they are by nature rooted in a world that is spatial and temporal. Antithetically, Ω
is by nature disembodied and as such is without any inherent grounding in time or space.
This is such that any non-spatial and non-temporal are by default attributed the properties
infinite and eternal. Unlike with a conventional metaphoric structure as discussed widely
in Conceptual Metaphor Theory, where both the source and target domain exist within a
shared sense of spatial and temporal embodiment, the contrast between the spatio-temporal
disembodiment of Ω and the spatio-temporal embodiment of the source domain. Thus, THE
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INEFFABLE POKER GAME (i.e., Ω IS A POKER GAME → [Ω](POKER GAME) ≈ THE INEFFABLE POKER
GAME)

is both an eternal and infinite game that constitutes and exceeds the limits of space

and time, unless specified otherwise. Likewise, a Property End-Point like
BEAUTIFULNESS

(i.e., Ω IS

BEAUTY

→ [Ω](BEAUTY) ≈

ALL-BEAUTIFULNESS)

ALL-

is an eternal and

limitless beauty, a state of beauty that is beyond any semblance of the embodied concept
of beauty. The spatio-temporal properties of the source domain become salient and
productive principally as a result of the target domains lack of any spatio-temporal
properties: with the entirety of the source domain being shifted into Ω, aspects of the source
domain that may be frequently overlooked in Conceptual Metaphor Theory studies as a
result of their non-productivity, the source domain in total becomes a salient though
unstable “mapping”.
For example, let us return to
sections, I have referred to

THE INEFFABLE GARDEN.

THE INEFFABLE GARDEN

Throughout the previous

as the infinite garden, the eternal

garden, and the ineffable garden to some extent interchangeably. In consideration of the
inherent spatio-temporal ontological properties of source domains, however, we can
specify the linguistic realizations of THE INEFFABLE GARDEN (i.e. the End-Point Concept) in
relation to the spatio-temporal properties of the source domain, either separately or
holistically. Consider the following:
Ω IS A GARDEN → [Ω](GARDEN) ≈ THE INEFFABLE GARDEN
Gardens exist in space
THE INEFFABLE GARDEN exists

in an infinite space ≈ The Infinite Garden

Gardens exist in time
111

THE INEFFABLE GARDEN exists

in eternity ≈ The Eternal Garden

(or)
Gardens exist in time and space
THE INEFFABLE GARDEN exists in infinite and eternal space ≈ The Infinite and Eternal

Garden
Here, we can begin to distinguish the End-Point Concept

THE INEFFABLE GARDEN’S

base

linguistic realization The Ineffable Garden from its entailed spatial, temporal, and spatiotemporal realizations: The Infinite Garden, The Eternal Garden, and The Infinite and
Eternal Garden, respectively. This process can be repeated for any non-spatial and nontemporal End-Point Concept.
As a point of clarification, temporal and spatial End-Point Concepts are excluded
by reason that they are the dimensionalities themselves and are therefore defined by their
contrast: space does not necessarily coincide with time and vice versa34. By the same
stroke, it is possible to stipulate a source domain that is a holistic representation of our
temporal and spatial embodiment:

34

SPACE-TIME

(not to be confused with its likeness in

This of course an extreme simplification of an area of intense philosophical debate: the interested

reader may reference Broad (1923) and Prior (1962) for early discussions on this and related topics,
whereas both may serve as accessible primers on the subject of space and time specifically. For a
more practical and at once more conjectural consideration of these problems as they are in our
embodied world, the reader may find the astrophysical ruminations of Adams and Laughlin (1999)
an entertaining exploration of space and time as they change over the course of the universe’s
history, theoretically.
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Physics). The End-Point Concept for the source domain

SPACE-TIME

would be of the

following form:
Ω IS A SPACE-TIME → [Ω](SPACE-TIME) ≈ _____
I assure the reader that it is by no accident that the End-Point’s equivalent has been omitted.
If spatio-temporal properties are essential if not a pre-condition of our embodied reality, of
any possible existence in our embodied reality, then it seems that [Ω](SPACE-TIME) is the
disembodied answer to existence. This may even be the fundamental realization and
conceptualization of Ω, and I mean that in the most extreme sense. One may recall
Heidegger’s attempt to index the ineffable, the un-indexical: ‘is’ itself – being – [which]
‘is’ not. Just as with the Leap of Faith Argument, the inescapable problem of referring to
the ineffable: saying that a thing is, has been, and will be there when that thing is not, has
never been, and never will be there, seems to pose the possibility that in asking the question,
we have asserted the fundamental principles with allow the question to be asked –
existence. As such, with [Ω](SPACE-TIME) seemingly being a precondition of all non-spatial and
non-temporal End-Points, it may be assumed as an underlying feature of ineffable concepts
unless otherwise specified.
2.3.3.7: Summary of End-Point Concepts
In summary, End-Point Concepts are of a single type: Ω

IS Y

 [Ω](Y) ≈ [Ω](γ);

though they may be further divided into four sub-groups of End-Point Concept: (1) Spatial
End-Points, (2) Temporal End-Points, (3) Property End-Points, and (4) Object End-Points.
In regard to their linguistic realizations, Object End-Point Concepts are by far the most
versatile in that they bring with them a greater amount of ontological properties and imageschemata from their respective source-domains. Yet, there are still limits on how these
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properties are realized linguistically: image-schemata prove difficult to conceptualize in
some augmented ineffable concept, and source-domains that are underdeveloped have little
to contribute to the ontological shift, leaving a somewhat formless but nonetheless
specified End-Point Concept. Furthermore, Property End-Point Concepts are by far the
most prevalent as sub-structures of Ilithyic Concepts or in considering that which goes
beyond the extreme of a property. Finally, Spatial and Temporal End-Point Concepts
behave in unique ways that are closely aligned with our ability to engage with and
comprehend aspects of our lived, embodied world. These ineffable concepts additionally
seem limited by that same embodiment, with iterative dimensionalities in space or the
absence of time in time approaching a nearly incomprehensible state. Despite this, these
two sub-types of End-Point Concept appear to be an underlying aspect of the discussion of
the ineffable itself and appear, almost necessarily, in the entailments of all other metaphor,
whether they are Property or Object End-Points or more complex Ilithyic Concepts.
Altogether, End-Point Concepts represent a productive and widely varied form of
conceptualization as a process and appear to possess non-finite realizations of the EndPoints both linguistically and representationally. This conceptual range is only exceeded
in variation and complexity by Ilithyic Concepts, described below, in which End-Point
Concepts serve a crucial structural purpose.

2.3.4: Ilithyic Concepts
Ilithyic concepts are by far one of the most recent developments in the line of
theoretical inquiry outlined above, wherein my original attempts to formulate a description
of the ineffable would eventually lead me to this carefully delineated conceptual category.
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They are fundamentally a collection of End-Point Concepts which possess a coherent
internal structure and are linguistically realized as a singular concept. However, their
internal structure is unstable and must be continually reconstructed in the face of
experiential or logical contradictions. Thus, unlike End-Point Concepts which may exist
outside of the confines of experience, Ilithyic Concepts are experientially constitutive in
that they frame the experiences which structure the conceptual frame itself. One might
reasonably argue that it is this infinite recursivity of experience and conceptualization
which causes Ilithyic Concepts to become unstable, but as will be demonstrated in the
following section, the true cause of this instability is derived from the contradictions
inherent to the concepts internal structure and the experience of the object which the
structure attempts to manifest. They are also central to faith as a function of human beliefs,
and in as much as beliefs are a matter of experience, so too is faith. In this sense, it is
artificial to limit Ilithyic Concepts to purely religious objects even for the sake of argument
and it is even more so limiting to describe the experiential objects constituted by Ilithyic
Concepts as religious objects. One obvious example of Ilithyic Concepts outside the
bounds of religion would be the experiential object of atheism, and it is immediately
apparent that religion, as a Western concept derivative of Western theology, would exclude
experiential objects in many cultures and societies simply on the grounds of cultural
differentiation. An example of the latter case would be the distinction between an
American’s belief in ghosts and the belief in semi-corporeal entities in non-Western
cultures, such as the Tanzanian’s Popobawa (Thompson 2017) or the Pirahã’s xíbiisihiaba
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(Everett 2008)35. The key here is an experiential connection to the ineffable, Ω, through a
structured collection of End-Point Concepts which are linguistically and experientially
realized as an Ilithyic Concept, [Ω](δ).
2.3.4.1: The Devil’s in the Details
When attempting to empirically discuss the ineffable and our relationship with it,
three problems always arise: the existence or nonexistence of the religious object; the
validity or invalidity of the manner in which it is experienced; and the literalness or
nonliteralness of the way in it is expressed. Of these, the first issue of existence and the
second issue of experience have been addressed by the Leap of Faith Argument. However,
the issue of expression and its relation to the question of experiential validity remains
problematic in regard to the linguistic realization of complex ineffable concepts. End-Point
Concepts in isolation require very little justification for the way in which any one source
domain is shifted into Ω although their realizations may differ depending on what

35

The claims presented in this thesis have interesting implications for Everett’s (2008) immediacy

of experience principle and current work on linguistic relativity in that vein. However, Everett
attempts to use the principle and an appeal to linguistic relativity as an explanation for the purported
lack of ritual practice in Pirahã culture to the effect that “a ritual where the character could not
claim to have seen what he or she was enacting would be prohibited” (p. 84). This conclusion seems
more as a result of Everett’s missionary (i.e. Western theological) background and subsequent
departure from faith rather than coming from any substantial or academically meaningful
documentation of Pirahãn beliefs. Nevertheless, these semi-corporal entities are included within the
category of Ilithyic Concepts on the grounds of their experiential implications rather than on their
ritualization within the aforementioned culture.
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properties of the source domain are foregrounded and backgrounded. Ilithyic Concepts
however do require such a justification, continually so. They also pose a specific problem
to identification and analysis – a problem similar to one that occurs with End-Point
Concepts – in that the expression of the Ilithyic Concept, as complex it is sometimes is,
may be relegated to the any degree of the expression’s cotext such that religions which
make use of the same theonym may understand their respective religious objects in
drastically different senses36. This issue is only further amplified once we move beyond
monotheistic thought experiments to consider how Ilithyic Concepts could potentially be
applied to polytheistic, agnostic, atheist, or even syncretic traditions and is made
emphatically more difficult by the theonymicization of religious epithets (e.g. Lord or
Christ). Many of these latter points cannot be fully accounted for without considering the
Vox et Silentium Dei outlined at the end of this chapter, and as such, my substantive
discussion of the way in which Ilithyic are formed and reformed must be postponed until
then. However, I would be remiss to not give some example of what an Ilithyic Concept is
and can be.
So, let us consider Satan. There are of course the culturally received forms from
Christianity such as a snake, a beautiful fallen angel, a cloven-hooved man with the head
of a goat, a red pitch-forked figure with horns, and many others; however, the Satan – or
perhaps Satans – considered here are of Christianity, Theistic Satanism (Devil
Worshippers), and Atheistic Satanism (Satanists). Beginning with Christianity, Satan as an

36

The reader may recall the earlier exploration of how one might differentiate Ocean-Godα from

Ocean-Godβ earlier in this chapter.
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Ilithyic Concept may be generally realized by a familiar structuring of End-Point Concepts
which you may recall as THE ETERNAL WICKED ENTITY:
Ω IS CAUSE  [Ω](CAUSE)
[Ω](CAUSE) IS AGENCY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY) IS EVIL  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ EVIL)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ EVIL) ≈ [Ω](EVIL-ENTITY) ≈ SATAN (THE ETERNAL WICKED ENTITY)

In the above Christian sense of the expression, SATAN is not a deity but rather an
ineffable agent of evil that generally allows for Christian theodicy. The internal ordering
of the Ilithyic substructures is also important to consider here in that SATAN is not realized
as an ineffable force of evil, which would some dualist conceptions of evil and would result
from the omission of line three (i.e. [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY) IS EVIL  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ EVIL)), but
as specifically an agent which creates evil. Within Christianity, SATAN is not equal in status
to GOD however as it does not possess the End-Point Concept Ω IS POWER → [Ω](POWER) ≈
OMNIPOTENCE as part of its substructure and is thus, as stated above, not a deity per se. Yet,

this is not always so clearly delineated in the world as it is, as can be seen in the following
examples taken from a wildly anti-Semitic sermon titled “One World Government 2: The
Assault on Identities” by Pastor Charles Lawson of Temple Baptist Church, which was
given before the church’s congregation on the morning of November 20, 201637:

37

The sermon was in response to Jeremiah 44:15-18 (KJV), which I have included here for ease of

reference: “15Then all the men which knew that their wives had burned incense unto other gods,
and all the women that stood by, a great multitude, even all the people that dwelt in the land of
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Men in power, women in power seek the blessing- now they don’t call
him the devil- we’ll get into that in a moment, they don’t call him the
devil, they call him that Great Spirit, Lucifer, and they make- they go
a long way out of their way to make sure that you don’t confound the
identity of Lucifer with the Devil. The Devil is an archaic, backwoods,
ignorant creation by uneducated people who cling to their Gods and
their guns. You remember the man that said that? Now I’m saying that
this is what they believe, folks. Please understand me, listen to what
I’m saying. That’s what they believe. They believe the Devil is a
superstitious creation. That’s all the Devil is to these people. Their true
God is Lucifer and to them Lucifer is the “light-bearer.”
In the above passage, Lawson emphatically affirms the existence of LUCIFER but makes it
clear, from his perspective, that the “[men and women] in power” make a distinction
between LUCIFER and the Devil. The implication here is that LUCIFER and the Devil are the
same entity and that the powerful worship the Devil without knowing it. Despite this
nominal clarification, the realization of LUCIFER in the sermon, appears similar enough to

Egypt, in Pathros, answered Jeremiah, saying, 16As for the word that thou hast spoken unto us in
the name of the Lord, we will not hearken unto thee. 17But we will certainly do whatsoever thing
goeth forth out of our own mouth, to burn incense unto the queen of heaven, and to pour out drink
offerings unto her, as we have done, we, and our fathers, our kings, and our princes, in the cities of
Judah, and in the streets of Jerusalem: for then had we plenty of victuals, and were well, and saw
no evil. 18But since we left off to burn incense to the queen of heaven, and to pour out drink offerings
unto her, we have wanted all things, and have been consumed by the sword and by the famine.”
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THE ETERNAL WICKED ENTITY.

Later in the sermon, however, makes a theodicy related

differentiation of evil, excerpted below, that runs counter to mainstream Christian
theology.
One is good, one is black. They are two opposing forces, diametrically
opposed to each other, yet they come together to create a one or they
merge to create a one whole. Now, that’s the occult view. Now the
Queen of Heaven is feminine. Lucifer is masculine. The Queen of
Heaven is feminine. Lucifer is masculine. You have people in this world
who are dedicated worshippers of Lucifer, you have people in this
world who are dedicated worshippers of the Queen of Heaven, or the
divine feminine. You could say how in the world could people like that
have anything to do with each other. The very simple principle that you
have opposites, you have a female and you have a male. They’re both
energized by the same spirit. The spirit of Satan, of Lucifer, the one
who came forth from the emanation. But also, Sophia, you remember,
you’ve got Sophia on one hand, feminine, Lucifer on the other hand,
masculine.
In the passage above, Lawson demonstrates an understanding and conceptualization of evil
as being of two forms: masculine and feminine. The impetus for this appears to derive from
his reading of Jeremiah 44:18 KJV and its reference to a deity referred to as “the queen of
heaven”. This subtle but important distinction can be realized in notation with the insertion
of a gendered-personification of the surrounding structure, as shown below:
Ω IS CAUSE  [Ω](CAUSE)
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[Ω](CAUSE) IS AGENCY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY) IS EVIL  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ EVIL)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ EVIL) IS A MALE  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ EVIL ˄ MAN)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ EVIL ˄ MAN) ≈ [Ω](EVIL-MASCULINE-ENTITY) ≈ SATAN (LUCIFER)

Ω IS CAUSE  [Ω](CAUSE)
[Ω](CAUSE) IS AGENCY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY) IS EVIL  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ EVIL)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ EVIL) IS A FEMALE  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ EVIL ˄ WOMAN)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ EVIL ˄ WOMAN) ≈ [Ω](EVIL-FEMININE-ENTITY) ≈ SOPHIA (THE QUEEN OF HEAVEN)

As it becomes clear later in the sermon, one motivating factor for making this gender
distinction between SATAN AND SOPHIA relates to the increasing visibility of transgender,
non-binary, and gender-queer individuals in public discourse and allows for the
conceptualization of a third ETERNAL WICKED ENTITY:

But He didn’t create the male and the female to merge and become an
androgynous creature. But that’s what’s happening in our society. Our
culture, folks, is worshipping the Queen of Heaven and Lucifer. Now
they might not know it- I’m sure if you talk to some intellectual from
one of the local universities, he’d scoff at you and laugh at you, if you
thought for a moment he might be religious. But he’s religious, believe
me. O yes, he’s very religious. And so, this is where it’s coming to. Can
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you see the merging of it, can you follow with me, can you see the
merging, can you see it right before your very eyes? There’s a real
agenda going on here, a real agenda, and this agenda is to confuse the
gender identity. But it’s also to bring them all together into one whole,
and that opposing forces literally counter each other and create the
Universal Life Spirit that they’re all looking for.
This “merged” entity, THE UNIVERSAL LIFE SPIRIT, is of the following form:

Ω IS CAUSE  [Ω](CAUSE)
[Ω](CAUSE) IS AGENCY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY) IS EVIL  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ EVIL)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ EVIL) IS A FEMALE  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ EVIL ˄ WOMAN)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ EVIL ˄ WOMAN) IS A MALE  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ EVIL ˄ WOMAN ˄ MAN)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ EVIL ˄ WOMAN ˄ MAN) ≈ [Ω](EVIL-FEMININE-MASCULINE-ENTITY) ≈

THE

UNIVERSAL LIFE

SPIRIT

In the Ilithyic substructures for

THE

UNIVERSAL LIFE SPIRIT, both the source domains

WOMAN and MAN shift into [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ EVIL) (i.e. the base form for THE ETERNAL WICKED
ENTITY)

that is terrifyingly – to them – inconsistent with their transphobic theo-political

ideologies. The experiential and conceptual motivations for this Ilithyic Concept, as well
as the underlying mechanisms for such, will be further discussed in the following section.
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Now, let us turn in the interim to SATAN as it is realized in Theistic Satanism (i.e. Devil
Worship). This conceptualization of Ω is the same as the Christian conceptualization,
which resembles that of THE ETERNAL WICKED ENTITY.
Ω IS CAUSE  [Ω](CAUSE)
[Ω](CAUSE) IS AGENCY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY) IS EVIL  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ EVIL)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ EVIL) ≈ [Ω](EVIL-ENTITY) ≈ SATAN (THE ETERNAL WICKED ENTITY)

However, in the case of Theistic Satanism as it is differentiated from Christianity, the
relationship between the Satanist and the Ilithyic Concept SATAN is dramatically altered so
that the substructure [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY) IS EVIL  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ EVIL) is either foregrounded
as a positive and alternative attribute or is further elaborated om so that it is understood in
a new light. For example, the metaphor SATAN IS A REBEL would potentially frame the devil
as a misunderstood freedom fighter rather than an evil entity, though equally as real as the
Christian deity.
In contrast, Atheistic Satanism does not take some variation of THE ETERNAL WICKED
ENTITY

as its religious object. Instead, Satan is a non-Ilithyic concept derived from a

Christian cultural tradition that is meant to symbolize Satanist values that are constructed
and perceived as counter to mainstream, primarily Christian values. Here, the “religious”
object of the atheist is a cause without agency that is nothing unto itself:
Ω IS CAUSE  [Ω](CAUSE)
[Ω](CAUSE) IS NOTHING  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ NOTHING)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ NOTHING) ≈ [Ω](NOTHINGNESS) ≈ NOTHING
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The Satan of Atheistic Satanism is then a symbol of the rebellious and self-focused values
professed by Satanists, values which have been developed in opposition to Christian values
and which therefore easily find representation in the Christian antithesis of divine grace.
Furthermore, while the ritual practices of Atheistic Satanism are centered on imagery and
language of Satan derived from Christian beliefs, it is repeatedly made clear that this is
meant to uplift ideals of personal freedom and liberty rather than represent any fully
realized worship of a religious object.
Considering the three realizations of the theonym Satan presented above, it is clear
that all religious objects (of belief or worship) are Ilithyic Concepts but that not all Ilithyic
Concepts are religious objects. It is also evident that the theonym Satan can be either an
Ilithyic or a non-Ilithyic Concept and that such a differentiation has a meaningful impact
on the way in which the individual engages with and responds to the concept itself in their
larger social and cultural spaces. Lawson’s masculine Lucifer and LaVey’s rebellious
Satan have little more in common than a nebulous assemblage of theonyms and a
diachronically diversified range of icons. This continues to raise the issue of the
interconnectedness or lack thereof between expression and experience as it relates to
Ilithyic concepts, especially as it relates to religious objects with which human can create
meaningful relationships. Here it is sufficient to describe the underlying form of the Ilithyic
Concept, but a greater discussion of expression and experience as it relates to the function
of Ilithyic Concepts is still required and will be addressed in in the following sections.
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2.4: The Vox et Silentium Dei
Ilithyic Concepts, specifically their internal substructure of additive End-Point
Concepts, are by nature unstable as they take the ineffable as their target domain and
referent simultaneously. As I have touched on previously, this creates a tension between
our own embodied experiences of the world around us and the disembodiment of the
ineffable itself, leaving us with a multi-valent metaphorical truth of which we can never
hope to attain. In the previous section, Ilithyic Concepts were presented as if they were
static socio-cognitive objects that demand their own existence, but in reality, they are
nothing more than fleeting after-images of the attempt to conceptualize the ineffable. They
persist, mutate, and react in the face of our embodied experiences. The reader may recall a
quote from Pliny the Younger, presented in the Introduction of this thesis, which inspired
this line of inquiry and reads: “A few in their fear of death were praying for death. Many
were raising their hands to implore the gods, but more took the view that no gods now
existed anywhere, and that this was an eternal and final darkness hanging over the world”
(2009: 149). The divergent and visceral reaction in the face of a traumatic experience as
preserved by Pliny would seem to indicate a shared initial position regarding the
conceptualization of the ineffable – in this case, death, the afterlife, and the Roman deities
– that deteriorates and concludes in a number of predictable and semi-intuitive conceptual
positions such as a turn to faith and a turn away from faith. This process of conceptual
mutation and maintenance is central to the function and production of Ilithyic Concepts as
the unstable relationship between [Ω](δ) and Ω requires continued reconstruction in the face
of a contradictory embodied reality: the Vox et Silentium Dei, respectively.
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So far, we have examined how Ω develops into [Ω](δ) through the intermediate form(s)
[Ω](Yn ˄ YN+1), but this represents only half of the conceptual process which is foundational
to Ilithyic Concepts. A second process where [Ω](δ) deteriorates into Ω through the
intermediate form(s) [Ω](Yn

˄ YN+1)

is equally present in the conceptualization of the

ineffable. Moreover, due to the nature of our ubiquitous relationship to the ineffable, these
two processes constitute a holistic and non-terminating process motivated by an innate
necessity to reconcile our disembodied and embodied experiences. Definitively, the Vox
Dei or Voces Dei are notated by [Ω](Yn ˄ YN+1) and [Ω](δ) and represent the linguistic and
conceptual realizations of the ineffable, and the Silentium Dei is notated by Ω which
represents both the ineffable, in a notational sense, as well as the (re)actions which
instigated the deconstructive process, in an experiential sense. Together, they constitute a
non-Saussurian sign by which there is always a signifier or signified but never both at once
or in tandem: the voice of the divine silences the ineffable and the silence of the ineffable
voices the divine. Figure 2 models this process, below.
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Figure 2.. The Vox et Silentium Dei

In this model, Vα and Vβ indicate unresolved and resolved conceptual violations
respectively, wherein conceptual violations are taken to be the motivating factor for
conceptual deconstruction which therefore require resolution. These violations may be
resolved through a wide range of conceptual modifications or socio-cognitive corrective
mechanisms, but they are as central to the existence and maintenance of the Ilithyic
Concept as they are contradictory to its realization.
Before launching into a more detailed examination of the various stages and
processes of the Vox et Silentium Dei, I would like to offer up an abbreviated case study
drawn from the journal of the American Christian missionary John Allen Chau, who was
killed during his attempt to proselytize to the people of North Sentinel Island in the Winter
of 2018.
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LORD let Your will be done. If you want me to get actually shot or
even killed with an arrow, then so be it. I think I could be more
useful alive though, but to you, God, I give all the glory of whatever
happens. I DON’T WANT to die!
Throughout the journal entries, Chau is engaging with an Ilithyic conceptualization of God
that takes as part of its substructure the SOVEREIGNTY source domain, of the following form:
Ω IS CAUSE  [Ω](CAUSE)
[Ω](CAUSE) IS AGENCY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY)IS MORALITY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ MORALITY)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ MORALITY) IS A SOVEREIGN  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ MORALITY ˄ SOVEREIGN)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ MORALITY ˄ SOVEREIGN) ≈ [Ω](THE MORAL ALL-SOVEREIGN) ≈ GOD (LORD)

From this, which is a specified personification of

THE INEFFABLE MORAL ENTITY,

we can

predict certain entailments such as:
If God is a king, then He has a kingdom/crown/throne/etc.
(1) I can’t wait to see [the Sentinelese] around the throne of God
worshipping in their own language
(2) May Your Kingdom, Your Rule and Reign come now to North Sentinel
Island.
(3) Thank You Father for using me, for shaping me and molding me to be
Your ambassador.
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However, as is indicated by Chau’s prayer, there is a tension that exists between the
physical threat to Chau’s life that his mission work entails and his belief that it is the
command of an omnibenevolent deity to undertake such work. Briefly, if God is all-good,
why does He put Chau in harm’s way? In this case, Chau appeals to his conception of
God’s sovereignty and backgrounds his convictions about God’s moral goodness in order
to rationalize the problem posed by his own mortality in the face of his missionary work.
This process can be noted as follows:

Ω IS CAUSE  [Ω](CAUSE)
[Ω](CAUSE) IS AGENCY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY)IS MORALITY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ MORALITY)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ MORALITY) IS A SOVEREIGN  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ MORALITY ˄ SOVEREIGN)
[Ω](THE MORAL ALL-SOVEREIGN) ≈ GOD (LORD)
Vα Mortality; Obeying God could lead to death or personal harm
Ω
Vβ *[Ω](Y ˄ Yn+1)IS MORALITY  [Ω]( Y ˄ Yn+1 ˄ MORALITY)
Ω IS CAUSE  [Ω](CAUSE)
[Ω](CAUSE) IS AGENCY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY) IS A SOVEREIGN  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ SOVEREIGN)
[Ω](THE ALL-SOVEREIGN) ≈ GOD (LORD)

In the above notation, the initial Vox Dei, [Ω](THE MORAL ALL-SOVEREIGN), is deconstructed into Ω
in the presence of the Chau’s grappling with his own mortality, Vα Mortality. Chau resolves
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this conceptual violation through the removal of the Ilithyic substructure [Ω](Y ˄ Yn+1)IS
MORALITY  [Ω]( Y ˄ Yn+1 ˄ MORALITY) and continues to reconstruct an Ilithyic conceptualization

of GOD which excludes entirely any notion of the moral goodness of GOD, at least within
the Ilithyic substructure. In this scenario, the mortal peril that Chau finds himself and
whether or not it is good or bad becomes irrelevant to his relationship with GOD; it is
enough that Chau has faith in GOD and that such faith constitutes a necessary obedience to
a divine sovereign, regardless of what one has been called to do. Now, this is not the only
means of addressing the conceptual violation Vα Mortality, and it need not be addressed
solely through the alteration of the Ilithyic substructure. In fact, Vα is not even required to
cause a contradiction within the Ilithyic substructure if it can be resolved in relation to
subsidiary metaphors of [Ω](δ). There is, simply put, no singular motivation or course of
action for deconstruction and reconstruction, with the options for such including linguistic,
cognitive, and social factors. However, an overview of the possible avenues by which the
Vox Dei may be reconstructed can shed light on potential real-world repercussions
stemming from the individual’s actions in relation to belief. For instance, in his
reconstruction of an all-sovereign GOD, Chau commits himself to a conceptualization of
the ineffable which prevents his self-removal from a mortally dangerous situation.
Moreover, after his initial grappling with the issue of mortality and his reconstruction of
the Ilithyic Concept GOD, Chau is presented again and again with Vα Mortality, but it no
longer requires any alteration to the Ilithyic Concept’s substructure: it becomes a matter of
Chau’s self-perceived obedience to GOD. This is an example of what we might call
conceptual maladaptation and is only one of many ways in which the de- and reconstructive processes can have a

negative
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(or

positive)

effect

on

the

world

surrounding the individual. In the remainder of this section as follows, I provide a more
detailed account of the variety found within these parallel processes.

2.4.1: Proto-Constructions:
The initial construction of an Ilithyic Concept from Ω, if such a thing makes sense
within the complex matrix of social, cognitive, and linguistic development, is assumed to
occur but is otherwise unseen. Perhaps, the great mystics and esoterics, those that James
referred to as religious geniuses, could have sufficiently deconstructed the Vox Dei to a
stable and isolated Silentium Dei. This is certainly what Ibn Tufayl imagined Hayy ibn
Yaqzān doing as he grew up isolated from the rest of the medieval Muslim world and seems
like an appropriate explanation for the darkness of unknowing professed by PseudoDionysius. However, such individuals are far from common, and the majority of
individuals content themselves with far less existential labor in their relationship with their
chosen divinity. It can be assumed that there are some initial constructions that are
universal such as our first confrontation with mortality and the after and that some must be
acquired through intentional instruction such as the Trinity or Christian communion. Yet,
the most frequent occurrence of Ilithyic Concepts within the Vox et Silentium Dei is far
less galvanizing than a radical comprehension of an unknowable rite of truth: they are the
maintenance of the concept or a specification on an aspect of the Ilithyic substructure. In
these cases, and for the purpose of entering into the analysis of religious metaphors with a
general idea of how the Ilithyic Concept is structured, we can posit proto-constructions of
the Ilithyic Concept which allow us to avoid starting entirely from scratch. The reader may
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recall some proto-constructions presented earlier, which I have included below for
reference.
THE INEFFABLE ENTITY

Ω IS CAUSE  [Ω](CAUSE)
[Ω](CAUSE) IS AGENCY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY) ≈ [Ω](ENTITY) ≈ THE INEFFABLE ENTITY

THE INEFFABLE MORAL-ENTITY

Ω IS CAUSE  [Ω](CAUSE)
[Ω](CAUSE) IS AGENCY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY) IS MORALITY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ MORALITY)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ MORALITY) ≈ [Ω](MORAL-ENTITY) ≈ THE INEFFABLE MORAL-ENTITY

THE ETERNAL RIGHTEOUS ENTITY

Ω IS CAUSE  [Ω](CAUSE)
[Ω](CAUSE) IS AGENCY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY) IS VIRTUE  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ VIRTUE)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ VIRTUE) ≈ [Ω](VIRTUE-ENTITY) ≈ THE ETERNAL RIGHTEOUS ENTITY

THE ETERNAL WICKED ENTITY

Ω IS CAUSE  [Ω](CAUSE)
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[Ω](CAUSE) IS AGENCY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY)
[[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY) IS EVIL  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ EVIL)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ EVIL) ≈ [Ω](EVIL-ENTITY) ≈ THE ETERNAL WICKED ENTITY

As demonstrated in the brief case study of Ilithyic conceptualizations of SATAN where we
began our analysis from

THE

ETERNAL WICKED ENTITY proto-construction, these pre-

formulated structures are useful for comparing divergent conceptions of (purportedly
shared) Ilithyic Concepts.
These proto-constructions, in addition to serving as convenient analytic tools, can
also potentially shed light on the role of conceptual processes in the development of new
religious or ritual practices. One particularly illuminating example is THE MESSIAH, which
we can notate as:
THE MESSIAH

Ω IS CAUSE  [Ω](CAUSE)
[Ω](CAUSE) IS AGENCY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY) IS VIRTUE  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ VIRTUE)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ VIRTUE) IS A HUMAN  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ VIRTUE ˄ HUMAN)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ VIRTUE ˄ HUMAN) ≈ [Ω](THE MESSIAH) ≈ THE MESSIAH

In this case, [Ω](Y ˄ Yn+1) IS

A HUMAN

is underspecified. This allows for reconstructive

processes in messianic traditions that can have wide-ranging though predictable effects.
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One stark example of this, presented below, is demonstrated through a quote from The
Holy Book of Hitler, published in 1952 by James Battersby.

Yes, the Germans are the God-appointed Lords of the Earth and those
who have vowed their eternal loyalty to Adolf Hitler shall be given all
power from on high. The world will understand the supreme honour
that is embodied in the phrase, “Ich bin ein Deutscher.” For to be
German or Aryan is to be the holy or whole man – one in spirit, mind
and body in the Lord of Lords, Adolf Hitler. Mere nationality is a minor
matter; Race and Spirit are everything.
In the conceptual framework of this cult text, the only alteration that has been made to the
proto-construction given above is that the substructure [Ω](Y ˄ Yn+1) IS A HUMAN has been
specified as [Ω](Y ˄ Yn+1) IS ADOLF HITLER so that the Ilithyic Concept structures as:
ADOLF HITLER, MESSIAH OF THE GERMAN WORLD CHURCH
Ω IS CAUSE  [Ω](CAUSE)
[Ω](CAUSE) IS AGENCY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY) IS VIRTUE  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ VIRTUE)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ VIRTUE) IS ADOLF HITLER [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ VIRTUE ˄ HITLER)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ VIRTUE ˄ HITLER) ≈ [Ω](THE MESSIAH) ≈ ADOLF HITLER (LORD OF LORDS)

As can be seen in the excerpt, the “source domain” ADOLF HITLER is subsumed into the
Ilithyic substructure and is not subsidiary to it. Properties from that domain are shifted into
the proto-construction THE MESSIAH which leaves us with predictable amalgamations of
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Nazi and messianic ideologies, including the elevation of “Race” to an equal status with
“Spirit” and the conceptualization of Hitler as a divine being that is distinct from God.
Proto-constructions are far from a rigid account of how Ilithyic Concepts are structured
and are instead a useful pretense for a static starting point in the analytic process, when in
fact no static concept can exist. They simply serve as a useful though tenuous
generalization. This does not mean, however, that they tell us nothing about the Vox et
Silentium Dei or Ilithyic Concepts as a category. In the case of the proto-construction THE
MESSIAH, hypothetical specification for the substructure [Ω](Y ˄ Yn+1) IS A HUMAN can allow
us to examine novel and potentially violent messianic traditions in such a way as to provide
level judgement for their self-potential to cause harm or enact violence. For example, it is
clear that if separate messianic traditions developed around BOB ROSS and DONALD TRUMP,
the practitioners of each group would behave (predictably) in vastly different manners. In
this case, proto-constructions also serve as a diagnostic tool in examining the potential
sociological impact of new religious sects. Although for our purposes here, they will serve
primarily as a starting point for the analysis of the vox et Silentium Dei.
2.4.2: Deconstructions: Silencing Divinity
The process of deconstruction, which begins with an Ilithyic Concept or protoconstruction and ends with Ω, is the most straightforward and least complicated of the
various stages that compose the Vox et Silentium Dei. Deconstruction from [Ω](δ) to Ω is
a reaction to an experiential incongruency Vα which causes the individual to re-assess the
conceptual structuring of [Ω](δ). For instance, the death of a loved one may cause a crisis
of faith for someone who believes in an omnibenevolent deity, and death anxiety at the end
of one’s life may give one reason for a turn to faith or at least the belief in an afterlife.
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However, deconstruction does not always mean that the Ilithyic Concept will be
reconstructed in a different manner or that the violation forms a specific contradiction with
an Ilithyic substructure rather than a conceptual metaphor within the subsidiary theopolitical ideology. Although, the outcome of such is limited by the nature of the violation,
Vα, which will be the focus of this subsection; the model for the deconstructive process
overall can be seen below.
Ω IS Y  [Ω](Y)
[Ω](Y) IS Yn+1  [Ω](Y ˄ Yn+1)
[Ω](Y ˄ Yn+1) ≈ [Ω](δ)
Vα
Ω

The deconstructive process in notation is therefore (1) the proto-construction of the Ilithyic
Concept [Ω](γ), (2) the violation Vα, and (3) the ineffable Ω. It is this intermediate step, Vα,
which requires clarification. Here, I define it as an experiential contradiction in or violation
of the internal conceptual logic of an Ilithyic structure or a subsidiary system which triggers
the process of deconstruction and necessarily precedes the process of reconstruction. It can
be something as straightforward as a contradiction with the Ilithyic substructure – e.g. an
omnipotent and omnibenevolent deity allowing evil to exist; a traumatic individual or
community experience – e.g. the eruption of Mt. Vesuvius; a conflict between the personal
and the ideological – e.g. a homophobic parent learning that they have a queer child; or
simply unmet expectations – e.g. a run of bad luck or circumstances which precedes a loss
of or change in faith. These violations of the Ilithyic Concept or a subsidiary system of
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conceptual metaphors can include the most private and the most communal, the most
informal and the formal, the most traumatic and the most insignificant of experiences. In
short, the deconstructive process is the easiest of the two processes in the Vox et Silentium
Dei because the Ilithyic Concept itself is fragile and easily challenged by experiences that
run counter to our understanding of or relationship with it. It is what follows deconstruction
that is by far the most difficult step in the construction of an Ilithyic Concept.
2.4.3: Reconstructions: Voicing the Ineffable
The second stage of the Vox et Silentium Dei is the process of reconstruction from
Ω to [Ω](δ) though the intermediate phase, Vβ. This process responds to and reacts in
relation to the form of the preceding deconstructive process with reference to Vα. It
represents an attempt on the part of the individual to reconcile or rationalize the conceptual
instability introduced by Vα and takes the following notational form:
Ω
Vβ
Ω IS Y  [Ω](Y)
[Ω](Y) IS Yn+1  [Ω](Y ˄ Yn+1)
[Ω](Y ˄ Yn+1) ≈ [Ω](δ)

Now, as mentioned earlier, the process of reconstruction does not necessarily result in a
structuring of the Ilithyic Concept that is meaningfully distinct from the proto-construction
or the preceding construction. In this process, Vβ is simply how the initial Vα has been
addressed, but this allows for a wide range of possible solutions. To explore this, let us
consider a few possible alternative solutions to the conceptual violation Vα Mortality in the
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example taken from John Chau’s missionary journal. This is the solution that Chau arrived
at:
Ω IS CAUSE  [Ω](CAUSE)
[Ω](CAUSE) IS AGENCY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY)IS MORALITY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ MORALITY)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ MORALITY) IS A SOVEREIGN  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ MORALITY ˄ SOVEREIGN)
[Ω](THE MORAL ALL-SOVEREIGN) ≈ GOD (LORD)
Vα Mortality; Obeying God could lead to death or personal harm
Ω
Vβ *[Ω](Y ˄ Yn+1)IS MORALITY  [Ω]( Y ˄ Yn+1 ˄ MORALITY)
Ω IS CAUSE  [Ω](CAUSE)
[Ω](CAUSE) IS AGENCY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY) IS A SOVEREIGN  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ SOVEREIGN)
[Ω](THE ALL-SOVEREIGN) ≈ GOD (LORD)

Another possible solution would have been for Chau to simply remove himself from the
dangerous situation by leaving the island and ceasing his missionary work. This could be
achieved in two ways. In the first, instead of rejecting the absolute benevolence of God,
the characteristic of omnibenevolence could be foregrounded and the domain of
SOVEREIGN

elided so as to rationalize not following a command that would lead to Chau’s

death, in which case Chau would have likely returned home.
Ω
Vβ *[Ω](Y ˄ Yn+1)IS A SOVEREIGN  [Ω]( Y ˄ Yn+1 ˄ SOVEREIGN)
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Ω IS CAUSE  [Ω](CAUSE)
[Ω](CAUSE) IS AGENCY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY) IS MORALITY [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ MORALITY)
[Ω](MORAL-ENTITY) ≈ GOD

The second option in this case would have been to simply accept the consequences of
Chau’s self-conceived disobedience to God, which would be to seek forgiveness from the
Lord. In this scenario, there would be no underlying alteration to the reconstructed Ilithyic
Concept that would differentiate it from the Ilithyic proto-construction. Chau simply
eliminates the violation rather than the contradiction.
Ω
Vβ * Mortality; Obeying God could lead to death or personal harm
Ω IS CAUSE  [Ω](CAUSE)
[Ω](CAUSE) IS AGENCY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY)IS MORALITY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ MORALITY)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ MORALITY) IS A SOVEREIGN  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ MORALITY ˄ SOVEREIGN)
[Ω](THE MORAL ALL-SOVEREIGN) ≈ GOD (LORD)

While each possible solution would indicate one way of salvaging the Ilithyic
Concept (i.e. Chau’s religious object and his relationship with it), this cannot accurately
predict his actions in response to the reconstruction. It is entirely possible that following
the first option Vβ *[Ω](Y ˄ Yn+1) IS A SOVEREIGN  [Ω]( Y ˄ Yn+1 ˄ SOVEREIGN) could result in Chau
continuing his mission on the grounds of ‘bringing the blessings/grace of God to the
139

Sentinelese’ rather than as a way of ‘obeying God’. Another option for Vβ would have been
for Chau to assume that his own death during the course of carrying our his mission was
impossible since he was under the divine protection of his deity, in which case there would
not need to be any alteration to the Ilithyic Concepts substructure during reconstruction. In
fact, this seems to have been his initial solution to the issue of Vα Mortality prior to his
arrival on the island, as indicated by an earlier journal entry: “All along the way, our boat
was highlighted by bioluminescent plankton – and as fish jumped nearby, we could see
them like darting mermaids shimmering along. The Milky Way was above and God
Himself was shielding us from the Coast Guard and Navy patrols.” This tendency towards
the preservation of the Ilithyic Concept’s substructure throughout the deconstructive and
reconstructive process via the elimination or rationalization of Vα seems to be both a
common and intuitive feature of reconstruction.

One final comment on the reconstructive process is that reconstructions tend
towards either the smallest, incremental change or the most drastic substructural reduction.
In the case of the example from Chau’s journal, he made a distinction of only one line in
the Ilithyic Concept’s substructure, specifically Vβ *[Ω](Y ˄ Yn+1)IS MORALITY  [Ω]( Y ˄ Yn+1
˄ MORALITY).

Of course, one possible solution for Chau would have been the more extreme

crisis of faith resulting in a complete rejection of the deconstructed Ilithyic Concept, similar
to the form presented here where the reconstructed form is an atheistic Ilithyic Concept:

Ω IS CAUSE  [Ω](CAUSE)
[Ω](CAUSE) IS AGENCY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY)
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[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY)IS MORALITY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ MORALITY)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ MORALITY) IS A SOVEREIGN  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ MORALITY ˄ SOVEREIGN)
[Ω](THE MORAL ALL-SOVEREIGN) ≈ GOD (LORD)
Vα Mortality; Obeying God could lead to death or personal harm
Ω
Vβ *[Ω](Y ˄ Yn+1) IS AGENCY  [Ω](Y ˄ Yn+1 ˄ AGENCY)
Vβ *[Ω](Y ˄ Yn+1)IS MORALITY  [Ω]( Y ˄ Yn+1 ˄ MORALITY)
Vβ *[Ω](Y ˄ Yn+1)IS A SOVEREIGN  [Ω]( Y ˄ Yn+1 ˄ SOVEREIGN)
Ω IS CAUSE  [Ω](CAUSE)
[Ω](CAUSE) IS NOTHING  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ NOTHING)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ NOTHING) ≈ [Ω](NOTHINGNESS) ≈ NOTHING

In comparison to deconstruction, the process of reconstruction is exponentially more openended and allows for any number of possible solutions, Vβ, to conceptual or experiential
violations, Vα.
2.4.4: The Eternal Engine:
The dual processes of deconstruction and reconstruction constitute the link between the
Ilithyic Concept and the ineffable, between [Ω](δ) and Ω, and are central to the grounding
of the disembodied in our embodied (experiential) reality. They compose the silenced voice
and the voiced silence. Moreover, they are not limited to small, incremental changes, and
if large scale changes do occur, it is not as if the entire Ilithyic Concept has been abandoned
or that there is an entirely new framework to work within. Even in a crisis of faith that leads
from a theistic to an atheistic Ilithyic Concept, a portion of the prior Ilithyic substructure
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remains as a foundation from which to reconstruct the new concept. Sometimes change is
resisted through violence, where the preservation of the Ilithyic Concept or a subsidiary
system is given the greatest priority. As the Vox et Silentium Dei continues on and on from
one reconstruction to another deconstruction, there are inevitable side-effects and
consequences that stem from the solutions offered for conceptual and experiential
violations. They can also be so long-lasting that divine epitaphs become theonyms devoid
of all but the semblance of their original meaning. These are all unavoidable by-products
of the non-terminating socio-cognitive linguistic process that I have outlined here as the
Vox et Silentium Dei.
2.5: Comprehensive Summary
In this chapter, I have clarified the distinction between ineffable metaphors and metaphors
of religion on the quality of their target domain and have put forward a system for
identifying, notating, and modeling the underlying processes by which ineffable metaphors
are created and function. To that end, I argued for the theoretical efficacy of making a leap
of faith in regard to the definition of the ineffable as a conceptual domain, Ω, and for the
means by which that domain is structured relative to its own unique properties. From this,
I have further delineated two distinct categories of concepts that are produced by and
themselves constitute in part ineffable metaphors: End-Point Concepts and Ilithyic
Concepts. Relating to the latter category, especially in the context of religion, I have
furthermore offered an account of how Ilithyic Concepts are grounded in embodied
experience as well as how they react to such experiences insofar as the embodied is
fundamentally contrary to the disembodied. The reader should take heed to understand that
what I offer here is merely an amendment or perhaps supplement to Conceptual Metaphor
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Theory as outlined thoroughly at the beginning of this chapter and throughout the preceding
one. However, in its application alongside Conceptual Metaphor Theory as will be
demonstrated in the following chapter’s case study of, I am adamant that it allows for a
more accurate and efficacious analysis of religious life, language, and metaphors.
Chapter 3: Case Study & Discussion
3.1: A Brief Case Study, Expanded
Let us consider an earlier example more closely with full consideration of all parties
involved at the time and place of the ensuing drama.

3.2: Background
In November of 2018, an American missionary by the name of John Allen Chau
ventured under the secrecy of night to North Sentinel Island, a small island in the east
Indian Ocean populated by an ostensibly uncontacted tribe known as the North Sentinelese.
This missionary, like many who had come to the region since the early 1800s, possessed
the single-minded goal of bringing the Gospel to all peoples and expanding the kingdom
of the Christian God to encompass all nations. Chau writes of this in his first journal entry,
saying “God, I thank you for choosing me, before I was even yet formed in my mother’s
womb, to be Your messenger of Your good news to the people of North Sentinel Island.”
Three days and thirteen pages of journal entries later, the mission had taken a darker turn
as the Sentinelese understandably resisted this encroachment on their sovereignty. Chau
later writes, “watching the sunset and it’s beautiful – crying a bit … wondering if it’ll be
the last sunset I see before being in the place where the sun never sets.” By the following
morning, Chau would be dead, presumably succumbing to Sentinelese arrows.
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3.2.1: The Andaman Islands
The Andaman Islands are composed of four larger islands and a collection of
smaller islands in the Bay of Bengal, south of modern-day Myanmar (Endicott et al. 2003;
Burenhult 1996). Through genetic analysis, the islands are argued to have first been
inhabited during the late Pleistocene movements of humans into Southeast Asia around
17,000-32,000 years ago with the possibility of multiple settlements over time (Endicott et
al. 2003). However, after populating the islands, the Andamanese appear to have remained
quite isolated as demonstrated both through genetic as well as linguistic analyses
(Burenhult 1996); yet, the historical record demonstrates that this isolation was two-fold,
both a policy of avoidance by maritime traders and the frequently violent encounters during
which the Andamanese defended their islands. The islands and their inhabitants appear in
writing throughout history, but sailors have been generally encouraged to avoid them
(Temple 1901; Radcliffe-Brown 1933). For example, Marco Polo writes in the thirteenth
century that ““[The Andamanese] are idolaters and live like wild beasts … They are a very
cruel race: whenever they can get ahold of a man who is not one of their kind, they devour
him” (1958: 258) and that “the island lies in a sea so turbulent and so deep that ships cannot
anchor there or sail away from it” (258). It is likely because of both the dangerous seas and
the fearsome reputation of the Andamanese themselves that the world beyond the Andaman
Islands decided to avoid them, and it would not be until the nineteenth century that any
sustained contact, through British colonialism, would be maintained.
From the seventeenth to the twentieth century, the British Empire were increasingly
present in the Andaman Islands, especially as the East India Trading Company sought to
secure the shipping route (Portman 1899; Radcliffe-Brown 1933). In 1789, Lord
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Cornwallis was commissioned to establish a colony there, from which Port Cornwallis was
founded, but the colony was abandoned by 1796. In 1858, a new penal colony, Port Blair,
was established on the ground of the old colony, and it began receiving prisoners captured
in the 1857 Indian Revolt in March of 158, shortly after its foundation (Anderson 2011).
British occupation of the islands would continue up until the early twentieth century, during
which the majority of the islands’ indigenous peoples would succumb to foreign diseases.38

3.2.2: The Journal of John Allen Chau
Regarding the data used in this case study, John Chau’s journal is roughly 3600
words in length and is composed of thirteen individual pages of text. The journal
documents his journey from self-imposed quarantine in a safehouse on November 14,
2018, to his farewell letters written before his final departure to North Sentinel Island on
November 16, 2018. Thus, the entirety of the journal constitutes a well-documented three
days of missionary work: a microcosm of experience in the final moments of Chau’s life.
The bulk of the journal entries are devoted to anthropological notes and narrative accounts
of Chau’s interactions with the Sentinelese and his plans for establishing sustained contact.
Interspersed throughout the journal, there are nine written prayers by Chau to God,
sometimes asking for guidance and strength and other times petitioning God on behalf of
the Sentinelese. The final two pages of the journal are letters to Chau’s friends and family,
written in the event of his death. While the portions of the text containing religious
metaphors are relatively small in comparison to Chau’s narratives and anthropological
38

For further reading on the Andamanese peoples, their cultures, and their languages, see Kumar

(2012), Anderson (2018), and Pandya (2009) for more detailed accounts.
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notes, it is within the cotext of these documented experiences that the religious metaphors
can be best understood and most reliably analyzed.

3.3: Sovereignty Metaphors: Expanding the Kingdom of God
Writing in a safehouse in Port Blair, John Chau pencils in his journal “thank You
Father for using me, for shaping me and molding me to be Your ambassador … May Your
Kingdom, Your Rule and Reign come now to North Sentinel Island.” Even in this short
excerpt, several metaphorical expressions can be observed, but before delving into their
Ilithyic structures, let us consider them at face value within the broader context of the
journal entries:

GOD IS A SOVEREIGN

1) “to be Your ambassador”
2) “May Your Kingdom, Your Rule and Reign”

GOD IS A POTTER

3) “thank You Father for using me, for shaping and molding me”

GOD IS A FATHER

4) “thank You Father for using me”

Though the first page of the journal is largely an explanation of what Chau had been doing
to keep himself busy at the safehouse, Chau clearly sees the sovereignty of God, and
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obedience to that divine sovereign, as central to his mission to North Sentinel. Even while
utilizing several metaphors for God, it is this system of sovereignty metaphors which
appears most prevalently throughout the text. As an exemplar of this, Chau uses the titular
theonym “LORD” only five times but always fully capitalized: in fact, of ten total fully
capitalized phrases or expressions, theonyms account for six, including the instances of
“LORD.” This deliberate practice of full capitalization for lord directly indexes the
SOVEREIGN

domain by consciously emphasizing the expression, in contrast to emphatic

capitalization such as the phrase “I DON’T WANT to die!” found later in the journal.
In consideration of the entirety of the journal, there are only three more novel
instances of the GOD IS SOVEREIGN metaphor:

GOD IS SOVEREIGN

5) “LORD is this island Satan’s last stronghold”
6) “I can’t wait to see [the Sentinelese] around the throne of God worshipping in their own
language”
7) “Jesus Christ gave me the authority to come to you”

In (5), Chau presents both his only usage of Satan and his only conceptualization of the
adversarial forces of Christianity as a physical structure, a stronghold. He understands
North Sentinel Island and the Sentinelese’s lack of Christian knowledge as the domain of
evil, though only in the absence of good. He writes at the end in a letter to his family “this
is not a pointless thing – the eternal lives of the tribe is at hand.” This concern for their
souls can also be seen in the full context of (7), Chau’s first words to the Sentinelese, which
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he records in full as “John. I love you and Jesus loves you. Jesus Christ gave me the
authority to come to you. Here is some fish!” Thus, to expand the Kingdom of God to
North Sentinel Island, Chau takes on the role of “[God’s] messenger for [His] Good News
to The People of North Sentinel Island,” wherein he believes that simply the knowledge of
Christianity will combat vice and dispel Satan from the island. Finally, (6) represents a
more tangible conceptualization of sovereignty based on the entailment kings have thrones
so God as King has a throne. This is a fairly common expression but is activated further
by the Biblical verses cited at the end of the sentence, Revelation 7:9-10 (NIV):
9

After this I looked, and there before me was a great multitude that no one

could count, from every nation, tribe, people and language, standing before the
throne and before the lamb. They were wearing white robes and were holding
palm branches in their hands. 10 And they cried out in a loud voice: “Salvation
belongs to our God, who sits on the throne, and to the lamb.”
What is most interesting about this extension of the sovereignty metaphor is that throne is
being reanalyzed from the prophetic context of Revelations to the immediate proselytizing
project in which Chau finds himself. Bringing the Sentinelese before the throne of God
may then be said to be Chau’s ultimate goal.
Yet, what would instill in any individual such a disregard for their own person? As
most of the journal’s text is devoted to narrative descriptions of his interactions with the
Sentinelese, Chau’s central religious values can only be observed in his praise or
encouragement of others. Thus, obedience takes center stage when Chau is both addressing
others and grappling with his own self-doubt. This is a prevalent theme in the Bible, one
which Chau would have been familiar with, but is also an extension of the sovereignty
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metaphor outlined above. For if God is king and one has faith in God, then faith in God is
obedience to the Sovereign God.

FAITH IS OBEDIENCE

8) “I’m in awe of how GREAT our God is – the simple obedience of Adoniram”
9) “Alex – I’m so grateful to you and to your simple obedience to God”
10) “please live your lives in obedience to whatever [God] has called you to”

The first instance of obedience in the text (8) is in reference to Adoniram Judson, one of
the first American missionaries to travel outside the early Republic to establish a mission,
his being in Burma (Conroy-Krutz 2015). The remaining instances are from two letters
included at the end of the journal entries: one (9) addressed to his friend Alex and one (10)
addressed to his family. Chau, however, never describes himself as obedient; rather, he
enacts obedience during his written prayers. In the course of bargaining with God for his
life, Chau routinely lists reasons why it would be better for him to live and then submits to
the perceived will of God.
LORD let Your will be done. If you want me to get actually shot or even killed
with an arrow, then so be it. I think I could be more useful alive though, but to
You, God, I give all the glory of whatever happens. I DON’T WANT to die!
Here, the underlying metaphor FAITH IS OBEDIENCE can be observed in practice though not
in expression. In the course of this exchange, Chau beseeches God to protect him but
nevertheless yields to the will of God. Consider an earlier excerpt from a prayer:
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All in all, this is all in the hands of You – my will nor my plan be done but
only His good, pleasing and perfect will. Forever You, Jesus, are to be praised.
Here, Chau’s abdication of agency in favor of the will of God is even more explicit,
implying that Chau has no control in the face of obedience to divine sovereignty.
In the course of these journal entries, one observes a sub-structural rationalization
taking place. Chau understands his religious object, the Christian God, as a king or
sovereign ruler. This conceptualization is further reinforced by auxiliary contexts accessed
through Biblical scripture. These auxiliary contexts contribute a new context in which the
conceptual metaphor GOD IS SOVEREIGN can be understood: for example, in the context of
the Biblical book of Revelations, the metaphor and its extension, the throne of God, are
reinforced twofold as it occurs in the context of John the Apostle’s prophetic vision. These
auxiliary contexts contribute instances in which the metaphor is almost if not entirely
literal, and when these literalized contexts are used to reinforce the metaphor, they also
reinforce the metaphor’s patent literalness.

In consideration of the above, we might now reasonably make some assumptions
about the nature of the religious object [Ω](δ) as presented in Chau’s journal. Intuitively, as
Chau is self-described Christian, it is safe to assume that proto-construction for [Ω](δ) here
is THE INEFFABLE MORAL-ENTITY:
Ω IS CAUSE  [Ω](CAUSE)
[Ω](CAUSE) IS AGENCY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY) IS MORALITY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ MORALITY)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ MORALITY) ≈ [Ω](MORAL-ENTITY) ≈ GOD
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If we were to stop here, then our analysis of the metaphors for God within the text would
more or less follow along the lines of a traditional application of Conceptual Metaphor
Theory, though obviously with some difference regarding the treatment of religious
experience. If this were the case, then we would be left with four distinct groupings of
ineffable metaphors in addition to related religious metaphors (e.g. FAITH IS OBEDIENCE):

[Ω](GOD) IS A SOVEREIGN
11) “to be Your ambassador”
12) “May Your Kingdom, Your Rule and Reign”
13) “I can’t wait to see them around the throne of God worshipping in their own language”

[Ω](GOD) IS A POTTER
14) “thank You Father for using me, for shaping and molding me”

[Ω](GOD) IS A FATHER
15) “thank You Father for using me”
16) “Father, forgive him and any of the people on this island who try to kill me, and
especially forgive them if they succeed?”

[Ω](GOD) IS A GUARDIAN
17) “The Milky Way was above and God Himself was shielding us from the Coast Guard
and Navy patrols”
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18) “LoRD protect me and guide me”
19) “LORD strengthen me as I need Your strength and protection and guidance and all
that You give and are.”

However, this analysis would render the internal conceptual structures of Chau’s
faith to be largely disorganized, and though some of these expressions could be explained
as ad hoc generalizations, it would be difficult to deduce a coherent conceptual target
domain for these metaphors. Assuming that the domain SOVEREIGN, however, is in fact a
part of the Ilithyic substructure allows for such coherency, and we can make this
assumption provided several linguistic motivations observed in the text.

Ω IS CAUSE  [Ω](CAUSE)
[Ω](CAUSE) IS AGENCY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY)IS MORALITY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ MORALITY)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ MORALITY) IS A SOVEREIGN  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ MORALITY ˄ SOVEREIGN)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ MORALITY ˄ SOVEREIGN) ≈ [Ω](THE MORAL ALL-SOVEREIGN) ≈ GOD (LORD)

In regard to the former groupings of metaphors, these can be reduced into two sets with
respect to this newly proposed Ilithyic Concept: linguistic realizations of the ineffable and
metaphors which take the ineffable [Ω](δ) as their target domain, respectively below.
[Ω](THE MORAL ALL-SOVEREIGN)

20) “to be Your ambassador”
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21) “May Your Kingdom, Your Rule and Reign”
22) “I can’t wait to see them around the throne of God worshipping in their own language”
23) “The Milky Way was above and God Himself was shielding us from the Coast Guard
and Navy patrols”
24) “LoRD protect me and guide me”
25) “LORD strengthen me as I need Your strength and protection and guidance and all
that You give and are.”
26) “thank You Father for using me”
27) “Father, forgive him and any of the people on this island who try to kill me, and
especially forgive them if they succeed?”

[Ω]( THE MORAL ALL-SOVEREIGN) IS A POTTER
28) “thank You Father for using me, for shaping and molding me”

In respect to the first, one may observe Ilithyic metaphors as a coherent whole with their
linguistic realizations being derived, diversely, from various entailments involving the
domain SOVEREIGN, such as a king is a father to his people39, a king protects his people,
and a king guides his people. The second, religious metaphor may then be observed as a

39

I recognize the theological motivations for referring to the Christian God as Father as well as

how such a theonym has evolved through comparison with the Christ as God the Son. Such falls
outside what is readily available within the data as limited by Chau’s journal and so shall be
relegated to future, optimistically fruitful discussions.
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novel outlier, though not without its ritual precursors. This allows us then to more readily
interpret the prevalent metaphor FAITH IS OBEDIENCE as a systematic product of the internal
structure of the Ilithyic concept rather than as an entirely separate, unmotivated metaphor
for religious faith. Faith, in this instance, is not understood in terms of obedience simply
because it has secular equivalents or because it is rooted in some embodied experience of
faith itself; indeed, we need not appeal to such arguments and ubiquity or embodied reality
of such a metaphor in a secular context need not immediately concern us. Instead, with the
proposed Ilithyic concept [Ω](THE MORAL ALL-SOVEREIGN), the metaphor
readily understood as being motivated by the domain

FAITH IS OBEDIENCE

SOVEREIGN,

is

found within the

concept’s substructure. What more, it is through this metaphor that we find the most
compelling case for the inclusion of the domain

SOVEREIGN,

specifically, within the

substructure. Let us again consider how Chau’s faith motivates an obedience to his god
even unto his death.
Ω IS CAUSE  [Ω](CAUSE)
[Ω](CAUSE) IS AGENCY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY)IS MORALITY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ MORALITY)
[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ MORALITY) IS A SOVEREIGN  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ MORALITY ˄ SOVEREIGN)
[Ω](THE MORAL ALL-SOVEREIGN) ≈ GOD (LORD)
Vα Mortality; Obeying God could lead to death or personal harm
Ω
Vβ *[Ω](Y ˄ Yn+1)IS MORALITY  [Ω]( Y ˄ Yn+1 ˄ MORALITY)
Ω IS CAUSE  [Ω](CAUSE)
[Ω](CAUSE) IS AGENCY  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY)
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[Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY) IS A SOVEREIGN  [Ω](CAUSE ˄ AGENCY ˄ SOVEREIGN)
[Ω](THE ALL-SOVEREIGN) ≈ GOD (LORD)

Chau never asserts that professing Christ to the people of North Sentinel Island is
bad or not worth the trouble; he is principally concerned with his own physical well-being
which, through the above reconstruction, he deems to be irrelevant to his faith in God and
his mission. Here is perhaps the most convincing evidence for the Ilithyic concept [Ω](THE
MORAL ALL-SOVEREIGN)

in comparison to the earlier proto-construction. The sovereignty of God

is so fundamental to Chau’s conceptualization of the ineffable that it would allow him to
endanger his own life in a way that we would not expect from the religious metaphors
[Ω](GOD) IS A SOVEREIGN or [Ω](GOD) IS A POTTER. Chau is willing to die for a king and his
kingdom, patently literal as it is.

3.4: ‘The place where the sun never sets’: Phenomenology at the brink of death
Within such an intimate account of his mortality, Chau also provides a glimpse of
how he conceptualizes the ineffable in a more immediate sense. He also details his
interpretation of many unfortunate events which only served to reinforce his above
conceptualizations and reconstructions. The first interpretive event occurred on the first
day following Chau’s leaving the safehouse, when he and the fisherman who had agreed
to take him to North Sentinel Island successfully evaded the Indian Coast Guard:
All along the way, our boat was highlighted by bioluminescent plankton – and
as fish jumped nearby, we could see them like darting mermaids shimmering
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along. The Milky Way was above and God Himself was shielding us from the
Coast Guard and Navy Patrols.
Chau makes no further comment on this, though this entry serves as a response to his plea
a page earlier for God to “keep all of us involved hidden from the physical and spiritual
forces who desire to keep the people here in darkness.” Here, Chau conceptualizes the
conflict between good and evil, Chau and the fisherman versus the Indian Coast Guard and
Navy respectively – with the former bringing the news of Christ to North Sentinel Island
and the latter attempting to prevent it. Later that day, after initiating contact with a small
group of Sentinelese men and women, Chau states that “this nice meet and greet went
south.” Not only did he lose his kayak, which contained his passport and travel documents,
but he also received his first arrow shot.
The little kid shot me with an arrow – directly into my Bible which I was
holding in front of my chest. I grabbed the arrow shaft as it broke in my Bible
(on pg 433, Isiah 63:5-65:2), and felt the arrowhead. It was metal, thin but very
sharp.”
Not only does the Bible literally protect Chau, but he also takes note of the particular verse
the arrow stopped at, indicating their significance in the context of this event40. After
having returned to the boat, shaken but unharmed, he writes:

40

Isiah 63:5 KJV reads: “And I looked, and there was none to help; and I wondered that there was

none to uphold: Therefore mine own arm brought salvation unto me; and my fury, it upheld me.”
One could scarcely imagine a worse passage for the arrow to glance upon.
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Although I now have no kayak, or my small Pelican and its contents, I’m
grateful I still have the word of God.
This further emphasizes the value of the Bible to Chau, as he is thankful for retaining it
even after losing his passports, kayak, and a substantial amount of survival gear. As an
even more unfortunate coincidence, the verses that Chau says the arrow stopped at, Isiah
63:5-65:2, only further reinforce Chau’s broader interpretation of events as divine
providence. These verses highlight aspects of the lone believer speaking the word of God
and include themes such as God’s vengeance, judgement, and the means for reaching
salvation. Two pages later, Chau repeats this theme of the lone, righteous man standing
against indifference and sin: “God, I don’t want to die. WHO WILL TAKE MY PLACE if
I do?” All taken together – the Bible literally protecting Chau, the loss of his travel
documents, the arrow-indexed Bible verse – Chau’s decision to continue his mission in the
face of danger resulted from both an interpretation of experiences as providential and as a
result of practical, legal concerns regarding deportation.
On the same day, there were two further events: one perhaps serving as a good
omen and one which facilitated a conceptualization of the Christian afterlife. The former
is simple and goes without saying that it is an explicit symbol of divine grace in
Christianity; John notes near the date and time at the top of the page: “Calm waters in the
cove / (actually) rainbow over the island!” That this precedes the entry for November 15th,
which constitutes the bulk of the text, frames Chau’s interpretation of events as instances
of God’s grace. Regarding the latter event, that evening’s sunset, Chau writes at the bottom
of page eight, almost as an addendum:
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“Watching the sunset and it’s beautiful – crying a bit … wondering if it’ll be
the last sunset I see before being in the place where the sun never sets. Tearing
up a little.”
Contemplating the possibility of his own imminent death, Chau uses his direct experience
to motivate a conceptualization of the afterlife as a place without sunsets. In the context of
life and death, the conventional metaphor

A LIFETIME IS A DAY

allows a sunset to be

understood as an end to something or death (Gibbs 2019: 45). Pulling from Chau’s
observation of the day’s end (i.e. watching a sunset), the afterlife then becomes a place
without sunsets to indicate that the afterlife has no end (i.e. it is eternal and infinite). This
conceptualization of the afterlife in terms of an unknowable length of time without end, is
further consistent with the end-point target domain detailed earlier, wherein
SPACE

TIME

and

are conceptualized as follows:

Ω IS TIME  [Ω](TIME)
Ω IS SPACE  [Ω](SPACE)
This notation is crucial for understanding Chau’s conceptualization of the afterlife, as he
understands it not to be the place without sunsets but rather the place where the sun never
sets. Therefore, if the metaphor

A LIFETIME IS A DAY

represents our temporal

conceptualization of life and death, then the metaphor THE AFTERLIFE IS AN ETERNAL DAY
can represent the ineffable temporality of an unknowable state of being. Though, the
metaphor THE AFTERLIFE IS AN ETERNAL DAY is more accurately notated as [Ω](LIFE) IS A DAY
wherein an unknowable mode of existence conceptualized in terms of LIFE is structured in
terms of an unknowable period of time conceptualized in terms of DAY.
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Relative to this contemplation of the afterlife, life and death are centrals themes in
Chau’s journal. These expressions of mortality range from obedient resignation to
evangelical optimism and, moreover, provide a glimpse into how Chau rationalizes his
mortality.

(29) “My life is in Your hands, O Father, so into Your hands I commit my spirit.”
(30) “LORD let Your will be done. If you want me to get actually shot or even killed with
an arrow, then so be it. I think that I could be more useful alive though …”
(31) “I’ll see you again bro – and remember, the first one to heaven, wins.”
(32) “I’ll see you again when you pass through the veil”

Furthermore, Chau ends nearly every entry with Soli Deo Gloria or its English translation
To God Alone be the Glory. Almost as a rally cry, he repeatedly uses this expression to
further express his devotion to God and his commitment to bring the “Good News” to
North Sentinel Island regardless of the danger. This is further evidenced by Chau’s
repeated abdication of agency in regard to his death as in (29) and (30); additionally, Chau
conceptualizes death as a type of JOURNEY, both simply as A CHANGE IN LOCATION (32) and
as a RACE (31), the latter also entailing an early death is a type of victory. However, as can
be observed in the examples throughout the previous section, Chau’s conceptual system
and its underlying metaphysical commitments disallows any negative conceptualization of
death and further entails that such is a lack of faith ergo a lack of obedience to God.

159

Conclusion:
In this paper I have advanced a unified linguistic theory of religious violence that is
admittedly un-unified and ostensibly concerned little with itself with regards to violence,
even religious violence. Many well-meaning though self-inflating detractors have accused
it of being a not linguistics. However, at its very core and at the very least, I am certain that
what I have advanced here is a theory of religion as it pertains to language and its sociocognitive underpinnings. I am deeply aware that this theory is impractical and unwieldy,
yet it is also consciously in response to an impractical and unwieldy subject – divinity, or
so at least ineffability. I am also sorely aware that religion and the study of religion tends
toward the outright contradiction of empiricism as a statement of what is valued, that the
empirical study of religion is by most accounts an oxymoron, and that the forcing together
of the two rarely yields satisfactory results for either epistemological institution. As an
illumination, there is furthermore no denying the fact that within the full-breadth of
theological thought this work represents little more than a half-faded comment to an
obscure footnote in some long-but-still-not-as-of-yet-misplaced apocrypha. Nevertheless,
and ever with an eye toward holisticity, the Vox et Silentium Dei as it is advanced here
stands as a cohesive and comprehensive account of religious metaphor, as impractical as it
might be for all concerned.

There is little left to say beyond this, except those things that cannot be said – and we have
already pursued such at length within that darkness of unknowing. If you have suffered as
I have through this odyssey of letters, then I believe that you will forgive me – and you
must – if I decide to end here quite abruptly, as is the way of things. Ω‽
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Appendix: Transcript of John Chau’s Journal
Page 1

Journal
November 14, 2018
Port Blair

Well it’s 1450 on Wednesday, November 14, 2018. I’ve been in a safehouse in Port Blair
since returning from Hut Bay, Little Andaman, for the past Eleven days! Bobby and
Christian left 5 days ago and it was such an encouragement to see them. The originally
planned date was delayed from the 11th until tonight due to a cyclone in the Bay of Bengal.
Being stuck in the safehouse meant that I hadn’t seen any full sunlight till today and my
nice tan I had acquired on Little Andaman started to fade, as well as my thickly calloused
feet. The benefit is that I was essentially in quarantine, I stayed fit by doing 3x of: 20
pushups, 50 leg tucks, 20 wide pushups, 50 side-to-sides, and 20 triangle pushups with 50
20 squats, or varying exercises incorporating burpees and rubber resistance bands. Much
time was spent in prayer and reading. I met last night with the fishermen who are all
believers and agreed to drop me off. Jonathan won’t be accompanying me as they will be
at Sen doing their regular fishing maneuvers to avoid raising suspicion and there is a high
chance They’d get checked by the Indian Coast Guard. The meeting went well – I trust
them although I’m the only English speaker so there is quite a language gap; I’m relying
on the Holy Spirit to direct us. The dropzone was pointed out on the map as being a cove
on the SW of the island, and I depart in 3 or 10 hours. While While in the safehouse, I
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finished reading a book about “The Lives of the Three Mrs. Judsons” and today I’m in awe
of how GREAT our God is – the simple obedience of Adoniram which led to Sarah and
George Boardman going to work with him and reaching the H’s and then the H’s being put
in the Andamans by the British (who failed by being diso to be a blessing to the nations
and rejected the Commands of Jesus) and now Them helping reach one of the last uPbs on
earth … and the various ethnicity and nationality of all involved: South African, American,
Indian, Chinese, etc. God, I thank you for choosing me, before I was even yet formed in
my mother’s womb, to be Your messenger of Your Good News to The People of North
Sentinel Island. Even my heritage points to you – me, an American citizen, part Irish, part
Native American (Choctaw), part African, and part Chinese and Southeast Asian – thank
You Father for using me, for shaping me and molding me to be Your ambassador. Please
continue to keep all of us involved hidden from the physical and spiritual forces who desire
to keep the people here in darkness. Holy Spirit please open the hearts of the tribe to receive
me and by receiving me, to receive You. May Your Kingdom, Your Rule and Reign come
now to North Sentinel Island. My life is in Your hands, O Father, so into Your hands I
commit my spirit.

The plan is to linkup with the crew tonight and depart tonight, arriving at the shore around
0400. From there we make progressive contact with fish and gifts over the next four days
and then send me off. Depending on the darkness, I might land briefly at dark and bury a
cache – a Pelican case for later. We might even send the kayak laden with gifts toward
shore. All in all, this is all in the hands of You il – my will nor my plan be done but only
His good, pleasing and perfect will. Forever You, Jesus, are to be praised.
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– John Chau
Soli Deo Gloria!

Page 2

Journal
November 15, 2018
North Sentinel
0530

Rendezvoused successfully last night with the friends. Currently on the boat waiting to
make contact. Left last night around 2000 and arrived around 2230 or so but as we went
North along the eastern shore, we saw boat lights in distance along the North shore and
turned around. Headed South along the eastern shore and evaded then went along the
Southern shore and then up along the western shore. All along the way, our boat was
highlighted by bioluminescent plankton – and as fish jumped nearby, we could see them
like darting mermaids shimmering along. The Milky Way was above and God Himself was
shielding us from the Coast Guard and Navy patrols. At 0430, we entered the Cove on the
western shore and as the sun began to light the east above the island, me and two of the
guys jumped in the shallows and brought my two Pelicans and kayak onto the North point
of the cove. The dead coral is sharp and I already got a slight scratch on my right leg. Now
we see a Sentinel islander home and are waiting for them to come out. We also saw three
large fires on the eastern shore last night.
Soli Deo Gloria.
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– John Chau

[Page includes a drawing of the “Sentinel islander home”]
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Journal
Psalm 91
November 15, 2018
1000
North Sentinel Island
Southwest Cove

Around 0830, I tried initiating contact after no one came to meet us after we waved our
arms and a cloth. I went back to the cached kayak and built it up, then rowed to the boat
and got two large fish – about 15 lbs it felt like (on barracuda and one half of – GT/tuna).
I put them on top of the kayak and began rowing to the house we had seen about a halfmile or so along, over the top of the dead coral in 4ft of water.

I was about 400 yds out, I heard women losing and chattering.

Then I spotted two dugout canoes with outriggers. I rowed past one the saw movement on
the shore. Two Armed Sentinelese came rushing out yelling at me – they had two arrows
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each, unstrung, until they got closer. I hollered my name. “John. I love you and Jesus loves
you. Jesus Christ gave me authority to come to you. Here is some fish!”

I regret I began to panic slightly as I saw them string arrows in their bows. I picked up the
half GT/tuna fish and threw it toward them. They kept coming. Then I slid the barracuda
off and it started to sink but my thoughts were directed toward the fact I was almost in
arrow range. I backpaddled facing them and then when they got the fish, I turned and
paddled like I never have in my life, back to the boat. I felt some fear but mainly was
disappointed they didn’t accept me right away. I can now say I’ve been nearly shot by the
Sentinelese and I’ve walked and cashed gear on their island (thanks Matt, your bedrock
sandals work great). Now I’m resting in the boat and will try again later, leaving gifts on
shore out on rocks. LoRD protect me and guide me.
SDG
– John Chau

Page 4

Journal
Calm waters in the cove
(actually) rainbow over the island!
November 15, 2018
1350
North Sentinel Island
Southwest cove
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Well, I’ve been shot by the Sentinelese ..
by a kid probably about ten or so years old, maybe a teenager, short compared to those who
looked like adults. Let me first back up: after that initial contact, some of the guys on my
boat went spear fishing and caught what they call “cut-a-la” that looks like a grouper or
sea bass with big lips – they caught two and each weighed about 30 lbs – so after a meal
of dal and rice, I swam back to the cached kayak (after first going poop in the water (We’re
about a mile or ¾ mile from the Sentinel bank do I wasn’t worried they’d see but more
concerned that if I went on shore they’d see or find it) and left a few gifts (scissors, cord,
and safety pins) on a log that a human must have put there – this cache and location is on
the North side of the southwest cove. Then I built the kayak (again because I had broken it
down to hide after that first contact), and paddled back to the boat. We put the two big fish
on top of my kayak, and my small Pelican (all that held many pencils, my initial contact
response kit (for arrow wounds) such as hemostat/quick clot, abdominal pads, chest seal,
and dental forceps for arrow removal, plus it contained my picture cards, and multivitamins
and multitools (including the one my brother gave me as a graduation gift that has my name
engraved on it … and unfortunately it also contained my passports (I’ll say why it was
unfortunate in a moment) inside my kayak; plus I had my waterproof Bible (thanks Bardin
and Marsel Publishing) and some gifts: scissors, tweezers, safety pins, fishing line and
hooks, cordage, and rubber hose tubing, and my new [illegible]. I set off toward the north
shore of the cove toward where I had seen a dilapidated structure and two destroyed
dugouts via binoculars.
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Why was it destroyed? Perhaps a death?

Then seeing no one from the water, I waded my kayak through the shallows of the dead
coral reef and still didn’t see anyone. I fixed some gifts to the fish
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and then proceeded around the cove toward the hut I had been chased from on initial
contact. Soon enough, as I got closer, I heard the whoops and shouts from the hut. I made
sure to stay out of arrow range, but unfortunately that meant I was also out of good hearing
range. So I got a little closer and as they (about 6 from what I could see) yelled at me, I
tried to parrot their words back to them. They burst out laughing most of the time, so they
probably were saying bad words or insulting me. They were also yelling into the forest
behind the hut which echoed and they made a drumming sound if I can recall. Perhaps their
men were away which would explain why the only ones yelling at me looked fairly
juvenile. I spotted one man wearing a white crown of something (flowers maybe) on his
head and he also took a seemingly leadership stance and yelled at me. Leadership stance
meaning he climbed atop the tallest coral rock to yell. I yelled some phrases in Xhosa and
sang some worship songs and hymns, and they would often fall silent after this. Then two
of them dropped their bows and took a dugout to meet me. I couldn’t tell if they were truly
unarmed so still kept a safe distance away and dropped off the fish and gifts and at first
they poled their dugout past the gifts and were coming at me, then they turned and
[illegible] the gifts except for the shovel/adze. I paddled after them and exchanged some
more yells of currently unintelligible words with them.
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Here's when this nice meet and greet went south. A child and a young woman both with
bows came behind the two gift receivers, with bows drawn and I kept waving my hands to
say, “no bows” but they didn’t get the memo I guess. I tossed the adze/shovel a midway
distance between all of us and then began talking to the two unarmed guys. They came
over to get it but unfortunately one grabbed a bamboo knife. By this time the wind had
picked up and the kayak was sat near sat near some shallow corral.
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The islanders saw that and blocked my exit. One blocked (unarmed) while other (bamboo
knife) waded along the coral. They Then little kid with bow and arrow came down the
middle and I figured that this was it. So I preached a bit to them starting in Genesis and
disembarked my kayak to show them that I too have two legs. I was inches from the
unarmed guy (well built with a round face one fly on right face cheek, and yellowish
pigment on circles on his cheeks, and about 5 ft. 5”) and gave him a bunch of the scissors
and gifts as they got bunched together – so basically I gave them all the gift-type items
(except for some spares in my cached gear) and then they took the kayak … and the little
kid shot me with an arrow – directly into my Bible which I was holding ove in front of my
chest. I grabbed the arrow shaft as it broke in my Bible (on pg 433, Isiah 63:5-65:2), and
felt the arrowhead. It was metal, thin but very sharp. I stumbled back and I recall yelling at
the kid for shooting me – now as I look back at it, my Bible cover looks like bark – like
treebark, so maybe he was just being curious but yikes, it sure gave me a fright. They left
me alone as I half waded half swam through the broken coral to the deep part of the cove
168

where I knew their dugouts couldn’t reach if they chased me. I had to swim almost a mile
back to the boat at the mouth of the cove … as I got closer I thought a rock was the boat
and then saw the boat but with figures with their arms up waving and I
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thought briefly that another group of Sentinelese had attacked the boat while they were
watching me but Thank God that wasn’t the case. Although I now have no kayak, or my
small pelican and its contents, I’m grateful that I still have the written word of God.

The plan now is to rest and sleep on the boat and in the morning to drop me off by the
cache and then I walk along the beach toward the same hut I’ve been giving gifts to.

It’s weird – actually no, it’s natural: I’m scared.

There, I said it. Also frustrated and uncertain – is it worth me going on foot to meet them?
Now they have attached me to the gifts – unfortunately JP won’t go with me and only stays
on the vessel. The language gap is tough too as it’s hard to get good input – LORD let Your
will be done. If you want me to get actually shot or even killed with an arrow, then so be
it. I think I could be more useful alive though, but to You, God, I give all the glory of
whatever happens. I DON’T WANT to die! Would it be wiser to leave and let someone
else continue? No. I don’t think so – I’m stuck here anyway without a passport and
[illegible] off the grid. I still could make it back to the US somehow as it almost seems like
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certain death to stay here – yet there is evidenced change in just two encounters in a single
day. Will try again tomorrow.

I’m sending these pages to A to take a picture of and give to Bobby and AN.
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Observations:



# of people in hut: ~10, including juveniles (we’ve seen more elsewhere so
estimated 50+ here. Boatmen say 250.



Language: lots of high pitched sounds with [b] [p], [L], and [s] heard. Couldn’t
quite get any words. Insults are probably exchanged a lot. Did not seem to
understand Jarawa words I said.



Gestures: Arms in the air = unarmed, friendly Pointing with hand/finger(?) =
pointing a location Arrows in bow = ready to shoot you



Scenery Environment: Beautiful cove, all mostly dead coral but clear and dead coral
bottom. Sand is white but course. There’s an amazing surf break at the South part
of the entrance to the cove – Saw 3 perfect sets of 4-6 foot high swells barreling the
wh 200yds or so.



Ruined hut and dugouts points to a cultural practice. It could also be from poachers
as I have seen numerous rocky coral that juts out of the cove having lines (thick)
wrapped around them.
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If they see something they like, they’ll take it (by force if necessary). I wonder how
many other folks have given them something. And if they feel like it is expected or
due them?

Watching the sunset and it’s beautiful – crying a bit … wondering if it’ll be the last sunset
I see before being in the place where the sun never sets. Tearing up a little.
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God, I don’t want to die. WHO WILL TAKE MY PLACE if I do? OH GOD I miss my
parents, my mom and my dad and Brian and Mary and Norah and Jeremy and Jude and
Jennifer and Seth and Bobby (even though he was just here!) and Christian and Someone
I can talk to and be understood. None of the guys on the boat know much English and I
don’t know how much Hindi or K to ask their opinions and to tell stuff like this to.

I’ve never felt this much grief or sorrow before. WHY! Why did a little kid have to shoot
me today? His high pitched voice still lingers in my head. Father, forgive him and any of
the people on this island who try to kill me, and especially forgive them if they succeed?
What made them become this defensive and hostile? Legends passed down through the
millenia of their escape from a slave ship? Why does this beautiful place have to have so
much death here? Last night, I had what I’d call a vision as I’ve never had one before – my
eyes were shut but I wasn’t asleep and I saw a purple hue over an island-like city as a
meteorite or star fell to it
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and it was a frightening city with jagged spires and I felt distressed. Then a different light,
a whitish light filled it and all the frightening bits melted away. LORD is this island Satan’s
last stronghold where none have heard or even had a chance to hear Your name?

LORD strengthen me as I need Your strength and protection and guidance and all that You
give and are. Whoever comes after me to take my place, whether it’s after tomorrow or
another time, please give them a double anointing and bless them mightily.

The plan for tomorrow is to drop me at the cache and then the boat will leave for the day,
returning at night – I’m at peace with that plan because A) Pieter V. from South Africa had
said the reason the Jarawa didn’t kill him was that he got dropped with no boat nearby and
B) if it goes badly on foot, the fishermen won’t have to bear witness to my death.

Alternative … is to either wait another time and go back to Port Blair without any
documents and stay in the safehouse again and put all at [illegible] (why are we so afraid
of death?) or get deported. If I leave, I believe I’ll have failed the mission.
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Now that I remember it, after I got shot by the arrow and it was in my Bible, I gave it back!
Man, I should have snapped it.
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Perfect LOVE casts out fear. LORD Jesus, fill me with Your perfect love for these people!

11/16/18
0620

Woke up after a fairly restful sleep, heading to island now. I hope this isn’t my last noted
but if it is, to God be the glory.

One thought occurred to me last night: only young adults were seen, and kids, but no elderly
– are they separated and must stay on the shore? Are the elderly in the jungle?

I’m heading back to the hut I’ve been to. Praying it goes well.
– John Chau

Page 12
Alex – I’m so grateful to you and to your simple obedience to God, and how you’ve served
this mission with your best. I think I might die – tomorrow even (see previous entries to
see why) and I wish I could have had more time to express my thanks to you. I’m proud of
you Bro and I pray that you will never love anything in this world more than you love
Christ. Stay strong, keep the good faith, and may your life be continually filled with His
grace and peace and mercy. I’ll see you again bro – and remember, the first one to heaven,
wins.
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Much love and to God Alone Be the Glory.

P.S. Please send all pages of the journal entries to Bobby and tell him to forward to the
[illegible] update to All Nations:

“I got shot by an arrow yesterday that was stopped by my Bible, but this particular contact
trip had gone well until then – and it was an adolescent (pre-pubescent) that had shot me.
Trying again tomorrow (11/16/18).”

Page 13
Brian and Mary and Mom and Dad,

You guys might think I’m crazy in all this but I think it’s worth it to declare Jesus to these
people. Please do not be angry at them or at God if I get killed – rather please live your
lives in obedience to whatever He has called you to and I’ll see you again when you pass
through the veil. Don’t retrieve my body. This is not a pointless thing – the eternal lives of
this tribe is at hand and I can’t wait to see them around the throne of God worshipping in
their own language as Revelation 7:9-10 states.

I love you all and I pray none of you love anything in this world more than Jesus Christ.

Soli Deo Gloria,
John Chau
[Signature]
174

11/16/18 0620
Written from the cove on the southwest-ish (more like west) of North Sentinel Island.
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